


THE MILITARY REFORM IN THE VICEROYALTY OF PERU,  
1762-1800

By  
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TO J.E.A., S.P.A., AND A.A.C.  
WHO PUSHED, PAID, AND PULLED, RESPECTIVELY

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release my wife and children from their vows of perpetual silence while I am typing.

While praise may be distributed widely, blame cannot. I assume all responsibility for errors of fact and interpretation contained in the manuscript.

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## A NOTE ON CITATIONS

The research for this dissertation was done in four principal archives: the Archivo General de las Indias in Seville, Spain (hereinafter cited as AGI), the Archivo Nacional, Lima (hereinafter cited as ANL), the Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley (hereinafter cited as BL) and the Biblioteca Nacional, Lima (hereinafter cited as BNL). In order to facilitate citing these sources, abbreviations will be used. The name of the archive will be immediately followed by a colon and the name of the ramo (section) of the archive where the particular document is to be found. The abbreviations for these are as follows:

AC - Audiencia de Cuzco  
AL - Audiencia de Lima  
IG - Indiferente General  
RA - Real Audiencia  
RH - Real Hacienda  
RTC - Real Tribunal del Consulado  
TM - Tribunal Militar

The ramo is followed by the number of the volume in which the document was found. Wherever possible, this number is followed by the number of the expediente (item or document) itself, although in many instances these were unnumbered. In this case, the document is identified by the names of the correspondents, the location, the date and the page numbers.

For example, a letter from Viceroy Manuel de Amat to José de Gálvez, Lima, January 12, 1775, which was located in the Archivo General de las Indias in Section Audiencia de Lima, volume 1490, would

be cited as AGI:AL 1490 Amat to Gálvez, Lima, January 12, 1775.

Particular titles are enclosed in quotation marks and cited exactly as they appeared.

Source: John Preston Moore, The CabiIdo in Peru  
under the Bourbons (Durham, N.C., 1966),  
facing p. 252.





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By

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During the seventeenth century the defense of the Spanish empire in America was in the hands of regular army troops sent from Spain and stationed in the presidios or garrisons located along the frontiers of the several viceroyalties. The decisive defeat of Spain at the hands of Great Britain during the Seven Years War (1756-1763) demonstrated the inadequacy of these presidial troops to defend such a vast region and led to a major reorganization of the New World armies. This reorganization of the military comprised one of a series of measures known collectively as the Bourbon Reforms in honor of their creator, the Bourbon monarch Charles III.

The intention of the Spanish crown was to replace these garrison troops with battalions raised in the colonies themselves in an effort to better defend against future attacks. In addition, a militia was to

be created on a regional basis and disciplined by veteran command and staff groups which were to provide them with periodic training. While this approach was successful in New Spain, the immense size of the Viceroyalty of Peru prevented its effective implementation there. The distance between towns and cities and the rural nature of the kingdom meant that the militia in Peru were too widely dispersed to operate as tactical units during wartime. Moreover, the lack of whites in these highland regions made the Spanish authorities reluctant to grant commissions as officers to mixed bloods, whose loyalty to the crown was frequently suspect. The discipline of the militia broke down because militia commissions were instead granted to the creole nobility in Lima who rarely, if ever, travelled to the provinces to inspect their companies.

A decade of Indian rebellion, beginning with the Tupac Amaru revolt in 1780, forced the eventual disbanding of the interior militia except in certain large cities such as Cuzco where bodies of urban militia remained as a form of civil guard. Thereafter a disciplined militia in Peru was retained only along the coast. This reduction in the size of the militia and of the fijo battalions that had been raised in the colonies, combined with the arrival of two veteran regiments from Spain in 1786, signified a return to the traditional form of defense, and was a tacit admission that the military reform had failed.

Further limitations were placed upon the military reform by the disruptive visitation of José Antonio de Areche and the creation of the Viceroyalty of the La Plata in 1776 which removed the silver mines of

Charcas from Peru's jurisdiction. To replace this source of revenue, tax levels were increased in Peru which provoked further disturbances. Efforts to collect a "military contribution" to pay the salaries of veteran training cadres were defeated by militia resistance. Embroiled in a long series of European wars, Peru was forced to restrict its army to the defense of Lima and certain other large cities along the coast.

The failure of the Army of Peru to achieve the power and prestige which a successful reform might have brought about caused it also to be unable to assert its fuero militar, or privileged military jurisdiction, at the expense of civil authority as the Army of New Spain was able to do. Although creoles by 1800 monopolized both the regular and militia components of the Army of Peru, they were a conservative and internally divided group. In addition, the military was split over the issue of pardo or Negro military privileges, and opposed by a powerful civil jurisdiction which was exercised by men of wealth and prestige in the community. In Lima, courts were unwilling to grant the military special privileges since they were not considered to be the defenders of the kingdom. The viceroy himself enforced a strict code of military justice. In Peru the military reform was largely abortive and the army never succeeded in becoming a corporate interest group. Not until the wars for independence did anything resembling a praetorian tradition take hold in Peru.

## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study of the reform of the Army of Peru which took place during the period 1762-1796 under the auspices of the Bourbon Kings Charles III and his son Charles IV and which constituted one of the group of measures collectively known as the Bourbon Reforms.

This study specifically is intended to help fill three important historical needs. First, it offers additional information regarding the Viceroyalty of Peru during a critical epoch in its history. Peru was the oldest and wealthiest of Spain's possessions in South America, but unfortunately it has never received the historical attention commensurate with its importance to the empire. Moreover, studies of colonial Peru bear the marks of passion and bias. Jorge Basadre, perhaps Peru's greatest living historian, has explained this phenomenon in terms of the "civil war" which he feels has raged in his country between those scholars who defend Spain's actions and those who downgrade them in favor of the Indian cultures which the Spanish displaced. Such a polemic, he maintains, has made the writing of objective colonial history practically impossible.<sup>1</sup> The eighteenth century--sandwiched between the dramatic events of conquest and independence which flank it on either side--has been seriously neglected in this regard. This period deserves a better fate. Not only does it embrace the precursors of independence such as José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, the Indian rebel whose

revolt in 1780 was the most significant challenge to royal authority of the century, but also other important events such as the Bourbon Reforms, which historians only recently have come to regard as crucial to a full understanding of the independence period which follows.<sup>2</sup>

The second purpose of this work is to shed additional light on these reforms which have not been studied as a whole at this writing. The military reorganization is especially pertinent in this regard, since it touched upon and was affected by several other Bourbon reform measures, including the expulsion of the Jesuits, the creation of the La Plata Viceroyalty, the intendant system, and many of the fiscal actions intended to produce additional revenue.

Finally, the study will examine the growth of the military corporation in Peru. The author is interested in determining if the stated purposes of reforming the institution were achieved or not, and the consequences of such a reform. Few other studies of the military during this period exist.<sup>3</sup> Without them the assumption that all royal laws were applied and executed uniformly throughout the empire tends to be perpetuated by default. This study attempts to demonstrate that in fact such was not the case. Often the historical realities of each region imposed changes which led to the creation of military institutions which varied greatly in terms of size, composition, and function. These differences often assume an important role in understanding the subsequent histories of the areas in question, and should be recognized for this reason.

The significance of the Bourbon Reforms lies in the fact that they sought to effect a complete fiscal and administrative renovation

of the Spanish empire in America. To help achieve these purposes, jurisdictional boundaries within the empire were redrawn to increase efficiency, and administrators known as intendants were dispatched from Spain to apply precedents which had been successful earlier in France. Capable administrators known as visitors-general were sent out to investigate current conditions and to implement the reform program. Measures were also taken to insure internal security including the expulsion in 1767 of the powerful Society of Jesus, which the crown regarded as subversive.

In 1778 a "free trade" regulation was passed which was designed to increase economic growth by permitting expanded trade within the colonies themselves and with the Peninsula. Efforts were made to stimulate colonial industries such as tobacco and brandy manufactures by converting them into royal monopolies. Measures designed to increase royal revenues were central to the Bourbon program because of Spain's constant involvement in European wars. Duties were placed upon many colonial products formerly excluded from payment, and levels of sales taxes and tributes were increased. Scientific missions from Europe were dispatched to factories and mines to apply technological advances and thereby increase productivity.

The underlying reason behind all of these measures was to strengthen the empire in order that it might defend itself from external aggression and bear its fair share of the expenses of such defense. As historian R. A. Humphreys has stated

The reasons for these striking innovations were, in the broadest sense of the word, strategic. Efficiency in administration, the rehabilitation of colonial trade, were not so much ends

in themselves as means to an end; and the end was colonial defense, the protection of the empire against foreign aggression, particularly English aggression.<sup>4</sup>

Such a purpose dictated that the size and quality of the small colonial armies be improved.

The proposed military reform consisted of four major parts. First, a series of new fortifications were to be built and older ones improved in order to protect the shipping and populations of the coastal port cities. Secondly, the quality of the Spanish regular forces serving in the garrisons throughout America was to be upgraded. Third, additional regular troops, known as fijo (fixed), or permanent battalions were to be raised within the colonies themselves. Finally, a militia was to be raised and disciplined in order that it could bear the major share of colonial defense. The relative importance of this militia increased after the Spanish defeat in the Seven Years War (1756-1763), since money was less available to construct fortifications or to raise additional regular troops. Instead of garrisoning the colonies with veteran troops as it had formerly done throughout the seventeenth century, Spain sent out veteran command and staff groups from the Peninsula to train and discipline these militia. Taken together, these four measures were intended to create the first modern armies in Spanish America.

The several chapters of the dissertation are designed to illustrate the stages through which the reform program passed and the changes which circumstances imposed upon it. The emphasis throughout is upon the effect which these changes had upon the functionality of the reform itself, or to what degree the stated objectives of the

reform were achieved. Chapter I offers an overview of the defenses of the Viceroyalty of Peru immediately prior to the reform in order that the reader can better evaluate the changes which occurred thereafter. Chapter II describes the impact of the Seven Years War upon Spanish military policy. The war itself provoked two measures, one of which was an initial mobilization of forces at the time of Spain's entrance into the war in 1762. The end of the war the following year caused this mobilization to be tentative and provisional in nature but the stinging defeat which Spain had suffered at the hands of Great Britain created the preconditions for a thoroughgoing reform of the army instituted in 1766 by the Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Junient and designed to avert continued British intrusion into the empire. One of the leading historians of this period has claimed that this reform "militarized" Peru, enabling it to withstand the serious challenges of Indian revolt during the following decades, and to hold back the movement for independence after the turn of the century.<sup>5</sup> Archival research indicates, however, that this interpretation is dangerously misleading and that certain features of the reform itself might have actually helped to provoke these later events.

Chapter III treats the third stage of the reform which coincided with the arrival in Peru of the Visitor-General José Antonio de Areche in 1777. His counterpart in New Spain, José de Gálvez, had initiated a series of measures in that region which materially aided the success of the Bourbon reform program. The different experience of Areche in Peru demonstrates that personality conflicts and economic circumstances



were to affect the outcome of the visitation, the military reform program, and even the future of the viceroyalty itself. Moreover, it also points up the fact that often the reform programs did not constitute a harmonious whole. Both the creation of the La Plata Viceroyalty and the emergency fiscal measures initiated by Areche actually worked at cross purposes with the military reform, preventing its full implementation and altering its course. This factor has not previously been considered in assessments of the success and significance of the Bourbon Reforms. This chapter introduces several documents which illustrate that the reformed militia played an important part in defeating these fiscal reforms and in at least one instance provided a model of successful resistance to royal authority which was utilized by the leaders of the indigenous rebellions shortly thereafter. This constitutes a reinterpretation of the events of the period, and of their significance within the context of reform.

Chapter IV describes the Indian rebellions which provided the first true test of the effectiveness of the military reform, and which led to an important reorientation of the program after 1784.

Chapter V describes the culmination of the military reform which took place between 1784 and 1796. Here it will be shown that changes resulted from the Indian wars which caused the composition, location and mission of the Army of Peru to be altered. Such changes raise the questions of whether the purposes stated at the time of its formation had in fact been achieved, or whether a quite different institution had been created by the end of the century. And if it had, what the consequences of this were.

Chapter VI deals with the expanded military privileges which accompanied the reform program. These privileges, or fueros, included the right of soldiers to be tried by their military tribunals rather than the ordinary, or royal jurisdiction. Historian Lyle N. McAlister, in a book on the subject, holds that such privileges were abused in New Spain and that members of the army, notably the militia, utilized them to undermine the prestige and authority of the representatives of the king. He offers this as one explanation for the disintegration of Spanish government in New Spain after 1808, and for the creation of a praetorian tradition in that country.<sup>6</sup> This chapter will present several cases which illustrate the extent to which the Army of Peru was also able to become an effective corporate interest group, and offer some hypotheses regarding its ability to operate in this fashion. Finally a conclusion will summarize the findings of these chapters and offer some hypotheses regarding their significance.

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Jorge Basadre, Meditaciones sobre el destino histórico del Perú (Lima, 1947), p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> R. A. Humphreys and John Lynch (eds.), The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New York, 1965).

<sup>3</sup> Allan James Kuethe, "The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 1773-1796," doctoral dissertation, University of Florida (Gainesville, 1967); Colonel Juan Beverina (ret.), El virreinato de las provincias del Río de la Plata, su organización militar (Buenos Aires, 1935).

<sup>4</sup> R. A. Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt in Latin America (London, 1969), p. 78.

<sup>5</sup> Manuel de Amat y Junient, Memoria de Gobierno, Edición y estudio preliminar de Vicente Rodríguez Casado y Florentino Pérez Embid (Seville, 1949), p. lli.

<sup>6</sup> Lyle N. McAlister, The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Gainesville, 1957), pp. 15, 89.

## 1. THE DEFENSES OF PERU AT MIDCENTURY

The defense of the Viceroyalty of Peru had always been severely restricted by factors of geography and demography. In addition, Peru's isolation, maintained by the treacherous Cape Horn passage, prevented the need for a large standing army. By the middle of the eighteenth century this situation was rapidly changing. Navigational improvements reduced the hazards of the passage and English seaborne expeditions began to appear with increasing frequency, while Indian uprisings also proliferated.

The Viceroyalty of Peru in the eighteenth century embraced a huge area of approximately 2,300,000 square miles, more than ten times the size of Spain itself.<sup>1</sup> The viceroy in Lima held ultimate control over the districts of Tucumán, Paraguay, and Buenos Aires, also, but due to the great distance from Lima they were practically autonomous and will not be considered as part of the viceroyalty for the purposes of this study. Peru was divided into the judicial districts of Charcas, Chile, and Lima. The Audiencia of Charcas, or Upper Peru, exercised practical jurisdiction over the districts of Buenos Aires, Paraguay, and Tucumán to the east. The control of the viceroy over Chile to the south was limited to "grave and important matters" such as defense, and as such it will be included in this study, although in fact the president of that audiencia was relatively autonomous due to the formidable geographic barriers separating it from Lima. The Audiencia

of Lima, stretching along the coast from Piura to the Atacama desert to the south and eastward across the Andes to the Brazilian frontier (roughly the configuration of present-day Peru), was the immediate concern of the viceroy, although he bore ultimate responsibility for practically the entire subcontinent.<sup>2</sup>

Although the viceroy in Lima was the most powerful Spanish authority in South America, the geographical barriers which afflict this region severely limited the exercise of this power. The coastline of Peru stretches out some 1400 miles. For the most part it is barren desert, save for a few rivers which traverse it at certain points. Behind this desert is located the sierra and the formidable Andes mountain range which rises to heights of twenty thousand feet. Past the eastern peaks of the Andes lie the montaña and the selva (jungle) regions which extend to the Brazilian frontier.<sup>3</sup> Such geographic diversity has prevented the development of internal communications. Due to the seaborne nature of the Spanish American empire, most of the cities of colonial Peru were located among the coastal desert near the rivers which emptied into the sea and allowed agriculture to be established. The largest of these was the capital of Lima, "The City of the Kings," which by 1755 had an estimated population of 54,000, excluding Negro slaves and Indians. The other cities of Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa were located along the western sierra, at heights up to thirteen thousand feet. Northern and eastern Peru was practically uninhabited except by Indians.<sup>4</sup>

By midcentury the viceroyalty had an estimated population of 3.5 million people, the majority of whom were Indians inhabiting

the montaña and sierra regions.<sup>5</sup> A midcentury estimate of the Indian population of Peru sets their number at approximately 2.5 million.<sup>6</sup> While there are no accurate figures for Peru as a whole, the population estimates of Lima tell us something about the ethnic composition of the viceroyalty in general. Generally speaking, the coast was a Negroid area. The Spanish naval lieutenants Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa felt that Negroes and mulattos constituted the largest single group in Lima, working mostly as muleteers and agricultural laborers.<sup>7</sup> They estimated that the mestizos (a mixture of Indian and white) formed the second largest group.<sup>8</sup> These people tended to populate the sierra region, often employed as small tradesmen. The number of whites in Lima and elsewhere was particularly small in relation to the other races. The number of Peninsulares, or Spaniards born in Spain who owned property in Lima, has been estimated at 1,811. The total number of whites in Lima, including creoles or Spaniards born in Peru, has been estimated at between 15,000 and 18,000.<sup>9</sup> Although many of these had been ruined as the direct result of a violent earthquake which struck the city on October 28, 1746, a wealthy upper class, rich in real property and slaves, managed to maintain itself throughout the century.<sup>10</sup> These isolated cities, ruled by a provincial elite, and the geographic barriers which separated them prevented any centralized administration of the viceroyalty and produced a regionalism which is still prevalent in Peru today.<sup>11</sup>

The Pacific coast location of the Viceroyalty of Peru had granted that kingdom an isolation which had not been afforded to

Spain's circum-Caribbean colonies. The rigors of the Cape Horn passage tended to deter large expeditions which might assault its shores. By midcentury, however, navigational improvements such as the quadrant and the astrolabe had reduced the hazards of such a crossing and had ended two centuries of splendid isolation. Proof of this was to come with the invasion of Admiral George Anson in 1741.

English and French corsairs had frequently sailed off of the coast of Peru during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries but had done little actual damage due to their small number. But historian Jorge Basadre feels that

Only the absence of a common plan among all the freebooters, the distance of Peru from their bases, the contrary winds, and the internal dissension, saved Peru from worse depredations.<sup>12</sup>

This assertion is buttressed by the secret testimony of Juan and Ulloa, who reported to the king that the expedition commanded by the English Admiral George Anson which had captured the port of Païta in northern Peru would undoubtedly have been able to capture Lima also except for the fact that losses suffered in rounding the Horn had reduced his force to two ships and only 500 men. Even so, Anson had captured Païta and forced its ransom by the viceroy. Juan and Ulloa stressed to the crown that, as a result of the expedition, Great Britain had gathered sufficient geographical information about the Peruvian coast to mount an effective invasion of the viceroyalty in the future.<sup>13</sup> In addition, the earthquake of 1746 had affected the fertility of the soil in Peru which forced it to import wheat and other foodstuffs from Chile.<sup>14</sup> This made it very vulnerable to a blockade by sea which could possibly have forced the surrender of Lima through starvation.

By midcentury only the Andes provided the coastal cities of Peru with any sort of internal barrier against the depredations of the hostile Indians who inhabited the montaña and selva regions. This defense had its limitations, however, since there were numerous passes throughout the western cordillera where these Indians could penetrate and raid the small settlements of Tarma and Jauja to the east of Lima. In 1742 an Indian cacique (chief) of Cuzco, Juan Santos Atahualpa, rose in rebellion against the crown and proclaimed himself King of the Andes.<sup>15</sup> Local militia were raised in the Cuzco region to put down the uprising but their efforts were unsuccessful due to a lack of discipline, organization, and training.<sup>16</sup> In 1745 Viceroy José Antonio Manso de Velasco dispatched a force of 100 regular troops from Lima under the command of General José de Llamas to subdue the rebels. A combination of bad weather, epidemics, difficult terrain, and ineptitude defeated the efforts of this expedition. Juan Santos and his followers used guerrilla tactics to perfection, keeping to the high ground, and never allowing themselves to be drawn into a pitched battle with the Spanish forces.<sup>17</sup> For thirteen years Juan Santos raided the small towns in the Tarma-Jauja area and was never captured. His success was dramatic proof of the inability of the Army of Peru by midcentury to maintain the internal security of the viceroyalty.

The composition of the Spanish colonial armies can be divided into two groups, regulars and militia. The first of these were regular Spanish army troops which were sent out to man the frontier garrisons



which dotted the coasts and borders of the various viceroyalties. By midcentury this component numbered only 1,553 men (see Table 1). The second, or militia, component was separated into two classes, provincial and urban, modelled after the militia of Spain. The first of these was organized after the thirty-three infantry regiments which had been formed in the thirty-three provinces of Castile. It was frequently referred to as "disciplined" militia due to the fact it possessed a standard table of organization, a veteran training cadre, and regular instruction in tactics and the handling of arms. Urban militia, on the other hand, possessed none of these attributes. They were merely ad hoc bodies which were sponsored by guilds or corporations within the larger towns and cities. In general they were raised during periods of immediate emergency to defend the city from attack.<sup>18</sup>

The omnipresent danger of corsairs required that garrisons be maintained along the coast of Chile and Peru. The southern port of Valdivia was garrisoned with an infantry battalion numbering 315 men and a cavalry battalion of 185. The islands of Chiloe and Juan Fernandez off of the Chilean coast were also garrisoned due to the safe harbor they offered to expeditions which had rounded the Cape. Chiloe had infantry and dragoon companies numbering ninety-four men, while Juan Fernandez had an infantry company with forty-five. The capital of Santiago and its port of Valparaiso were guarded by a forty-four man dragoon company and a fifty-three man artillery company respectively.<sup>19</sup>

The interior of the viceroyalty had no formal garrisons until the Juan Santos rebellion of 1742. The failure of General Llamas to

TABLE 1  
THE ARMY OF PERU, 1760

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Regulars

Lima	
Cavalry	
Company of the Viceregal Guard	160
Halberdier Guard of the Viceroy	62
Companies of the Callao Garrison	100
Callao	
Royal Regiment of Lima	272
Tarma	
Companies of Infantry and Cavalry	156
Jauja	
Company of Infantry	67
Valdivia	
Battalion of Infantry	315
Battalion of Cavalry	185
Chiloe	
Company of Infantry	47
Company of Dragoons	47
Juan Fernandez	
Company of Infantry	45
Santiago-Valparaiso	
Company of Dragoons	44
Company of Artillery	53
Total Regulars	<hr/> 1,553

Urban Militia\*

Lima

    Infantry

TABLE 1 (cont.)

---

Regiment of Commerce	299
Twelve Companies of Spaniards	1,113
Eighteen Companies of Indians	900
Six Companies of pardos	300
Eight Companies of morenos	<u>392</u>
Total Infantry Militia	3,004
Cavalry	
Eight Companies of Spaniards	443
Three Companies of Indians	150
Eight Companies of pardos	453
Seven Companies of morenos	<u>100</u>
Total Cavalry Militia	1,146

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Source: AGI:AL 1490, "Extracto de la revista que el Marqués de Torretagle, Comisario de Guerra . . . dirige en el 1 de Diciembre de 1758 a la tropa de Ynfantería . . . que sirve en el Presidio del Callao . . .," Callao, December 1, 1758, p. 1; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 497-498, 500-501, 661-662, 668-669; Memoria del virrey Manso de Velasco, p. 104; Juan and Ulloa, Voyage, p. 183.

\*Viceroy Manso de Velasco does not cite figures for urban militia in the other towns of the viceroyalty besides Lima. The fact that he does not indicates that their strength was subject to considerable variation. The strengths given should be regarded as estimates at best since there was no way of accurately determining them. Memoria del virrey Manso de Velasco, p. 284.

capture the Indian rebel convinced the viceroy that expeditions sent from Lima could not expect to defeat well-organized guerrilla bands and that permanent fortifications would have to be erected to protect Spanish settlers in the area.<sup>20</sup> In 1746 a presidio was built in Jauja and another in Tarma. An infantry company of sixty-seven men was sent to the former, while the latter was provided companies of cavalry and infantry totalling 156 men. A cavalry detachment was established in the town of Santa Cruz de la Sierra to traverse the frontier to warn of impending attacks. The majority of these troops were local recruits supplemented by regular forces from the Callao garrison.<sup>21</sup> The viceroy was pessimistic about the future of these garrisons however. To his mind only the Church could ever effectively pacify the Indians.<sup>22</sup>

The fortress of Callao, the port city of Lima, was in a total state of disrepair at midcentury, mirroring the general inattention to defense which characterized the period. During the 1746 earthquake a tidal wave had engulfed the city, destroying the fort and killing practically all of the inhabitants of the garrison.<sup>23</sup> Viceroy Manso de Velasco dedicated himself to the task of rebuilding the fortress but was unsuccessful due to a lack of men, money, and matériel.<sup>24</sup> Although the new fortress, christened "Real Felipe" in honor of King Phillip V, was begun in January of 1747, it was still unfinished when Viceroy Manuel de Amat arrived to replace Velasco. He wryly noted that the "fortress" consisted of

nothing more than a simple outer wall which was unsuitable for mounting cannon, and that it seemed to serve the purpose of confining the soldiers better than of protecting the kingdom.<sup>25</sup>

Actually, the mounting of cannon would have done little to improve the situation, since the mouth of the Callao harbor was wide and placed invading ships out of the range of the cannons. The judgment of Juan and Ulloa that the fortress was inadequate to deter an enemy attack still was valid a decade after midcentury.<sup>26</sup>

The prescribed strength of the veteran garrison at Callao was seven infantry companies of 100 men each and a seventy-man artillery company.<sup>27</sup> It is doubtful if this strength had ever been maintained, even prior to the 1746 earthquake. The French voyager Amadée Frezier, writing earlier in the century, noted that the garrison was never at full strength, and that there were scarcely enough soldiers there to mount the guard.<sup>28</sup> This view was confirmed by the incoming Viceroy Manso de Velasco in 1745, who described the battalion as "nine companies without fixed number, and with many useless members, and other (places) given secretly to those who ought not to hold them."<sup>29</sup>

The fraud and corruption in the sale of military ranks was but one manifestation of a general malaise which pervaded Peru by midcentury.<sup>30</sup> Service in the garrisons of America was not popular with Spanish regular troops since promotion was often slower in areas farthest removed from the crown. Most odious of all was service in the presidio of Valdivia due to the presence

of the fierce Araucanian Indians. Each year a veteran company was dispatched from the Callao garrison, but because of the high rate of desertion, it became necessary for military officials to enlist local recruits to fill the ranks. Juan and Ulloa had estimated that no more than one-quarter of the soldiers in the Callao garrison were Spanish, the rest presumably being local conscripts.<sup>31</sup> The situation became increasingly worse each year since the governors of underpopulated areas such as Valdivia often granted these soldiers military discharges in an effort to retain them as permanent residents. This forced further local recruitment to fill the ranks to strength.<sup>32</sup>

Often service in the infantry battalion at Callao was performed for the benefits which accrued from it. Consequently, positions in the battalion were purchased at high prices. Juan and Ulloa remarked to the King that

It is very common [for] all those officers and even [field] marshals, who work in the mechanical trades of [Lima], such as silversmiths, painters, shoemakers, tailors, and similar positions, to come from Lima to enroll, be it in the artillery, or in the infantry, not with the purpose of serving, but only to enjoy the privileged military jurisdiction, and by this means to free themselves from the persecutions of the constables, or from some small fines of other justices; thus, they find it convenient to turn over all the pay from the position to the principal officer to whom the rank corresponds, retaining only the privileged title of soldier or artillerymen. When the situation of holding a review arises, they are always advised in time, and are all completely present so that never a man is lacking. So it is that not over twenty-five or thirty [soldiers] are actually in service, and all the rest are those who commit the fraud.<sup>33</sup>

The normal procedure was for the aspirant to the position to give a present to the company commander, after which the two would bargain as to the percentage of the monthly pay which the former

would turn over to the latter in exchange for the privilege of holding rank. This amount varied depending upon the rank to be filled and the number of applicants. Since pay in the artillery company was higher than in that of the infantry companies, positions in it were the most highly prized.<sup>34</sup>

Viceroy Manso de Velasco recognized the shortcomings of the Callao battalion and made some effort to improve its organization. These efforts, however, were insufficient to overcome a century of inertia. At the request of Velasco, the crown issued its approval of a plan to draw up a new regulation covering the Callao garrison. On July 1, 1753, the Reglamento para la Guarnición del Callao was published in Lima. The regulation renamed the unit as the Regiment of Royal Infantry of Lima, and reduced its size to a battalion of seven infantry companies and an artillery squadron with a total strength of 421 men.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, it seems that the regiment was frequently understrength.<sup>36</sup>

One hundred soldiers from the Callao garrison were quartered in the viceregal palace in Lima for the protection of the viceroy. In addition to guarding the palace these troops provided guards for the royal treasury, the mint, and the tobacco monopoly warehouse. Detachments also patrolled the city at night to suppress civil disturbances.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore nothing seems to have been done about the more serious lack of training which prevailed at Callao. Upon his arrival, Viceroy Amat remarked that "The few soldiers that were regulars lacked the training in the military exercises that they ought to have had."<sup>38</sup>

As a royal personage the viceroy enjoyed the services of a viceregal guard comprised of a company of cavalry and one of halberdiers. These companies were composed of Spaniards who were personally selected by the viceroy himself and great prestige was attached to such service. The cavalry company consisted of 160 soldiers, a lieutenant, and a captain. Fifty-three supernumeraries were available for ceremonial occasions. The company of halberdiers numbered sixty-two soldiers, a lieutenant and a captain.<sup>39</sup> The viceroy also retained the services of an honorary company known as the Spanish Guard which accompanied him on public excursions to lend dignity to his office.<sup>40</sup> The functions of the Viceroy's Guard, besides the protection of the viceroy himself, were to aid royal officials in the collection of taxes and in the enforcement of the decisions of the royal courts. Viceroy Manso de Velasco attached a higher significance to this guard than to any other unit within the viceroyalty because of these duties calling it "the principal respect of the government."<sup>41</sup>

The second component of the colonial armies was the militia, which has been defined as "citizen soldiers" who are organized into units and trained in times of national emergency to reinforce the regular units.<sup>42</sup> In Peru, as in the other Spanish possessions in America, no provincial or disciplined militia in the formal sense of the word existed by midcentury. What militia companies did exist had been raised in the larger interior towns such as Tarma, Jauja, Cuzco, and Arequipa in response to specific



emergencies such as the Juan Santos rebellion. These, however, were merely ad hoc bodies which dispersed when the danger had passed. In a sense they constituted private armies which came into being in response to the inability of the crown to protect the settlers of these rural areas.<sup>43</sup>

Along the coast the formation of urban militia units was somewhat more organized since the cities were larger and some continuity was provided by the frequent threat of seaborne invasion. In general these urban companies were sponsored by one of the local trade guilds or municipal corporations and were designed to act as a sort of civil guard. In Callao, for example, there were seven companies: one of seamen, one of residents and tradesmen, a third of master carpenters, caulkers, and shipfitters, including the free Negroes who worked in the naval yards. In addition, there were four companies of Indians drawn from the suburbs of Magdalena, Miraflores, and Chorrillos, whose job it was to transport provisions and ammunition to the presidio at Callao in the event of an attack by a foreign power.<sup>44</sup>

The infantry militia of Lima was organized according to race or trade in accordance with established tradition. The Regiment of Commerce was sponsored by the consulado or merchants' guild. The regiment was composed of six companies, totalling 299 men, each composed of members of a particular guild, including tailors, shoemakers, silversmiths, and artisans. The Spaniards in Lima formed their own regiment totalling 1,113 men, raised in the

several districts of the city. In addition, there were eighteen companies of Indians numbering 900 men, six companies of pardos (anyone containing Negro blood) with 300, and eight companies of morenos (pure-blooded Negroes) with 392 men. In addition, Lima had a cavalry regiment including eight companies of Spaniards totalling 443 men, three companies of Indians with 150, eight companies of pardos with 453 men, and seven companies of morenos numbering 100 men total. Viceroy Manso de Velasco claimed that seventy-six companies of militia totalling 4,150 men existed in Lima by midcentury (see Table 1).<sup>45</sup>

In conclusion, it would seem that the Army of Peru was incapable of defending the kingdom from attack midway through the eighteenth century. In part the immense geography and small population acted to defeat any attempt at maintaining internal security as the unsuccessful expedition against Juan Santos had conclusively proven. Secondly, the small veteran contingents, located on the coast, were too scattered and understrength to have formed an effective tactical unit capable of taking the field to repel an enemy invasion. As the Frenchman Frezier, referring to the garrisons in Chile, said

What may be said in general of the strength of the Spaniards in that Country is that their Military power is composed of Men who are much scatter'd about, not disciplin'd, and ill arm'd . . . the Spaniards have no Fortifications in their Lands where they may secure themselves, unless they fly to the Mountains . . .<sup>46</sup>

Much of what has been said about the Spanish regular forces in Peru can be repeated about the militia. The sacking and ransom of Paita

by Admiral Anson was proof, not only of their ineffectiveness to repel a foreign invader, but also that any attempt to call them onto active duty for any length of time would bankrupt the royal treasury.<sup>47</sup> By midcentury, European travellers had reported this weakness to their heads of state. Frezier dispelled the rumor that the Viceroy of Peru could raise 100,000 foot soldiers and 20,000 cavalry troops. In reality, the Frenchman asserted, he could arm no more than one-fifth this number.<sup>48</sup> Even this was a generous estimate, as was demonstrated during the effort by Viceroy Amat to mobilize the Army of Peru during the Seven Years War. The Army of Peru had been sufficient to protect the major cities from being raided by hostile Indian bands and had generally driven off corsairs. The Anson expedition and the Juan Santos rebellion were preludes to change. With the fall of Havana and Manila to the English Navy during the Seven Years War it became patently evident that a strong, well-organized expeditionary force could possess itself of the Viceroyalty of Peru if the defenses of that region were not drastically improved. Shortly thereafter the Tupac Amaru rebellion demonstrated the further need for a force capable of maintaining peace within the confines of the kingdom itself.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Jean Descola, Daily Life in Colonial Peru, 1710-1820, trans. Michael Heron (London, 1968), p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> Memoria del virrey José Antonio Manso de Velasco, in Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español, III (Lima, 1859), 78, 174-175; Primera parte de la Relación del virey Manuel de Amat y Junient, ibid., IV, 153-154.

<sup>3</sup> Frederick B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (London, 1967), pp. 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Geografía del Peru Virreinal (Lima, 1951), p. 20. This is an annotated republication of the "Descripción geográfica de las provincias que componen los reynos del Perú, Buenos Ayres y Chile, por Dn. Cosme Bueno, catedrático de matemáticas, y cosmógrafo mayor del Peru" (Lima, 1763-1778). Bueno directed a census of Lima for Viceroy Manso de Velasco in 1755.

<sup>5</sup> William S. Robertson, The History of America, in The Works of Wilham Robertson, D.D., 10 vols. (London, 1821), III, 370. Robertson's estimate was extrapolated from tribute records and from sales figures of copies of a papal bull throughout Peru. Later estimates indicate he was too high. A 1796 census set the total population at 1,076,122, while one taken in 1812 estimated 1,509,551 inhabitants.

<sup>6</sup> The Indian population of Peru at any time is still the subject of great debate. Viceroy Manso de Velasco estimated the total Indian population outside of Lima at 1,060,186. Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 79. Robertson utilized the figure of 612,780 tributaries cited by Velasco and multiplied it by four to include women and minor children, arriving at a figure of 2,449,120. History of America, III, 370. Viceroy Manuel de Amat cited 761,696 tributaries in 1776. Memoria de Amat, pp. 235-238. Later census figures indicate that all these figures were too high. Note the racial composition of Peru in 1796 and 1812:

1796

Spaniards (including creoles)	135,755
Indians	608,894
Mestizos	244,436
Free Negroes and mulattos	41,256
Slaves	40,336
Total	1,076,122

1812

Spaniards	178,025
Indians	954,799
Mestizos	287,486
Negro slaves	89,241
Total	1,509,551

Pike, Modern History of Peru, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America, The John Adams translation, abridged, 4th ed. (New York, 1964), p. 195. Juan and Ulloa were two young Spanish naval lieutenants sent out to America on a scientific expedition sponsored by the French Academy of Sciences. They first arrived in Lima in October, 1740, in response to a plea from the viceroy to help devise defenses against the Anson expedition. Their observations during a three-year residence in Lima are among the most informative records of that viceroyalty, first being published in 1748. Perhaps more important were the Noticias secretas de America, intended to inform the king on the social, economic, and political conditions of the "Peruvian Realms." These provided the first documented proof of the conditions which the Bourbon Reforms were intended to upgrade. Published by an Englishman in 1826, they remain the most damning indictment of Spanish rule in the New World.

<sup>8</sup> Juan and Ulloa, Voyage, p. 195. Cosme Bueno estimated there were about 2,000 Indians in Lima in 1755. Valcárcel, Geografía, p. 20.

<sup>9</sup> Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 99. Juan and Ulloa estimated Lima held between 16,000 and 18,000 whites. Voyage, p. 193. Cosme Bueno estimated 18,000 somewhat later. Valcárcel, Geografía, p. 20.

<sup>10</sup> Compare the observations about the upper class of Lima made by Juan and Ulloa, Voyage, pp. 193-195, with those in AGI:IG 1528, "Descripción dialogada de todos los pueblos del Virreinato del Perú," written between 1761 and 1776, and cited in Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires: repercusiones económicas y políticas de la creación del Virreinato del Plata (Seville, 1947), p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 130.

<sup>12</sup> Jorge Basadre, La Multitud, la Ciudad y el Campo en la Historia del Peru, 2nd ed. (Lima, 1947), p. 113.

<sup>13</sup> Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas de América sobre el estado naval, militar, y político de los reynos del Peru y provincias de Quito, costas de Nueva Granada y Chile, 2 vols. in one (London, 1826), I, 27.

<sup>14</sup> Oscar Febres Villarreal, "La crisis agrícola del Perú en el último tercio del siglo XVIII," Revista Histórica, XXVII (Lima, 1964), 102-199, passim.

<sup>15</sup> Francisco Loayza, Juan Santos, El Invencible (Lima, 1942) offers the best overview of this important rebellion.

16 The corregidor of Jauja, the Marqués de Casatorres put the blame upon the authorities in Lima. In a letter to the viceroy he noted that it was an axiom of warfare that "a soldier will not fight, finding himself without uniform, unshod, and unfed." Loayza, Juan Santos, p. 196.

17 Ibid., pp. 75-76, 113-116.

18 A detailed description of Spanish military organization can be found in L. N. McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1767," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIII (February, 1953), 1-32.

19 Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 497-498, 500-501, 661-662, 668-669. Since these are standard tables of organization it can be assumed that none of the garrisons were actually at full strength.

20 Loayza, Juan Santos, pp. 113-114.

21 Ibid., pp. 120-121; Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 104. See AGI:AL 1490, Reglamento para la guarnición de la plaza del Real Felipe, . . . , Lima, July 1, 1758, p. 1, for the classes of troops involved.

22 Memoria de Manso de Velasco, pp. 65, 197.

23 AGI:AL 983, Alfonso de Ortega to Juan de Jecta Santa, Tarma, May 30, 1747, p. 2, cited in Loayza, Juan Santos, p. 117. Other descriptions of the catastrophe which, according to the viceroy, left Lima "materially and formally ruined," and killed some 12,000 persons are to be found in the Memoria de Manso de Velasco, pp. 110-112; Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario histórico-bioográfico del Perú, 11 vols., 2nd ed. (Lima, 1931-1934), VII, 169; A True and Particular Relation of the Dreadful Earthquake which Happen'd at Lima, the Capital of Peru, and the Neighboring Port of Callao, on the 28th of October, 1746, 2nd ed. (London, 1748).

24 Mendiburu, VII, 175.

25 Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. xlviii.

26 Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, 23-27.

27 Ibid., pp. 140-141.

28 Amadée Frezier, cited in A True and Particular Relation, pp. 8-9.

<sup>29</sup> Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 262.

<sup>30</sup> For a critical report on the viceroyalty illustrative of this situation, see the anonymous "Estado político del Reyno del Perú: Gobierno sin leyes, ministros relajados, Tesoros con pobreza, fertilidad sin cultivo, sabiduría desestimada, milicias sin honor, ciudades sin amor patricio, la justicia sin templo, hurtos por comercios, integridad tenida por locura, Rey, el mayor de ricos dominios, pobre de tesoros . . ." (Madrid, 1751?) which has been partially republished in Revista Peruana (Lima, 1880), IV, 147-190, 351-369. Scholars believe its author was Victorino Montero de Aguilá, a Captain of the Halberdier Guard of the Viceroy and a former corregidor of Piura. As an alcalde, or civil magistrate of Lima, Montero reflects the hatred of the creole aristocracy for the Spanish merchant class which was aspiring to positions of importance.

<sup>31</sup> Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, 140.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 142; Boleslao Lewin, Descripción del Virreinato del Perú, Crónica inédita de comienzos del Siglo XVII (Rosario, 1958), p. 70.

<sup>33</sup> Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, 141.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>35</sup> AGI:AL 1040, Reqlamento para la Guarnición del Callao, Lima, July 1, 1753; Memoria de Manso de Velasco, pp. 271-272.

<sup>36</sup> AGI:AL 1490, "Extracto de la revista que el Marques de Torregale, Comisario de Guerra . . . dirige en el 1 de Diciembre de 1758 a la tropa de Ynfantería . . . que sirve en el Presidio del Callao . . .," Callao, December 1, 1758. This review reflects the number of troops detached in Lima, Tarma, and Jauja, whose inclusion would bring the regiment more nearly to strength.

<sup>37</sup> AGI:AL 1490, "Extracto de la revista . . .," Callao, December 1, 1758; Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 283.

<sup>38</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. xlviii.

<sup>39</sup> Juan and Ulloa, Voyage, p. 183.

<sup>40</sup> For the history of this honor guard, see Guillermo Lohmann Villena, "Las Compañías de Gentilshombres Lanzas y Arcabuces de la Guardia del Virreinato del Peru," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XIII (Seville, 1956), 151, 213.

<sup>41</sup> Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 283.

<sup>42</sup> McAlister, "Reorganization," p. 4.

<sup>43</sup>Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Berkeley, 1966), p. 4.

<sup>44</sup>A True and Particular Relation, p. 11.

<sup>45</sup>Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 284.

<sup>46</sup>Amadée Frezier, A Voyage to the South-Sea and along the Coasts of Chili and Peru, in the years 1712, 1713, and 1714 (London, 1717), p. 103.

<sup>47</sup>Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, 121.

<sup>48</sup>A True and Particular Relation, pp. 57-58.



## II. THE MILITARY RESPONSES OF PERU TO THE SEVEN YEARS WAR

Spain's entrance into the Seven Years War on January 22, 1762, provoked the first mobilization of the Army of Peru since 1740. Perhaps more importantly, it forced the creation of a large body of urban militia in Lima, and, to a lesser extent, in the outlying regions of the viceroyalty. While the defeat suffered by Spain at the hands of Great Britain the following year diminished the need for a large military buildup, it also created the preconditions for the first thoroughgoing reform of the Spanish colonial armies.

The central purpose of the French Bourbons was to strengthen their ally Spain and its colonies, in order that they might aid in the development of the French economy and in the French struggle against Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> In this regard, they were fortunate to have Charles III on the throne of Spain. His reign (1759-1788) has been characterized by one historian as constituting "the apogee of three centuries of Spanish colonialism in America."<sup>2</sup> One manifestation of this was to be seen in the capable administrators which he sent to the New World. By the middle of the eighteenth century it had become royal policy to substitute career military men for the clerics who had formerly monopolized the higher posts in the colonial bureaucracy under the Hapsburgs. Two reasons for this were that these men could presumably be counted upon to deter

English attacks upon colonial ports, and their strict code of military honor was felt to be a deterrent to their involvement in the contraband trade.<sup>3</sup>

The appointment of the former President of the Audiencia of Chile, Colonel Manuel de Amat y Junient, to the position of Viceroy of Peru, was particularly fortuitous for the latter kingdom. Amat had compiled a brilliant service record as the Commandant of the Regiment of Dragoons of Sagunto during the campaigns in Africa and Italy before being named to the Chilean post in 1755.<sup>4</sup> His arrival in Peru on October 12, 1761, to assume the responsibilities of that kingdom came at a critical juncture in the history of the viceroyalty. Historian Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo has observed that

The Peruvian viceroyalty was in the middle of a critical epoch; the war with England, inevitable and near at hand, put [Perú's] external security in danger; its political and administrative structure had proven to be antiquated and inefficient; deep social problems were about to explode violently in a great uprising . . . Fortunately, an intelligent, energetic, diligent, and efficient man ruled over the destinies of the viceroyalty, who warned of this crisis and confronted it with all his energies and means: he tried to secure the country militarily . . . he clamored for political reforms which years later would be implanted, and demonstrated an indomitable, at times ferocious, energy in the face of indiscipline.<sup>5</sup>

Amat considered himself as a man with a royal mandate to rule, a characteristic which increased his efficiency at the expense of his popularity. In his Memoria he stated that as the alter ego of the King himself he enjoyed the highest confidence of the crown.<sup>6</sup> Popularity, he felt, was inconsistent with his task of rebuilding the strength of the viceroyalty, and he consciously refused to curry

favor with the limeño elite.<sup>7</sup> His choice of the beautiful mestiza actress Micaela Villegas ("La Perracholi") was regarded as an insult by the class-conscious aristocracy of Lima whose company he shunned.<sup>8</sup> At the end of his term of office, the incoming visitor general held that "[Amat] . . . had been hated in the kingdom and in the capital for the harsh way in which he treated all people."<sup>9</sup>

Attention to military affairs was a task that the new viceroy was fond of. In his Memoria he confessed that he felt it was "the most interesting of the activities of the viceroy" and that he felt honored to have been selected for the task of defending and preserving the viceroyalty.<sup>10</sup> He had demonstrated this attention to military affairs during his tenure in Chile. There, Amat had noticed the "excessive number" of unemployed creoles (American-born whites) in the Santiago area, and determined to utilize them both to enhance the prestige of his position and to help maintain internal order which had been noticeably lacking to that time. He therefore selected fifty "uncultivated persons of the country" who were able to prove their purity of blood and formed them into a *fijo* company of mounted dragoons. A weekly program of drill and instruction in the handling of weapons was instituted by Amat himself to increase their skills in the military arts. Such a scheme constituted a departure from the established tradition of leadership set by his predecessors, especially insofar as he treated these creoles. In place of the strict obedience which

former Spanish administrators in Chile demanded from the subjects, Amat granted to them both "respect and presents of employment" in return for which he received their unquestioned loyalty. This company of gentlemen, "versed in politics and manners," was the pride of the creoles of Chile. The fierce pride in their own abilities which the company exhibited caused an observer to wryly note that the creoles were finally made aware of the deeds of their forefathers "which perhaps their executors had not read to them."<sup>11</sup> This sense of incipient nationalism was to fully manifest itself by the end of the century, and nowhere was it to become more evident than in the ranks of the reorganized Army of Peru, whose ranks were also to be filled by creoles.

The declaration of war against Great Britain, announced by Spain on January 22, 1762, allowed Amat to exercise his skills as a military leader. On May 2 he received by way of Panama a secret royal order from the Minister of the Indies Julian de Arriaga, notifying him that both countries had recalled their respective ambassadors, and that a formal declaration of war was imminent. Amat was ordered to "put Peru in a state of defense" and to perform this task "in terms of a manifest war." A second order, arriving on May 10, confirmed that war had been declared.<sup>12</sup>

In response to the first decree, Amat had issued a circular order to all the corregidores authorizing them to enlist militia within their coastal jurisdictions, and had included a series of instructions intended to place these regions in a state of readiness. To prevent abuses from occurring during the levies by which the

militia was to be raised, guidelines were provided covering this procedure.<sup>13</sup> All herds of livestock were ordered driven to the interior to prevent their capture. A coast guard was to be posted and Indian runners were to be employed to relay news of a landing to the authorities in Lima. Perhaps most importantly, Amat directed the officials of the Royal Treasuries in these areas to underwrite all reasonable defense expenditures recommended by the corregidores, rather than placing the burden of such an expense upon the local citizenry as was customary.<sup>14</sup> Defense was thereby taken out of private hands and assumed by the state.

The declaration of war also nullified the 1750 Treaty of Madrid which had established the border between Peru and Brazil, requiring increased vigilance along this frontier as well as along the coast.<sup>15</sup> In March, 1762, Amat was ordered to expel the Portuguese from the Jesuit missions in the Mojos region but the expedition failed when its membership was decimated by tropical fever. Although other expeditions were sent out later, they failed for the same reasons, and no further attempts were made to oust the Portuguese from these regions.<sup>16</sup>

The strategy of Viceroy Amat for defending the Viceroyalty of Peru took into consideration the financial limitations of trying to garrison such an extensive territory, and attempted to utilize the harsh terrain as a deterrent in lieu of fortifications. Amat hoped to avoid the experience of his predecessor, the Marqués de Villagarcía, whose actions in calling out the militia and raising a naval expedition to defend against the Anson expedition in 1741

had bankrupted the viceroyalty, forcing him to suspend the payment of salaries to the garrison troops and to the members of the Royal Audiencia.<sup>17</sup> Not only did such a situation provoke ill will among both civil and military officials, whose loyalty was important to the crown, the expenditures had done nothing to deter the invasion, and had left Peru financially unable to prepare for subsequent mobilizations.

Viceroy Amat was well aware that British naval expeditions to Peru would be forthcoming, especially now that Spain and Great Britain were at war. He told the king that

Until now distance has been our bulwark and security, but today the difficulties have been conquered . . . Foreign nations do not fear the Cape Horn or the Straits of Magellan. They think of creating ports of call where they can set up residences, regroup their forces, and strengthen their plans.<sup>18</sup>

Nonetheless, he felt it was impossible to attempt to defend the entire coast from attack with troops such as Villagarcia had tried to do.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, he considered it to be unnecessary. Amat believed that the constantly changing winds made the offshore shoals and reefs treacherous for anyone not having a perfect idea of their location. He also felt that even if an enemy expedition was able to make a safe landing, it could gain no appreciable amount of wealth in most of the small towns, and its presence would serve only to create ill feelings among the townspeople.<sup>20</sup> His strategy was simply to fortify a few presidial areas which guarded the major coastal towns. At this point, however, he does not seem to have determined whether the smaller towns should have been evacuated or defended in the event of an invasion.

Of immediate concern to the viceroy was the defense of the metropolitan Lima-Callao area. One of his first actions following the outbreak of the war was to lead a mounted expedition along the coast between Ancón and Lurin, a distance of about fifteen miles, to familiarize himself with the terrain and to chart the areas which would be most suitable for launching a counter-attack if an invasion should occur. A diligent student of military tactics, Amat felt that success in warfare often depended upon the ability of a commander to modify his plan of battle in order to take advantage of the physical geography of an area. It was this ability to adapt to circumstances, he noted in a dictum, which often accounted for victory rather than superiority of numbers.<sup>21</sup> From the expedition arose an elaborate plan of shore batteries which were arranged in a series of concentric rings around the city, to be manned by specific militia companies upon a given signal.<sup>22</sup>

Foremost in his plan of defense was to complete the fortress "Real Felipe" of Callao which had never been completely rebuilt after the 1746 earthquake. The military situation of Callao and Lima in general was deplorable. A high-ranking officer of the Lima customhouse, Juan de Echevarría, characterized Peru as being "without presidios, without troops, without cannonballs, without gunpowder and totally defenseless . . . Callao was reduced to a simple outer wall." What militia existed within the city, he noted, were completely lacking in military training.<sup>23</sup>

On June 8, 1762, Amat led a mounted procession from the viceroyal palace to the fortress for his first tour of inspection. As

a symbolic gesture he ordered that 106 cannon be mounted upon the walls to protect the harbor. Amat also ordered that a foundry be constructed to repair the weaponry which was in disrepair. The following year the crown approved his request for a veteran commandant of artillery, sending out Colonel Antonio Zini and a cadre of instructors to command the brigade of artillery at Callao and to direct work at the foundry. The results of such a commitment to ordnance were impressive.<sup>24</sup>

The commitment to reform of the Callao fortress led to other improvements, notably that of the study of mathematics which had previously been neglected in the viceroyalty. During his tour of the fortress Amat learned that its pentagonal design had been the idea of a Frenchman, Louis Godin, a former member of the French scientific expedition sent out to measure the curvature of the earth in 1734, who had remained in Peru as a professor of mathematics at the Royal and Pontifical University of San Marcos in Lima. While the Spanish officials held that Godin was the only mathematician deserving of the name within the viceroyalty, the creoles bitterly asserted that several of their number at San Marcos were qualified for the commission of designing the fortress, but had been passed over in favor of an "incomprehensible Frenchman" for the job. All of them admitted, however, that no formal engineers existed at the university.<sup>25</sup> Such information incensed Amat and drove him to introduce a program designed to produce qualified mathematicians. He explained in his Memoria that this branch of learning was so



important to defense and "guidance of the Military Art" that it must be developed.<sup>26</sup> The results of such a program will be discussed in the succeeding chapters.

A second consideration of the viceroy was to stem the corruption that flourished among the officials of the port of Callao and the command of the garrison.<sup>27</sup> His efforts to end the practice of these positions being hereditary provoked the first serious crisis of authority of his brief career in Peru. In a letter to the Ministry of the Indies he stated firmly his belief that offices should be granted on the basis of merit and individual capacity, rather than by heredity, because such a practice excluded the qualified aspirant unless he happened to be wealthy.<sup>28</sup> Amat cited specifically the positions of Commissar of War and Navy and Paymaster of the Troops of the Presidio of Callao, in an oblique reference to Pedro Tagle y Bustamante, the Marqués de Torretagle, a member of the creole aristocracy of Lima who had purchased the posts and was exercising them in his own interest. During the war Amat discovered that Torretagle had been charging the soldiers of the garrison for their uniforms and for time off in Lima. Due to the exigencies of war, Amat was unable to remove Tagle until after the end of the war, at which time he relieved the entire Guardia Mayor, or High Command, at the port and sent them to Spain.<sup>29</sup>

By deviating from a long-standing tradition of permissiveness, Amat incurred the wrath of these displaced officials, who took their grievances to the king. The governor of the presidio of Callao,

Francisco del Moral, had also been removed by Amat from his post for his refusal to lead the expedition being readied to oust the Portuguese from the Franciscan missions in Mato Grosso. Instead, Del Moral went into hiding, feigning illness. When news of the peace reached Peru he petitioned Amat for the return of his position but was refused. In his correspondence with the crown, Amat noted that in countries like Peru which a state of war had reduced to a complete ruin, if rulers continued to yield to the schemes of individuals such as Del Moral, it would have "very fatal consequences," since these men were completely lacking in subordination and honor.<sup>30</sup> He stated his intention to place the post of Governor of Callao in the hands of inspectors general of the army who were sent out from Spain in the future.<sup>31</sup>

Many of these displaced officials took their cases to the court in Spain, defending their conduct, and accusing the viceroy of numerous wrongdoings. José Morales de Aramburu referred to these men as papagayos (parrots), who not only slandered Amat but at the same time scorned Peru and the vigor and ability of its people, for which he felt they should be hanged for treason. He noted that frequently those who attacked the viceroy in public had privately expressed admiration for the man.<sup>32</sup> Although none of these allegations were sufficient to secure the ouster of Amat, who enjoyed great popularity among the ministers of Charles III, there is some indication that these dissident voices were heard in high places. Following the close of the war, the viceroy wrote to the crown that he had pacified Peru satisfactorily and

that his only remaining enemies were in the Council of the Indies.<sup>33</sup>

The most notable aspect of the initial mobilization of the army in response to the Seven Years War was the creation of a body of militia, since it was from these companies that a disciplined militia would later be created.<sup>34</sup> Following the publication of the declaration of war, Amat requested a report from the captain for the Royal Armory citing the total number of firearms which were in working condition. The report was not encouraging: gunpowder and munitions were in short supply, and there were insufficient arms to supply the soldiers. The conditions were so bad that the viceroy was forced to purchase sabers and broadswords from among the residents of the city to equip the militia of cavalry. By the end of Amat's term of office this situation had been markedly improved.<sup>35</sup>

On May 10 Viceroy Amat reviewed the unit rosters which he had requested from the commanders of the various urban companies that had been in existence in Lima prior to this time, and found them to be "small, undisciplined, and without the least order." For this reason he ordered an edict published requiring all subjects of the king between the ages of fourteen and sixty to present themselves at a review on the following day in the region of the city known as "Los Peines" to be enlisted in their proper militia companies. The members of the nobility were requested to present themselves to the secretary of the viceroy to record their names, along with the number of slaves and weapons which each possessed. Since Amat was desirous of having the nobility create and finance

additional companies of militia, efforts were made not to alienate this group. No penalties for failing to appear at the review were established, other than to say that persons whose absence was unauthorized would be identified by the authorities.<sup>36</sup> The cooperation of the large hacendado class was essential to securing the attendance at the review of their numerous slaves and retainers.

The following day Viceroy Amat appeared at the review and asked his military commanders to form their companies.<sup>37</sup> The review confirmed his worse suspicions: the companies ranged in size from twenty-five to two hundred men, all of them without uniforms, and completely lacking any knowledge of their duties.<sup>38</sup> Although such a situation was no doubt discouraging, the number of persons who had turned out to enlist offered some encouragement. Amat's secretary observed that the edict elicited the desired response among all groups in Lima

Gentlemen, titled persons, and the most wealthy quickly offered themselves and their sons . . . [it] caused no less commotion among the masses and common people, principally among the Indians, Pardos, and Morenos who emulated them in a most worthy manner.<sup>39</sup>

The request made subsequently to the nobility of Lima that they raise and outfit additional companies of militia struck an apparently responsive chord among creoles who hungrily sought the honor and prestige which emanated from a ranking military commission. The Commandant of Infantry, Colonel Felix Morales de Aramburu set an example by raising and outfitting a company of infantry. The Conde de los Torres followed by outfitting a company of cavalry, Felix de Encalada uniformed an infantry company designated as "La

Reina Madre," Juan Francisco Micheu, a prominent merchant of Lima formed a company of merchants, Pedro Josef de Zarate raised a company of mounted dragoons "Batavia," and Francisco Marino de Lobera founded a grenadier company "Príncipe de Asturias."<sup>40</sup>

The nobility of Lima formed into a regiment of twelve companies. Amat himself accepted the post of Colonel and Commandant, and underwrote the cost of raising four grenadier companies to be attached to the unit. In addition, the Audiencia of Lima dressed an infantry company of 104 men, while the cabildo, or municipal council sponsored 800, and the consulado an additional 1,000. Some of the urban companies of Indians, pardos, and morenos, which had existed prior to the mobilization, were reorganized. For example, the eighteen companies of pardos libres were consolidated into a battalion of nine companies as were the thirty-three companies of Indians. A battalion of morenos libres with ten companies was also created. Veteran troops from the garrison at Callao were assigned to these latter three battalions to give them instruction in the handling and firing of weapons. In addition, each militia company which was newly formed received a charter from the viceroy defining the limits of its duties and obligations. Since no general regulation covered their organization, the viceroy specifically granted each the rights and privileges of militia service, including the fuero militar, exemption from the payment of certain taxes, and limitations on the distance from Lima that each company would have to travel if called onto active duty.<sup>41</sup>

Although the size of the militia created by Amat remains a matter of speculation, it is not unduly important since no invasion by a foreign power was made to test it. As a result the companies were deactivated shortly after news of the Peace of Paris reached Peru, and not reorganized again until the reform of 1766. Of more interest is the degree to which this initial mobilization was carried out by the corregidores throughout the viceroyalty. A table compiled by Amat's recording secretary sets the total number of militia created during the year 1763 at 54,580 men, which he observed had been "dressed, armed and very skillfully instructed in the use of arms . . . without including in this figure the regular troops . . . and nearly ten thousand slaves that can be equipped in an emergency."<sup>42</sup> Such an estimate (see Table 2) is a gross distortion if this militia is regarded as a tactical weapon possessing the requisite skills and training to protect the viceroyalty from an attack by sea. As the following chapter will illustrate, these troops did not deserve to be regarded as a disciplined militia in the formal sense of the word.

Viceroy Amat was determined, however, to retain the capital in a mobilized state for as long as possible. Although the news of the peace reached Lima on March 30, 1763, Amat chose not to publicize it until November 5. As late as May, 1764, he was still requiring the militia to drill on a weekly basis. Similarly, the production of gunpowder and mortars was continued. This training produced a certain pride among the citizens of Lima in the military

TABLE 2

COMPANIES OF MILITIA RAISED DURING THE  
SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1762-1763

Urban Militia

Lima

Infantry Militia

Regiment of the Nobility  
Company of Lawyers  
Company of Students  
Regiment of Spanish Infantry  
Battalion of Merchants  
Regiment of Indians  
Battalion of pardos  
Battalion of morenos

Cavalry Militia

Regiment of Cavalry "De Los Reyes"  
Brigade of Royal Fusileers  
Company of Indians  
Company of morenos  
Company of pardos

Coastal Provinces

Cavalry Militia

Regiment of Lurigancho  
Regiment of Bellavista  
Regiment of the Villa de Arnedo  
Regiment of Mala  
Regiment of Huarura  
Regiment of Cañete  
Regiment of Chincha  
Regiment of Lambayeque  
Regiment of Quilihuay

Dragoons

Regiment of Carabaillo  
Regiment of La Muerte de Canta  
Regiment of Huarochiri  
Regiment of Pisco  
Regiment of Ica  
Regiment of Camaná  
Regiment of Cangallo

TABLE 2 (cont.)

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Infantry Militia	
Regiment of Piura	2,025
Regiment of Trujillo	1,498
Regiment of Santa	842
Regiment of Pisco	176
Regiment of Nazca	292
Regiment of Atacama	466
Regiment of Moquequa	904
Regiment of Arequipa	2,359
Regiment of Tarma	4,348
Regiment of Jauja	1,722
Regiment of Huaylas	2,647
Regiment of Conchucos	986
Regiment of Chachapoyas	536
Regiment of Cajatambo	1,077
Regiment of Urubamba	200
Regiment of Huancavelica	1,400
Regiment of Huamachuco	3,922
Regiment of Huamalies	261

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Source: AGI:AL 1490 Compendio de las prevenciones que el Excelentísimo Señor Don Manuel de Amat hizo para la defensa de la Guerra contra Portugal, e Inglaterra, Lima, November 10, 1763, pp. 10-21.

The author, Antonio de Elempuru, cites a total of 18,900 infantry militia and 35,680 cavalry militia in Lima and the proximate coastal provinces. The figures for infantry militia are appended, and presumably are not included in the totals above. They are probably based on estimates of some sort. Since all of the figures are inflated, the value of the table is to show the locations in which a mobilization of the militia was emphasized.



capabilities of their militia by this time. The Gaceta de Lima crowed that in the future Peru would be able not only to wage a defensive war against an enemy but an offensive one as well.<sup>43</sup> When news of the peace was published, Amat's secretary voiced the disappointment which it provoked among the militia

I do not know if these faithful vassals are content with such happy news; with regard to the common good and resignation of the will of their King . . . or saddened at having the occasion to give the most authentic proof of their love and loyalty escape from their hands.<sup>44</sup>

If a professional military had not come into being by this time, there were indications at least that the psychological conditions for creating one were at hand. These, combined with the crushing defeat of the Seven Years War, were to force the creation of a modern professional army in Peru to defend it against future attack.

The termination of the Seven Years War had a profound effect on Spain as well as its colonies. Historians are in general agreement that the humiliating defeat which Great Britain inflicted upon Spain and France convinced the vanquished allies of the need for a radical reorientation of Bourbon administrative policies.<sup>45</sup> There were two reasons to support such a decision. First, they had to be able to protect themselves should a second war against Britain break out, and secondly, Spain's empire in America had to be preserved from future attack if such should occur. The series of programs which stemmed from this decision are collectively known as the Bourbon Reforms.<sup>46</sup>

Spain had long realized the need for change within the commercial and administrative spheres of its colonial empire, but the

fall of Havana and Manila to the English in August, 1762, convinced it of the need for a colonial military reform as well. Havana had long been the sentinel protecting the outbound silver fleets on which Spain depended so heavily for revenue. Its fall demonstrated the fallibility of overdependence upon fixed fortifications which had, until this time, formed the basis of Spanish military strategy in the New World. The ease with which Havana had been captured also made an open secret of Spain's military weaknesses in the New World and heightened the chances of future attacks, since from Havana Great Britain would have a staging area from which to attack Veracruz and Mexico City. Another fact not lost upon the Spanish authorities was that over 700 merchant ships loaded with English manufactures had called at Havana during its eleven months of capture, whereas prior to this time not more than fifteen had called during any given year. Not only would England be desirous of recapturing these markets once again but it would be increasingly difficult to placate the Spaniards themselves unless their antiquated commercial system were altered.<sup>47</sup> Production and protection were the keys to Bourbon policies in the New World. The colonies had to increase production in order to finance Spain's return to greatness. They were also counted upon to bear their fair share of defense expenditures.<sup>48</sup>

To effect these changes, a Secret Committee for Imperial Defense was formed. The Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Indies and Finance, the Marqués de Grimaldi, Julian de Arriaga,

and the Marqués de Esquillache respectively, met in Madrid with their French counterparts to outline a general plan for the defense of the Spanish colonies. Although they agreed on the need for improved fortifications, the fall of Havana taught them that larger numbers of troops were needed to support the small numbers of presidial soldiers throughout the empire, since the deteriorated state of the Spanish treasury made it impossible to supplement these veteran units to the point that they might constitute an adequate standing army.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, the Spanish and French policymakers, for various reasons, were questioning the value of regular troops in the Indies. As Arriaga noted

The presidios of America do not have and cannot have the troops necessary for their defense. There is no money for the payment of such troops . . . and all the Infantry in Spain would not be enough to provide what is needed there . . . there is another highly important obstacle, which is that the troops who go to the Indies desert and become corrupted . . . as a result in a short while they are worth little more than the militia . . . Although it would please everyone for the King to recruit soldiers in Cádiz for the Indies, it would cost the Crown a voyage for the hundreds of parasites who furtively seek to go to America, and it is abundantly clear that these recruits would not remain in the corps longer than necessary to make good their escape. The result of all that I have expressed is that one cannot count on maintaining the presidios of America with a sufficient number of regular troops for their defense.<sup>50</sup>

The alternative to regular troops was to base colonial defenses upon small numbers of Spanish regular units who would be frequently rotated, supplemented by larger numbers of *fijo* (fixed) battalions of soldiers raised within the colonies themselves. Yet since both of these measures required substantial amounts of money to pay the salaries of these soldiers, it was necessary that these units be

supplemented by a militia, greatly increased in size and trained and organized on a standard basis like the provincial militia of Spain.<sup>51</sup>

In order to test the efficiency of this revised defense system, the Spanish crown dispatched Field Marshal Alejandro O'Reilly to Havana in April, 1763. O'Reilly was to determine the causes for the fall of the fortress, and to reform the fijo and regular battalions. In addition, he was to reorganize the militia of the island upon a disciplined basis. In July, 1764, O'Reilly completed his mission to Cuba and returned to Spain. The fruit of his labor was the Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y caballería de la Isla de Cuba, first printed in Havana on June 15, 1764.<sup>52</sup> It was from these provisional tables of organization, as well as from tables which had been drawn up earlier in 1734 for the use of the Spanish provincial militia that a basis for the creation of bodies of disciplined militia in New Spain, the Phillipines, New Granada, Peru, and the La Plata viceroyalties was established.<sup>53</sup>

The concept of a supplementary militia was not a new one in Peru. Juan and Ulloa had recommended that one be established to aid in the maintenance of coastal defense:

We are of the feeling that the principal defense of those populations which cannot be comprised within the enclosure of a provided fortification, consists in the inhabitants taking arms to defend themselves, or to oppose any attempted enemy landing, by forming bodies of militia in all the ports.<sup>54</sup>

This, however, was only an extension of the concept of an urban militia, in which no thought was given to periodic training or formal organization. In the new program, the emphasis would necessarily be upon training and discipline.

The first guidelines for the formation of such a militia in Peru were dispatched on May 11, 1763 in the form of a royal order entrusted to Colonel Juan Manuel Campero, a regular officer who had been sent out as the new military governor of Tucumán. Accompanying the order was a document entitled Plan de Milicias: su establecimiento y necesidad.<sup>55</sup> The plan convinced Viceroy Amat that a disciplined militia "was not only useful but necessary . . . successive experiences confirm this fact every day."<sup>56</sup> In December Amat wrote the Ministry of the Indies giving his analysis of prior defense strategy and its failures. In the letter he restated his belief that the navigational perils of the Cape Horn passage were no longer sufficient to deter an enemy invasion, and his awareness that no help could be sent from Spain in time should such an event occur. Efforts by his predecessors to raise standing armies to combat such invasions had failed from a military standpoint, he thought, since the number of troops which could be raised were insufficient to cover the extensive coastline. It also was unwise from an economic viewpoint, he felt, since such a measure forced small towns to donate far beyond their resources and bankrupted the royal treasuries. Once this happened, Amat noted that "all was reduced to discontent and confusion," the army drifted apart, and the towns were as defenseless as before. For the above reasons, Amat reiterated his preference for a militia which sought no pay for its services, and which was ready at a moment's notice. Those he had raised in Lima, he affirmed, "were not inferior to the most veteran soldiers from Europe." Already, he boasted, he

had raised and trained a larger number of these than Campero had estimated.<sup>57</sup>

On August 24, 1765, the crown issued a second guideline for the organization of a disciplined militia, which was republished in Peru as the Reglamento sobre las milicias del Virreynato del Peru.<sup>58</sup> Since the former plan had presumably only been intended to convince the viceroy of the efficacy of raising a militia, his enthusiastic support of the plan opened the way for a more detailed regulation designed to place this militia on a footing consistent with the Spanish provincials. Yet nowhere in the regulation is there any indication that Viceroy Amat was bound to adhere to these guidelines. The fact that the ministers of the crown considered Amat to have no peer as an administrator and military expert accounts for the flexibility given him to reorganize the militia along the lines he felt most suitable.<sup>59</sup>

The 1766 Reglamento contained a series of steps governing the raising and organization of units of disciplined militia in Peru. First, the governor or corregidor of a particular district was to take a census of the population within his jurisdiction in order to determine the number of persons available for duty. Each regiment was to be raised within a ten-league radius of a provincial capital, the regiment taking the name of that town. Although no mention was made of the number of companies which were to be raised, in most cases only one battalion could be formed. Often companies were raised in small towns distant from the capital which infrequently would train with the battalion but which were attached

to it for administrative purposes.<sup>60</sup> The regulation went on to state that each infantry battalion was to contain nine companies of seventy-five men each, cavalry or dragoon regiments were to be composed of nine companies of fifty men each, which were to be grouped into squadrons of three companies for tactical purposes.<sup>61</sup>

Enlistment procedures were not spelled out in the regulation, although a rather elaborate process for enlistment was in use in New Spain. The regulation did mention, however, that rank was to be granted in line with social status. All officers and sergeants were to be granted the active military privileged jurisdiction as long as they held their rank, while enlisted personnel enjoyed these privileges only when called onto active duty.<sup>62</sup> The regulation warned that militia officers or provincial officials were not authorized to employ soldiers in any capacity which interfered with harvesting their crops or other trades. The sole master of the militia, it noted, was the King of Spain.<sup>63</sup> The regulation also stated that the militia were to be provided with veteran training cadres to instruct them in military exercises and the handling of weapons. Although it was clearly intended to provide veteran troops wherever possible, the other members of the command and staff groups were allowed to be drawn from "the most decorated persons in the provinces."<sup>64</sup>

The capture of the "cold and sterile" Malvinas (Falkland) Islands off the coast of Buenos Aires by the English in 1766 created a climate of urgency in Peru which gave an added impetus to the

formation of these militia companies, since from them Great Britain could launch a full-scale attack on the West Coast without the danger of their movements being detected and relayed to Lima beforehand.<sup>65</sup> Such news provoked Amat to pledge all his efforts towards securing Peru against a seaborne invasion.<sup>66</sup> In an effort to do this, the viceroy made numerous overtures to enlist the support of the creole elites of Lima, in the hope that the lower classes would emulate their example and enter the militia voluntarily. Formerly, he had organized the Regiment of the Nobility, which became a creole unit encompassing the members of the best families of the city.<sup>67</sup> In granting military fueros (privileges) to this unit, Amat made it clear that membership would not abrogate any of the privileges which they already enjoyed.<sup>68</sup> A creole observer has observed that "the joy was universal" when this regiment was created, and that the creoles doubled their attention to the military exercises, quickly making "incredible progress."<sup>69</sup>

The other urban unit of Lima, the Battalion of Merchants, was also reorganized into ten companies of fifty men each, and thirty-nine officers, commanded by the Conde de Torrevelarde.<sup>70</sup> It was in this way that the numerous Spanish merchants of Lima were brought into the militia program.

Militia service was less popular among the negroes and mixed bloods who filled the enlisted ranks of these companies. To begin with the inhabitants of the city were unused to the demands of war-time and consequently afraid of them. Amat noted that "all the



people suffered from cowardice, and upset" and that in the past they had abandoned the city when news of an invasion had reached them.<sup>71</sup> Although training of the militia had been attempted in the past, the distance of a European enemy from Peruvian shores caused an air of unreality about such exercises and they were never taken seriously.<sup>72</sup> Especially problematical was the incorporation of the Negroes of Lima, an audacious group which was always at odds with the viceroy.<sup>73</sup> Although his resources were short, Amat had gold medals made featuring a bust of Charles III and granted them to the commanders of the companies of pardos, morenos, and Indians in an effort to raise morale among these groups.<sup>74</sup> The scheme apparently worked, and no reported cases of violence have been located surrounding the enlistment of these groups into the militia. This brought expressions of amazement from certain observers, who noted that the viceroy "accomplishes more by being agreeable than by force" and compared him with Alexander the Great who utilized similar methods to incorporate the defeated Macedonians into his army. The moral seemed clear: sagacity produced better results than the sword.<sup>75</sup>

Amat's deep interest in the militia persisted long after the initial reorganization. His presence at the weekly reviews in the plaza mayor (main square) of Lima provided these exercises with a dignity which they had never before possessed. Moreover, his passionate respect for a career at arms gave this vocation a new luster. According to one observer, the advent of Viceroy Amat

caused the proficient handling and firing of weapons to be looked upon as a badge of honor which distinguished "accomplished and gallant men." These creoles professed disdain for "excessive braid and trimming" which had distinguished the Spanish soldier and which to them seemed a mark of vanity rather than of service to the king.<sup>76</sup> The regulation specified that reviews were to be held a minimum of twice a year but made no mention of weekly drills. Viceroy Amat had definite ideas on the subject though, and called an untrained soldier "a body that serves only to embarrass."<sup>77</sup> During the war, the merchant's guild had sponsored the construction of two barracks in Lima for the training of the militia companies. Each week a company of infantry and one of cavalry would occupy the barracks to receive daily training sessions under the auspices of veteran officers from Callao. The artillery detachment practiced outside of the city by firing at a wall built especially for the purpose.<sup>78</sup> This practice was discontinued by the King in 1764 over the objections of the viceroy, who feared the consequences if the militia lost its wartime readiness. With the introduction of the 1766 militia regulation into Peru this weekly training was again resumed in Lima.<sup>79</sup>

Periodically, Amat would stage exercises in the plaza mayor to demonstrate the proficiency of the militia which he had created. these reviews were festive and glamorous affairs attended by the best people of Lima. The plaza was decorated for such an occasion and tapestries were hung from the balconies fronting the square.

Frequently fights broke out among the lower classes for the spaces not occupied by the nobility. One such demonstration was held on November 4, 1772 in honor of the birthday of Charles III. A wide trench was dug across the middle of the square to simulate a river, and a bridge was built across it. The militia of Lima was divided into two opposing armies and set up campsites at each end of the square. One side was to hold the bridge while the other attacked it in a series of stages which were explained to the assembled citizens in order that they might gain a better appreciation of military tactics.<sup>80</sup> Reviews generally began with each company passing before the royal balcony on which the viceroy and his military advisors were seated. At 3:30 the review terminated and the viceroy and his party entered carriages for the procession to the church of Our Lady of Monserrat, the patron saint of the militia of Lima, where a high mass was celebrated. The streets were jammed for the occasion. Following the mass, the militia companies took seats along the Rimac River where the brigade of artillery put on a demonstration of fireworks. Grenades were lobbed into the river, exploding and sending up plumes of spray. At the conclusion of the fireworks the procession returned to the plaza mayor where dinners and festivities lasted long into the night.<sup>81</sup>

Viceroy Amat took a similar interest in the veteran component of the Army of Peru, and consistently upheld their demands for higher pay and more generous benefits. He had been in Chile when a regular battalion revolted because the government had fallen

into arrears on their pay. Thus, when the crown asked him to draw up a revised pay schedule in 1768 to help offset rising costs, Amat tabled the order on the basis that such a measure was injurious to public safety due to the effect it would provoke on the veteran forces.<sup>82</sup> In a letter to the crown, Amat argued that while he was fully aware of the expense which this component caused, and the poverty of the royal treasury, veteran pay scales were already so low that they could barely sustain a common soldier, much less an officer. He observed that in Peru "the poor Negro journeyman" was better off than the soldier. He expressed fear that if pay was slashed further soldiers would begin leaving the army for civil occupations, and the king would be without an army to defend his possessions.<sup>83</sup> As it stood, he felt the regular and *fijo* troops in Peru were only capable of defending seventy of the seventy-six provinces in Peru. This excluded the highland areas filled with "barbarous Indians and innumerable castes." Amat went on to cite the great respect which veteran troops enjoyed within the viceroyalty and their value to it. As an example, he pointed to the cavalry company of the Guard of the Viceroy, without whose presence, he noted, "the Royal Treasury would not collect a real." He warned that if the presidial troops ever joined with the Indians to oppose the royal authority, no one "would be able to put out the fire that they could light."<sup>84</sup>

In addition to supporting their pleas for better pay and increased benefits, Amat applied the first comprehensive regulation to these regular and *fijo* units in 1770, intended to better their

organization and discipline.<sup>85</sup> He stressed the development of technical expertise among these units as well. As mentioned earlier, the viceroy was particularly interested in developing the field of mathematics which he considered essential to national defense, since mastery of this science helped the artillery brigade hit its targets more accurately, and because of the various applications it might have in erecting new fortifications. He therefore arranged that a hall at San Marcos be set aside for the teaching of this subject, which was to be taught by Cosme Bueno, the senior cosmographer of the viceroyalty. On February 21, 1766 Amat published an edict notifying all cadets, second lieutenants, and lieutenants in the regular or *fijo* companies that they might come to Lima and enroll as fulltime students of mathematics at San Marcos while drawing their full military salaries.<sup>86</sup> Of the "many" officers who took advantage of this offer, three were graduated in a special public examination on June 11, 1768. With the viceroy sitting as honored guest, the three engaged in an oral examination, after which they were granted diplomas and given promotions.<sup>87</sup> In a similar effort to maintain the morale of the regular forces at a high level, Amat voiced strong opposition to the Crown's plan to ship deserters from the Spanish army to Peru to serve in the *fijo* units there. He explained that they would merely desert again if given the opportunity and go off to live with the Indians, forming outlaw bands to terrorize merchants and travellers. In light of the small number of regular troops in Peru, Amat ventured that such occurrences could combine to overthrow the government if allowed to proceed unchecked.

The order was subsequently withdrawn.<sup>88</sup>

The viceroy felt that the capital cities of Peru and Chile were close enough to the coast to permit aid to be dispatched rapidly to other areas in the event of an invasion by sea, since a well-equipped field army could cover at least twenty leagues in a day's march. The small size of the majority of the Chilean coastal villages led him to joke that it would be easier to move them by tying the rude shacks to a horse's tail than to waste any additional money upon fortifications.<sup>89</sup> For this reason Amat recommended that Valparaíso and Concepción not be given additional regular garrison troops, but instead that their defense be left to the regulars of Santiago located thirty leagues away.<sup>90</sup> He similarly wrote off Valdivia as unworthy of further fortification, blaming its present condition upon the Company of Jesus who, he maintained, had always used their influence to defeat proposals to increase military construction amongst the Araucanian Indians.<sup>91</sup>

The one exception to the general rule of not increasing fortifications was the island of Chiloe, located off of the Chilean coast, which Amat sought to make the bulwark of his southern defensive perimeter. Chiloe was a logical stopoff for any marauder rounding the Cape Horn because of the available fresh water and plentiful wild animals which abounded on the island and had harbored the Anson expedition earlier. As such, it could increase the range of an enemy expedition, freeing it from the necessity of putting into a mainland port for repairs or supplies. Enveloped in fog for

nearly all the year, from Chiloe an expedition might directly attack Santiago or Lima without fear of being spotted. These were some of the considerations which led Viceroy Amat to refer to the island as "one of the principal keys to the security of the kingdom," and which caused him to increase the size of its garrison.<sup>92</sup>

Although the island came under the jurisdiction of Chile, the willingness of the president of that audiencia to abandon Chiloe to an enemy prompted Amat to request that it be transferred to the Viceroyalty of Peru. Since the voyage by sea from Chiloe to Callao was faster than from Chiloe to Valdivia, due to more favorable tides, this request made sense on strategic grounds, and it was approved by the king on August 20, 1767. In addition, the viceroy was granted permission to fortify the island and to name a military governor there. On March 28, 1768, Amat named Captain of Dragoons Carlos Beranger to the post.<sup>93</sup> By 1776 the island was garrisoned by 146 regular troops, the majority of them situated in the capital city of San Carlos.<sup>94</sup>

The news that Great Britain had possessed itself of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands off of the coast of Buenos Aires heightened Spanish fears that a second war against that nation was forthcoming. In order to assure itself that the Viceroyalty of Peru could surmount such an invasion, the Ministry of the Indies requested Viceroy Amat to make a full report on the defenses of the viceroyalty in order that the king might decide what measures, if any, were necessary to secure the kingdom from attack. Amat's

reply, dispatched on November 1, 1768, was a remarkably candid document, detailing the weaknesses in the Peruvian army as well as its strengths. It also signalled a departure from the original strategy of defense which Amat had expressed during the early part of the Seven Years War.

By 1767 the viceroy seems to have conceded to Great Britain control over the high seas and the folly of attempting to garrison Peru against any seaborne invasion which that nation might seek to carry out. "There is no naval force that is able to oppose them; there are not enough troops nor enough money in the world to garrison and fortify such vast territories."<sup>95</sup> Instead, Amat chose to concentrate almost exclusively upon the defense and fortification of Lima alone. The fortress "Real Felipe" (to be completed in 1774), the artillery foundry, and gunpowder factory were all symbols of this emphasis.<sup>96</sup> In his report, however, Amat voiced deep concern about the security of the city, which had "never seen the theater of Mars" and whose fabulous wealth made it the logical point of any English attack. He lamented the fact that women and priests outnumbered able-bodied men in Lima, and cited the presence of numerous troublesome castes whose conduct he feared during wartime. Although the people had a tendency to flee in the face of danger, Amat hoped that his presence would put an end to such practices.<sup>97</sup> By surrounding the city with militia to hold off an approaching enemy, the viceroy at least felt he would be able to transport the better part of the silver and other wealth into the mountains before the city fell.<sup>98</sup>



On the subject of the militia, Amat is more circumspect than in his earlier statements. While he categorized the militia of Lima as "numerous," Amat conceded that companies from the outlying provinces would be unable to assist in the defense of the city unless they had ample forewarning, due to the distances involved. Likewise, he noted that while the battalion at Callao and the Viceroy's Guard were both trained and ready to act in an emergency, some of these troops were always serving on the Indian frontier and therefore unavailable. Moreover, he estimated that 3,000 troops would be needed to garrison the fortress in the event of a siege. He therefore considered it "indispensable" that Peru receive more regular troops, especially to help in the training of the militia which he felt had deteriorated to their prewar condition. Since none of them had had combat experience, Amat urged that weekly training be resumed throughout the viceroyalty to improve their self-discipline, and strengthen their character which, he noted, "is so weak that a bad night is capable of making them surrender."<sup>99</sup> He had little good to say about the regulars either, referring to them as men of low reputation who joined the army only to avoid jail in Spain. He closed by emphasizing the need for driving the English out of the Malvinas, since not only did these islands provide them a base from which to invade Peru, but also would allow them to carry horses to transport their cannon once a beachhead had been established.<sup>100</sup>

Following the British occupation of the Malvinas in 1768, Charles III had requested his Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Marqués de Grimaldi, to prepare a memorandum outlining the measures which he felt should be taken to defend Peru against the possibility of foreign attack. On February 25 of the following year, Grimaldi submitted his report, entitled "Estado del Peru," to the Ministry of the Indies. In it he remarked that the numerous rumors of British schemes to establish themselves upon the mainland of Spanish America demanded that a program of military reform be undertaken in that kingdom to prevent its loss through invasion. Grimaldi stated that his understanding that practically the entire coastline was undefended and that Callao was garrisoned by a force of less than 500 men had caused him great worry about the security of the viceroyalty. He therefore recommended that the crown send an initial shipment of regular troops to Peru at once, and that each year this be supplemented with other shipments of soldiers, arms, and munitions, to "provide hope for the coming year" to the citizens of Peru in their efforts to defend themselves against attack.<sup>101</sup>

In response to the reports of Amat and Grimaldi, the crown took a series of measures intended to better the organization and efficiency of the Army of Peru. While much of the program was either not fully implemented or allowed to lapse after the English were ousted from the Malvinas by Spain in 1770, Amat worked exceedingly hard to retain the army in the state of readiness which it had

enjoyed in 1763. However, although the King, in an order dated October 21, 1768, ordered the Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y caballería de la Isla de Cuba applied in Peru, Amat did not order the regulation published and seems to have left the militia on the same footing as it was since its inception.<sup>102</sup> The crown also created the post of inspector general of the veteran and provincial troops of Peru, and appointed a proven soldier and administrator, Brigadier General Francisco Javier de Morales to fill it, but this measure was also abortive due to a series of unfortunate circumstances. Early in 1769 Morales and his second in command Colonel Baltasar Semanat left for Peru with a battalion of the infantry Regiment of Portugal, composed of six fusileer companies, an artillery company, and thirty cavalry soldiers. These troops were to serve as reinforcements for the garrisons and also as training cadres for the militia. Bad weather prevented the flotilla from rounding the Cape Horn, and in April they were forced to return to Montevideo. From there Morales and Semanat struck out overland on their own, reaching Santiago in February, 1770. Morales never did reach Peru due to an unforeseen set of circumstances.<sup>103</sup> This loss of vigorous leadership was to hinder attempts to reorganize the militia especially in the provinces where the subinspectors disliked and feared to go.

In an attempt to arrest the declining level of morality among the soldiers, Amat placed Peru under something quite like martial law during this period. Discipline was to Amat the cornerstone of any program of reform within the military institution. In his

Memoria he wrote "It is clear that obedience to the rigid Military Religion is the basic foundation upon which rests the glory and success of Arms, and the most minimal deceit and condescendence ought not be allowed to transcend it."<sup>104</sup> In order to reduce these vices to their minimum, Amat frequently called out the Callao garrison in the dead of night to determine if the tables of strength reported to him by the commanders was accurate. Units found unaccountably understrength were severely disciplined. The number of officers present at all reviews was doubled also to prevent future abuses from occurring. To check graft in purchasing and supply, the viceroy appointed a comptroller to audit the accounts of the commissar of war. In a letter to the king defending such strenuous measures, Amat stated that without constant vigilance, His Majesty would have "no troops, arms, treasury, or defense."<sup>105</sup>

During the Seven Years War the viceroy had jailed suspected wrongdoers through a series of legal subterfuges because of the delays involved in receiving rapid judgments from the crown.<sup>106</sup> Even when dealing with military cases Amat was liable to take matters into his own hands rather than turn the case over to a military court. In 1772, for example, when a ring of soldiers from Callao which had been terrorizing people on the streets of Lima was broken up, Amat ordered them to be marched into the plaza mayor where they were to be read the passages of the military ordinances pertaining to theft. He then decreed that they should be beheaded and their

heads placed on pikes as a warning to others.<sup>107</sup> In another case involving a pay dispute between the officers and crew of the Spanish warships Astuto and Septentrión harbored at Callao, Amat marched to the harbor at the head of his guard and boarded the ships. Bypassing the jurisdiction of the captain, the viceroy had forty-three suspects jailed and declared himself a court of military justice to hear the case. In a cruel travesty of justice, he declared all of the defendants to be guilty of mutiny, but permitted them to hold a lottery among themselves to see who would lose their lives. As a result, nine were hanged and thirty-four were given whippings and lengthy jail sentences. In his Memoria, Amat expressed some discomfort in having been forced to proceed in such a fashion, but defended his actions by noting that leniency on the part of military commanders had been the cause of repeated misbehavior among the soldiers.<sup>108</sup>

Although the Peruvian militia had no foreign war to fight during the viceregency of Manuel de Amat, their services were utilized numerous times to preserve the internal security of the kingdom. Two of the most significant instances of this were the Quito tax rebellion of 1765 and the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. The conduct of the militia in each of these circumstances helped to determine the limits of effectiveness of this component of the Army of Peru.

In Quito a rebellion broke out following the attempt by the governor of that city to impose a sales tax upon cane brandy. In retaliation, a roving band of townspeople on the evening of June

22 destroyed the Quito customhouse which had been built to hold the revenues from this tax. After a few tentative attempts by the *audiencia* and the local militia failed, the rebels grew stronger and possessed themselves of the entire city. When the negotiations between the government and the rebels broke down completely, the Viceroy of New Granada petitioned Amat on July 28 to send an expedition to liberate Quito. Amat quickly ordered two companies from the infantry Regiment of pardos and two from the "Prince of Asturias Battalion" of the Regiment of Spanish Infantry, along with an artillery detachment and 50,000 pesos to be sent to Guayaquil where they were to unite with soldiers arriving from Panama for the overland march to Quito. When the expedition arrived in Quito, however, the revolt had already been ended by negotiations, and the *audiencia* was in proper control of the city.<sup>109</sup>

The Quito expedition again pointed up the fact that the militia of Lima was of little use as a peacekeeping force in the more distant parts of the interior, due to the time which it took them to reach their destination. In view of this distance between Lima and Quito it is somewhat difficult to see why the Viceroy of New Granada requested troops from the former city, but more difficult to explain why Viceroy Amat should have acceded to this request and outfitted a fruitless expedition which cost the viceroyalty some 112,000 pesos. One student of the situation has speculated that Amat was trying to demonstrate to the crown that he was able to militarily defend Quito, which had once formed a part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, in an effort to have it and Guaya-

quil rejoined once again. The incorporation of Guayaquil especially, with its fine harbor and ship chandlery, made reincorporation a favorite idea in Lima for a century thereafter.<sup>110</sup>

The expulsion of the Company of Jesus from America in 1767 offers one striking instance in which the reorganized militia were able to aid in the execution of another important Bourbon Reform, and demonstrated how such a militia could be mobilized rapidly to suit the purposes of the crown. The wealth and independent policies pursued by the Company made it a real threat to the absolutist Charles III and had caused him to expel the order from Spain some years before. In Peru the Jesuits were among the strongest of the various religious orders, possessing large landholdings and exercising, especially in Lima, enormous political power.<sup>111</sup> Vice-roy Amat characterized their expulsion from Peru as one of the most difficult tasks ever undertaken by his government.<sup>112</sup>

On March 2, 1767, instructions for expulsion were sent by the Conde de Aranda, the president of the Royal Council of ministers, to the various governors of the American kingdoms. On August 20 this order arrived in Lima, delivered by an official of the Buenos Aires government, whose mere presence provoked rumors that something was afoot. The order had been sent out to the interior cities of Peru from Buenos Aires somewhat earlier and Jesuit houses in Chuquisaca (August 17), Cuzco (September 7), Moquequa (September 7), and Mojos (October 5-8) had all been closed without incident and their members marched towards Lima for eventual departure. The

situation in Lima, however, promised to be considerably more difficult since the capital contained five of the largest and wealthiest houses of the twenty-five in all Peru. In addition, the network of family and property ties which its membership maintained with the upper classes of the capital meant that a riot might break out once the expulsion order became known. Therefore, although the order made no specific mention of soldiers being used, Amat determined to use the militia to insure the success of the venture.

The order received by Amat gave no specific date for ousting the Company other than to say that it should take place promptly after the receipt of the order. Therefore, Amat chose September 8, the birthday of Our Lady of Monserrat, the patron saint of the militia of Lima, when a review of the militia and parade were scheduled in the plaza mayor. Since the militia would already be assembled, no suspicion would be attached to their presence when the order was carried out. Amat also ordered the warship San José (El Peruano) outfitted for taking the Jesuits to Italy, simultaneously letting it be known that he was planning to send it to Acapulco on a trade mission. Although the viceroy would have preferred to utilize only the members of the Regiment of the Nobility, which was composed of members of the upper class, for the task of expelling the Company, he felt he needed more men than this. Unfortunately, the records do not indicate which ones were utilized. All that is known is that ten grenadier companies were invited to attend a formal dinner in the Royal Palace following



the mass which ended the review. After the dinner there was dancing and entertainment, including plays and readings. At two a.m. the highest officials in the city appeared at the rear entrance of the palace and requested admission, showing the message which Amat had sent them earlier in order to gain it. At this time the viceroy read to them the expulsion order. Not long thereafter a fijo infantry company from the Callao garrison arrived at the palace to relieve the company on duty there. This company, the members of the Viceroy's Guard, and the militia, gave the authorities a force of 700 soldiers. These were divided into four equal groups and dispatched to the four main houses of the city. By 5 a.m. the houses of the Jesuits were all occupied and their members in protective custody. In addition, troops had been sent out to seize the extensive Jesuit landholdings outside of the city. Within a few weeks the Peruvian Jesuits were at sea on their way to Italy and exile.<sup>113</sup> In a letter to the crown, Viceroy Amat boasted that "The Jesuits have been thrown out, and I threw them out like a herd of livestock."<sup>114</sup>

Although the crown considered the expulsion of the Jesuits to have been necessary to preserve the colonies, some subsequent developments tend to raise the question that perhaps its overall effect was detrimental to this end.<sup>115</sup> On the other hand, the skill and efficiency which the militia and fijo troops of Lima manifested in the affair indicated that in lieu of foreign wars to fight, their talents could be utilized in domestic affairs without concern

about their loyalty to the King.

This situation demonstrated as well as any the improvement which Viceroy Amat had effected in the Army of Peru, which, at the time of his arrival had been understrength and in a demoralized condition. The veteran, or regular component, which composed the backbone of the army at midcentury, had never been held in high regard by the inhabitants of Peru, due to the fact that as Spaniards they could be counted upon to treat both the lower classes and the creoles condescendingly and also because they were members of the lower class in Spain. In effect, the Callao garrison was, because of its notorious lack of discipline, a laughing stock.

There is no doubt that before the coming of this Viceroy [Amat] the critics joked with some apparent factual basis since there was no other [military] organization to be found except the good judgment of a retreat because the garrison, the armory, the militia, the cannon, only demonstrated that defenses were attributable to miracles. The advantages were always with the enemies, but through the Mercy of God we lived without fear, conceited in both spirit and necessities. Since [former viceroys] lacked the audacity to place the blame, no concern developed for the necessity of their arms, which became rusty from lack of use . . .<sup>116</sup>

By the end of Amat's term of office this situation seems to have changed. Certainly discipline was much improved due to the iron rule of the viceroy who served as a court of first instance whenever it pleased him. With the arrival of the battalion from the Regiment of Portugal in 1770 the size of the veteran component was substantially increased from what it had been at mid-century. By 1777 the Regiment of Royal Infantry of Lima had reached a strength of 690 men, 320 of which were regulars.<sup>117</sup> The size of the total veteran contingent in Peru and Upper Peru (Bolivia) numbered 1,362.

An additional 1,894 troops were located in the presidios of Chile. In all, the Viceroyalty of Peru and its dependency Chile could count 3,256 regular troops within their borders.<sup>118</sup>

Amat's accomplishments with the militia were equally impressive. The urban Battalion of Merchants and Regiment of the Nobility had been reorganized and numbered 495 and 384 men respectively. The remaining militia companies in Lima were classified as disciplined and were provided with veteran training cadres composed of twenty of the officers of the Regiment of Portugal and an additional twenty-six officers and sergeants from the militia Regiment of Spanish Infantry (Regimiento del Número) who were dispersed among them.<sup>119</sup> The several companies of disciplined militia were reorganized as follows.

The Regiment of Spanish Infantry which in 1762 had totalled twenty-seven companies had been reduced in size to two battalions with nineteen companies, numbering 1,347 men, including its command and staff group. In its officer corps were the members of the Lima nobility, with lower-born whites of the capital serving in its enlisted ranks.<sup>120</sup> In addition to the "free companies" of scribes, students, and artisans which had been raised in 1763, two more companies of mestizo tailors, officered by Spanish members of the tailors' guild, had been formed in 1769, each with a total strength of seventy-five men. The "free companies" all had their own training cadres and totalled 474 men in all.<sup>121</sup> The Regiment of pardos stood at two battalions of nine companies each totalling 942 men, while the Battalion of morenos numbered nine companies

with 474. The Regiment of Indians stood at three battalions with a total strength of 1,458. In all, the infantry militia of Lima numbered 5,251 soldiers by 1776. The artillery brigade had been increased in size to five companies totalling 344 men by the same date.<sup>122</sup>

The cavalry militia showed a similar increase in size. In addition to the two urban units already mentioned, there was a "free" company of lawyers with seventy-five men, four companies known as "Royal Fusileers," who were Spanish nobles with hunting experience. These compañías de cazadores (companies of hunters) as they often referred to themselves numbered 157 men. In addition, there were three companies of pardos numbering 104 men, three of morenos with seventy-seven, and a company of ninety-nine Indians. These seven companies of castes formed a Regiment of Nations numbering 280 troops in total.

The Regiment of Dragoons had been formed by Viceroy Amat in 1773 by combining into it the companies of dragoons which had been formed in 1762. By 1776 it was composed of three squadrons with three companies each, with a total strength of 362 men. In addition dragoon regiments had been raised in the outlying areas of Lima by large landowners possessing both horses and retainers. In the Lurigancho valley, for example, a regiment of dragoons existed formed into ten companies with a total strength of 445 men, all under the command of the Marqués de Moscoso. Another existed in the Carabaillo valley consisting of five companies totalling 314 men under the command of Colonel José Antonio Borda, a wealthy

creole. An additional regiment numbering 180 men existed in the suburb of Bellavista. By 1776 the cavalry and dragoon militia of Lima and its immediate suburbs stood at just over 2,000 troops. Viceroy Amat personally considered these cavalry soldiers to be the most useful arm of the service since they could rapidly traverse the coast to meet an enemy invasion near Lima.<sup>123</sup>

The size and condition of the militia outside of Lima during any given time is more difficult to estimate since the practice of sending copies of the reviews to Lima does not seem to have been followed. The distinguished historian Mendiburu states that prior to 1762 there were regiments of militia only in Cuzco, Arequipa, Guamanga, Trujillo, Tarma and three or four more provinces which he does not identify.<sup>124</sup> By the end of that year, an estimated 25,000 militia has been raised in response to the Seven Years War.<sup>125</sup> By the end of the viceregency of Manuel de Amat the total number of militia in Peru was estimated to be four times this number, or nearly 100,000, composed of seventy-five battalions and seventy-five "free companies" of infantry which totalled 60,775 men, 125 squadrons and fifty "free companies" of cavalry numbering 22,273, and eighty squadrons and thirteen "free companies" of dragoons with 13,348.<sup>126</sup>

The size of these figures would be suspect even if further proof of their existence were available. Since it is not they are even less reputable and consequently unworthy of much attention. In cases where evidence is available, it can be seen that the companies in these battalions frequently existed at some distance

from each other, reducing the tactical utility of the regiment immeasurably. This was clearly evident in a letter written in 1770 to Amat by the governor of the province of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Luís Alvarez de Nava. In it he noted that since most of the militia worked on large landholdings located well outside of the town, they could not be freed for a sufficient amount of time for them to travel to town to drill with their companies. Therefore, he proposed that the viceroy provide him with sufficient funds to cover the cost of maintaining these soldiers in town for a one-month training period which he felt would be sufficient to turn them into effective soldiers. There is no indication that Amat honored this request, however. The governor also complained that the efforts of interior governors to train their militia were frustrated by the authorities in Lima, who paid far more attention to the companies located on the coast. He warned that the numerous Indians and Portuguese required as much attention as that being given to the possibility of an English invasion, since this region was "the key and doorway to Peru."<sup>127</sup>

Such a telling comment indicates something about the militia buildup in Peru: namely that the emphasis by 1776 was almost completely upon the creation of coastal units designed to protect against an English invasion. A proper disciplined militia did not exist in the interior by 1776. The only exception to this general rule were the new companies raised in the larger mining towns and cities of the highlands against the threat of Indian attack. Moreover, along the coast, the emphasis seems to have been on the

creation of mounted "flying squads" which could rapidly cover the area in case of an invasion. For example, in the provinces of Chancay, Canta, Huarochiri, Jaujos, Cañete, and Ica which ringed Lima, of the 6,609 militia which had been raised, all but 900 were mounted cavalry or dragoon units. Numerically, recruitment had been heaviest along the northern coast from Paita to Chimbote, where 16,062 militia had been raised. To the south along the Atacama desert, less than half of this number of militia had been raised, most of them close to the city of Arequipa.

In the interior, most of the militia units centered in and about the larger towns and cities such as Jauja (13,250), Huanca-velica (5,093), Cuzco (11,773), and La Paz (4,974), which reflected more than anything the Spanish desire to avert raids by hostile Indians. It is practically certain according to later testimony, that all of the militia raised outside of the immediate Lima area were of an urban classification, lacking standard strengths and training cadres, due to the reduced danger of attack in these areas and the scarcity of veteran troops. (See Table 3.)<sup>128</sup>

In conclusion, Viceroy Manuel de Amat presided over several of the early Bourbon Reforms, and instituted others of his own, such as the teaching of mathematics and Newtonian physics at San Marcos. In addition, Amat reoriented military strategy to utilize the harsh topography of Peru to deter enemy invasions, retaining selected fortifications only for the purpose of protecting certain populated areas from capture and ransom.<sup>129</sup> He also succeeded in

TABLE 3  
THE ARMY OF PERU IN 1776

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1. Regular Troops

Lima	328
Callao	785
Santiago	214
Valdivia	357
Chiloe	146
Juan Fernandez	56
Tarma	156
Jauja	67
Santa Cruz de la Sierra	26
Chilean Frontier	<u>1,121</u>
Total	3,256

2. Militia

Lima - Companies of Infantry

Regiment of Spanish Infantry	1,347
Battalion of Merchants	495
Regiment of Indians	1,458
Regiment of pardos	942
Battalion of morenos	535
"Free companies of scribes, students, tailors, etc.	<u>474</u>
Total	5,251

Lima - Companies of Cavalry and Dragoons

Regiment of the Nobility	384
Company of Lawyers	75
Companies of Spaniards	157
Companies of Nations	280
Regiment of Dragoons	362
Dragoons of Lurigancho	445
Dragoons of Carabaillo	314
Dragoons of Bellavista	<u>180</u>
Total	2,197



TABLE 3 (cont.)

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Provinces surrounding Lima	6,809
Coastal Provinces North of Lima	16,062
Coastal Provinces South of Lima	7,752
Interior Cities:	
Tarma and Jauja	13,520
Huancavelica	5,093
Cuzco	11,773
Lake Titicaca Basin	4,017
La Paz	4,974
Cochabamba	8,595
Oruro	750
Potosí	5,912
Total Infantry Militia	60,775
Total Cavalry Militia	22,273
Total Dragoon Militia	13,348
GRAND TOTAL	96,396

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Source: Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 85-86; AGI:AL 653 "Estado general que manifiesta las tropas milicianas . . . que en este virreynato del Peru se han alistado . . . n.d.; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 371-373, 723-724.

completing the fortress "Real Felipe" at Callao despite financial limitations which hindered his efforts. Third, he reoriented Peru away from its former dependence upon a large and expensive navy which consumed much of its revenues.<sup>130</sup> In its place Amat created an improved standing army, increasing the size of the regular contingent considerably. Finally, he created the first disciplined militia in Lima and ordered the creation of many other urban units throughout Peru. In so doing, Amat encountered the opposition of the Church which created a psychology of distrust to these innovations. This was no doubt due to its fear of having its own privileged status diminished by the rise of a competitive institution to power in the form of a professional military. Some persons, for example, questioned whether the preponderance of clerics in Lima was necessary for its security now that soldiers were there.<sup>131</sup>

One of Viceroy Amat's prime accomplishments was to restore the dignity of militia service as an honorable form of employment. One observer called this the viceroy's "greatest triumph" and noted that militia posts which had formerly been fit only for Negroes were now "hungrily sought" by sons of the best families of Lima, whose fathers encouraged them to pursue a career of arms rather than letters.<sup>132</sup> The fact that many of them were creoles would become increasingly significant as the period wore on.

These contributions have led Spanish historian Vicente Rodríguez Casado to conclude that by the end of Amat's term

the militarization of the country was achieved, and when, years later, the Tupac Amaru revolt occurs and in the epoch of [Viceroy] Abascal, the civil war for independence begins, the viceroyalty of Peru will always be the principal center of resistance to the death. In the final analysis, such facts have been accomplished, thanks perhaps to the organizational efforts of don Manuel de Amat.<sup>133</sup>

Since this interpretation of the period is dangerously misleading, it is necessary, from an historical viewpoint, to clarify the situation.

To begin with, the militia buildup in the interior cannot be proven, and in fact subsequent developments after 1776 indicate that a disciplined militia never came into existence there before or after that date. This, combined with the failure of the various expeditions sent during the two preceding decades to subdue Indian rebels indicates that one cannot properly speak of the interior being "militarized" in any sense of the word. Only in Lima could a proper army be said to have existed by this date.

Secondly, the rivalry between whites in the Army of Peru caused a cleavage within that institution which militated against the unity requisite to an effective militarization. It is an axiom of Latin American history that Peninsular Spaniards held the top positions in society in most of Spanish America and in addition, commanded the best political offices and highest salaries.<sup>134</sup>

This statement is generally true in Peru, although due to their loyalty creoles seem to have been relatively well off in that kingdom. Still, there were not enough positions of responsibility to be given to all those desiring them. Excluded from positions of honor and responsibility, the creoles entered the militia after

1762 as both a means of reaffirming their loyalty to the king and to improve their own positions. Creoles monopolized the senior officerships in the militia companies created in Lima during the Seven Years War.<sup>135</sup> The pride which emanated from belonging to this militia was an interesting byproduct of the mobilization, since it heightened the tension existing between creoles and Spaniards. One creole observer, whose brother was the infantry commandant, boldly asserted that

We do not have to fear England, any other nation, or Hell itself, due our discipline, instruction, artillery, [and] arms. I doubt that other better prepared, and disciplined [militia] can be found on the day and hour that a drummer sounds.<sup>136</sup>

The bitterness of the creole nobility towards the Spaniards in Peru was deep and definite.<sup>137</sup> Much of it can be seen in the contempt held by the creole militia for the Spanish regular troops, whom they felt were avaricious, dissolute, and expensive to maintain. They felt that these soldiers forgot their training in the Indies, and maintained that if only the creoles were given the proper instruction, they would exceed them in the handling of arms which was considered to be a European virtue.<sup>138</sup> Creoles cited as proof of this the example of the Captain of the Viceroy's Guard Victorino Gonzales Montero, a creole who had been appointed to train the companies being readied in Lima to pursue the rebel Juan Santos, a spectacle which drew great crowds of admiring creoles.<sup>139</sup>

Although Amat privately referred to the members of the creole nobility as "evil and daring" men, to whom corruption

was an attribute of their birth, he actively sought their participation in the militia since this group could best afford to bear the expense of raising and outfitting new companies.<sup>140</sup> In so doing, he sought to help heal the breach between creoles and Peninsulars which threatened the unity of the kingdom. That he and his successors were unsuccessful in this will be shown throughout the following chapters.

Finally, it is wrong to give to the militia created by Amat credit for the defeat of the rebel José Gabriel Tupac Amaru or for prolonging the later wars for independence. In the first place, as Chapter IV will show, it was not the provincial militia, but rather local irregulars, officered by Spanish regulars, who finally subjugated the Indian forces. Although it is without the scope of this paper, there is good evidence that this combination also formed the basis of the Army of Peru during the wars for independence.

Viceroy Amat left Peru with the warning that internal rebellion posed a far greater threat to the security of the viceroyalty than did the threat of an external attack, although he urged that defenses against both dangers be maintained. In a broader vein, he called for a thoroughgoing reform of the administrative system to end corruption and injustice.<sup>141</sup> Although his military reform program was not without its detractors,<sup>142</sup> it provided a solid base for the later reforms provoked by the Wars of the American Revolution.

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective (New York, 1970), p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 103; Woodrow Borah, "Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII, No. 3 (August, 1963), pp. 375-376.

<sup>4</sup> Mendiburu, I, 410-441.

<sup>5</sup> Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 72-73.

<sup>6</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 153.

<sup>7</sup> José Cruces Pozo, "Cualidades militares de Amat," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, IX (Seville, 1952), 338.

<sup>8</sup> Micaela Villegas was a thirteen-year-old courtesan living in the Calle del Huevo, in Lima's bordello when Amat arrived as the viceroy in 1761. In 1766 the two were introduced and the viceroy fell madly in love with the young girl. When he took her as his mistress, the scandal rocked the vicerealty. He built her a house, the Quinta del Rincón, and had the Rimac river diverted through it to simulate the famous Alhambra of Spain. Amat took no efforts to hide his love, and often paraded openly with Micaela through the streets of Lima. He also preferred to spend time with her friends in the theatre rather than with members of the Lima aristocracy. Her nickname, "La Perricholi," apparently stemmed from an argument in which Amat referred to her as a perra chola (half-bred bitch) in reference to her low birth. He built the famed Paseo de Aguas and the bullfight arena Acho to please her, much to the dismay of his critics, who accused him of misusing public funds. When Amat left Peru in 1776, he left Micaela pregnant. She subsequently bore him a son, Manuel de Amat y Villegas, later to become a signer of Peru's Act of Independence. See Descola, pp. 246-260.

<sup>9</sup> Antonio de Areche to Fernando Marqués de La Plata, Viceroy of La Plata, Lima, February 1, 1783, p. 1, cited in Eunice Joiner Gates, "Don José Antonio de Areche: His Own Defense," Hispanic American Historical Review, VIII, No. 1 (February, 1928), 23.

<sup>10</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 701.

<sup>11</sup> José Morales de Aramburu, "Noticias del verdadero ventajoso estado político, de el Perú vajo [sic] la governación de el Excelentísimo Señor Don Manuel de Amat y Junient," Fenix, V (Lima, 1947), 335-336. Aramburu was a wealthy creole who was in Chile during Amat's presidency, and then later returned to Lima where he became a lawyer for the Audiencia and a prosecutor for the Inquisition. He later was made rector of San Marcos. See Mendiburu, II, 99. Amat also raised an urban militia in Santiago and enforced strict rules at the presidio of Concepción and Valdivia in an effort to end the corruption which prevailed there. Before his arrival, Aramburu notes, Royal laws were nothing more than "painted images to which reverence is lent."

<sup>12</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 706; AGI:AL 1490, Compendio de las Prevenciones que el Excelentísimo Señor Don Manuel de Amat hizo para la defensa de la Guerra contra Portugal, e Inglaterra, Lima, November 10, 1763, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Compendio, pp. 1-2. For a succinct analysis of the steps whereby a militia company was raised, see McAlister, "Reorganization," pp. 22-24.

<sup>14</sup> Compendio, p. 21. The author of the Compendio was Antonio de Elexpuru, Viceroy Amat's secretary. He notes that Amat "supplied money in hand, the obstacle to obtaining sutlers and vehicles which are not customary in these areas; as a result, many are found there today." Prior to this, troops were left to feed themselves off the land as best they could and often stole to do so.

<sup>15</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. lxxix-lxxxiv.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 579, AGI:AL 653, Report from Viceroy Manuel de Amat to the King, Lima, December 10, 1763, pp. 2-4.

<sup>18</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 328-331.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 703.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 746-747. Amat enumerates the ports and their suitability for an invasion on pp. 777-778.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., pp. 322, 747.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 748.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. xlviii.

<sup>24</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Royal order from King Charles III to Viceroy Amat, Madrid, November 22, 1764; Aramburu, p. 317. By 1777 weapons shipments brought the total number of rifles in the Lima armory to 12,000. The coast bristled with 400 cannon, of which "Real Felipe" mounted 186 of all calibers. Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, p. 88, notes 101-102.

<sup>25</sup>Aramburu, p. 299.

<sup>26</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 124.

<sup>27</sup>AGI:AL 639, "Resumen por menor de las graves [sic] dolencias en que ha enfermado esta basta gobernación del Perú," Lima, March 12, 1762, cited in Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 79-80; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 353-354; Pozo, pp. 11-12.

<sup>28</sup>AGI:AL n.c. Letter from Viceroy Amat to Minister of the Indies Julian de Arriaga, Lima, November 18, 1769, cited in Pozo, pp. 12-13.

<sup>29</sup>AGI:AL 639, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 7, 1768, p. 1; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 580.

<sup>30</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Report of Viceroy Amat to King Charles III, Lima, January 5, 1764, cited in Pozo, p. 14.

<sup>31</sup>Del Moral was temporarily replaced by Pablo Saenz de Bustamante who had been educated in Spain and was an officer in the Royal Army. Mendiburu, X, 7-8.

<sup>32</sup>Aramburu, p. 315.

<sup>33</sup>AGI:AL 639, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, January 6, 1768, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup>A list of the units and their officer corps is set out in Elexpuru, Compendio, pp. 10-19, passim.

<sup>35</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 734; Elexpuru, Compendio, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup>Elexpuru, Compendio, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>38</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 713.

<sup>39</sup>Elexpuru, Compendio, p. 3.



<sup>40</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 713-714. The overwhelming majority of the men who sponsored militia companies were prominent creoles. See AGI:AL 1491 "Lista de los oficiales que se dedicaron al arreglo egercicio y enseñanza de los soldados de su cargo," Lima, February 23, 1765, pp. 1-3.

<sup>41</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 713; Mendiburu, I, 411. For a sample of one of these charters, see "Decreto de Amat sobre la creación de una compañía de Fusileros," Revista Histórica, VI (Lima, 1918), 290-293.

<sup>42</sup>Elxpuru, Compendio, pp. 20-21.

<sup>43</sup>Ella Dunbar Temple (ed.), La Gaceta de Lima del Siglo XVIII (Lima, 1965), p. 75.

<sup>44</sup>Elxpuru, Compendio, p. 23.

<sup>45</sup>Arthur S. Aiton, "Spanish Colonial Reorganization under the Family Compact," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII, No. 3 (August, 1932), 269-280; L. N. McAlister, "Reorganization," pp. 1-2.

<sup>46</sup>Aiton; Allan Christelow, "Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil, 1759-1783," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXVII, No. 1 (February, 1947), 9-10, 24-27.

<sup>47</sup>Stein, pp. 95-97. At the end of the war Great Britain returned Havana and Manila to Spain. In exchange, Spain gave up all its possessions east of the Mississippi River, including Florida and granted important trading concessions also.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 90-91.

<sup>49</sup>Aiton, pp. 273-274; McAlister, "Reorganization," p. 8.

<sup>50</sup>Letter from Julian de Arriaga to Richard Wall, Madrid, April 2, 1760, cited in Vicente Rodríguez Casado, La Política y los Políticos en el Reinado de Carlos III (Madrid, 1962), pp. 105-108.

<sup>51</sup>McAlister, Fuero Militar, p. 3.

<sup>52</sup>Bibiano Torres Ramírez, "Alejandro O'Reilly en Cuba," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XXIV (Seville, 1967), pp. 1357-1388.

<sup>53</sup> The 1734 Ordenanza de milicias provinciales de España was supplemented and amended and finally culminated in 1767 in the Real declaración sobre puntos esenciales de la Ordenanza de milicias provinciales de España. In New Spain, for example, both of these plus the Cuban Regulation were supplied the inspector-general in charge of reorganization of the militia, yet he was free to set up the strength and organization of the regiments as he saw fit. McAlister, "Reorganization," p. 12.

<sup>54</sup> Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, p. 56.

<sup>55</sup> Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 313. I have been unable to locate this document. Presumably it was only a rationale for the establishment of a militia and not a table of organization, since it is not referred to during the subsequent reorganization.

<sup>56</sup> AGI:AL 651, Report from Viceroy Amat to the King, Lima, December 10, 1763, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-4.

<sup>58</sup> AGI:AL 654, Reglamento sobre las milicias del Virreynato del Peru, Lima, August 31, 1766.

<sup>59</sup> AGI:AL 644, letter from the Marqués de Grimaldi to Julian de Arriaga, San Ildefonso, September 10, 1769, p. 1. Grimaldi states that

With respect to Peru, that viceroy [Amat] displays such military expertise, and moderation [regarding] what he considers necessary in order to defend that domain, that it seems to me that one ought to supply all that he asks.

<sup>60</sup> McAlister, "Reorganization," pp. 20-21.

<sup>61</sup> Reglamento sobre las milicias del Peru, p. 2. While the Peruvian militia regulation coincided to some degree with the Cuban regulation, there is enough difference between the two to assume that the former was based on earlier regulations instead. For example, an infantry battalion under the Peruvian regulation was based upon nine companies of seventy-five men apiece, while the Cuban regulation specified ninety. Thus the battalion strength for the Peruvian regulation was 675 men, while the Cuban regulation specified 800. Furthermore, the Peruvian regulation made no distinction between cavalry and dragoon battalions, whereas the Cuban regulation specified a cavalry battalion to contain 650 men and a dragoon battalion to contain 450. (See Table 4, Chapter III.)

The officer corps and the command and staff groups of the Peruvian regulation also varied from the Cuban ordinance in that the former did not specify which ranks were to be held by veterans, whereas the Cuban regulation was more definite on the subject. In practice, however, the key posts of sergeant major and adjutant were reserved for regulars, while militia officers frequently held

the other ranks, due to the shortage of regular troops in the vice-royalty.

The usual practice was for the colonel of a regiment to be appointed by the king from a list of candidates submitted by the viceroy. The remaining officers were then selected by the viceroy from a list submitted by the colonel. Noncommissioned officers were chosen by the captains of each company. Due to the difficulty of communicating with the crown during the Seven Years War, Viceroy Amat appointed all militia officers subject to royal confirmation. After the war the crown ordered an end to this practice and also decreed that vacancies in the fijo regiments should be filled by the Minister of War. AGI:AL 1491 Royal Order from the King to Viceroy Amat, San Ildefonso, September 14, 1764; ibid., September 8, 1766; AGI:AL 1885 Royal Order from the King to Viceroy Amat, San Lorenzo, November 21, 1770.

<sup>62</sup>ibid., p. 3. For a detailed explanation of the history of the fuero militar, see McAlister, Fuero Militar, pp. 6-10.

<sup>63</sup>McAlister, Fuero Militar, p. 5.

<sup>64</sup>ibid., p. 3.

<sup>65</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 701-702.

<sup>66</sup>AGI:AL 664, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, August 6, 1771, cited in Pozo, p. 9.

<sup>67</sup>El expuru, Compendio, p. 10.

<sup>68</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 11.

<sup>69</sup>El expuru, Compendio, p. 9.

<sup>70</sup>Aramburu, p. 316.

<sup>71</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1768, p. 5.

<sup>72</sup>Aramburu, p. 316.

<sup>73</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1768, p. 5; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 104; Aramburu, p. 343. For an example of their diatribes against Amat, see the "Drama de los Palanganas Veterano y Bisoño," Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía, LXXXVI (Santiago, 1939), pp. 280-329.

<sup>74</sup>AGI:AL 652, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, February 10, 1776; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 765.

<sup>75</sup>Aramburu, p. 317.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 333.

<sup>77</sup>Reglamento sobre las milicias del Peru, p. 3; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 714.

<sup>78</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 715-716.

<sup>79</sup>AGI:AL 651, Amat to the King, Lima, December 10, 1763, pp. 5-6; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 716-717.

<sup>80</sup>See Plate Two following page xlvi in Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, showing a diagram of this demonstration in the plaza mayor.

<sup>81</sup>Aramburu, pp. 327-329.

<sup>82</sup>AGI:AL 653, Amat to Arriaga, January 26, 1775, p. 1. Viceroy's were allowed to reject orders which they considered to be inflammatory and contrary to public safety.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., pp. 2-3.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.; AGI:AL 653, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, March 18, 1775, pp. 1-3. Amat boasted that he trusted the members of his Guard so completely that he had entrusted a shipment of 200,000 pesos to a soldier to carry a distance of 500 leagues and not a peso had been lost.

<sup>85</sup>AGI:AL 652, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, May 31, 1770, p. 1; Ordenanzas de S.M. para el régimen, disciplina, subordinación y servicio de sus ejércitos . . . 2 vols. (Madrid, 1768).

<sup>86</sup>AGI:AL 651, Por quanto el Estudio de las Matemáticas, que hoy tan empeñosamente se cultiva en todo el Orbe Literario . . . Lima, February 21, 1766.

<sup>87</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Certamen o Conclusiones Matemáticas defendidas en este Real Universidad de San Marcos . . . bajo la Instrucción y Dirección del Doctor D. Cosme Bueno, Lima, June 11, 1768, pp. 1-9. Amat's secretary enthused that "These young men . . . capable of shining in any court, will free from ignorance a new World that ought to have flowered from the time of its conquest." (Aramburu, p. 299.)

<sup>88</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 730.

<sup>89</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 1, 1768, p. 4.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>92</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 659.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 660. This became necessary since, by Amat's estimate only about 2,500 of the 14,000 Indians on the island were capable of bearing arms in an emergency (pp. 657-658).

<sup>94</sup>In addition, Beranger reported that he had raised 1607 infantry militia and a 20-man artillery company. AGI:AL 1492. Report from Colonel Carlos Beranger to Julian de Arriaga, San Carlos de Chiloé, April 9, 1770, p. 1; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 660-662.

<sup>95</sup>AGI:AL 1492, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, February 23, 1767, p. 2.

<sup>96</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. lxvi-lxvii. For the best study of Amat's program of fortification, see Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Florentino Pérez Embid, Construcciones Militares del Virrey Amat (Seville, 1947).

<sup>97</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1768, pp. 1-5.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 5. For a diagram of the shore batteries, see Figure 11 which follows p. 748 in Amat, Memoria de Gobierno.

<sup>99</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1768, pp. 10-12.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-9.

<sup>101</sup>AGI:AL 644, "Estado del Peru. Año de 1769," San Ildefonso, September 10, 1769. This is a copy of the report sent by Grimaldi to Arriaga on February 25, 1768, pp. 1-5.

<sup>102</sup>Mendiburu, VI, 169. See the observations of Viceroy Guirior (AGI:AL 655 Manuel de Guirior to José de Gálvez, Lima, February 20, 1777, p. 1) who denied the regulation had ever been put into effect.

<sup>103</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Arriaga to Amat, San Ildefonso, n.d. The President of Chile died while Morales was in Santiago, and Amat appointed him to fill this position which he did until 1773 when he was replaced by Augustín de Jauregui. Morales died shortly thereafter. Another Inspector General was not sent out to Peru until 1776. Diego Barros Arana, Historia General de Chile, 16 v., 2nd ed. (Santiago, 1932), VI, 342, 363; Mendiburu, VIII, 7.

- <sup>104</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 800.
- <sup>105</sup>Pozo, pp. 11-12.
- <sup>106</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>107</sup>Mendiburu, I, 445-446, 467.
- <sup>108</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 800-802; Pozo, pp. 11-12.
- <sup>109</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 288-291. The rebellion was led by three Spaniards who had heavy investments in the business of distilling brandy. Mendiburu, I, 414.
- <sup>110</sup>John Edwin Fagg, Latin America, a General History (New York, 1963), p. 349; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 703-704. In 1803 Guayaquil was reincorporated into the Viceroyalty of Peru.
- <sup>111</sup>AGI:AL 1491, Report of Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1768, p. 5. A project currently undertaken by Professor Pablo Macera of San Marcos University is compiling data on the extent of their landholdings.
- <sup>112</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. xlv.
- <sup>113</sup>Descriptions of the expulsion of the Company from Lima may be found in Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 130-132; Aramburu, pp. 310-311; Reuben Vargas Ugarte, Jesuitas Peruanos desterrados a Italia (Lima, 1934), pp. 4-11, and the last chapter of Luis Martin, The Intellectual Conquest of Peru: the Jesuit College of San Pablo, 1568-1767 (New York, 1968).
- <sup>114</sup>AGI:AL 639, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, April 12, 1768, p. 2.
- <sup>115</sup>The classic condemnation of the Spanish colonial system was the Lettre aux Espagnols-Américains, written by the Peruvian creole Juan Pablo Viscardo. It was later published by Francisco de Miranda and taken by him to Spanish America in 1799 for propaganda purposes. Humphreys and Lynch, pp. 7-8.
- <sup>116</sup>Aramburu, p. 315.
- <sup>117</sup>AGI:AL 655, "Estado que manifiesta la Tropa, que el Batallon Fixo de Ynfanteria del Rl. Phelipe del Callao . . . Lima, March 8, 1777.
- <sup>118</sup>Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 85-86. In royal orders dated January 12, 1767, and October 20, 1768, the crown had requested Field Marshal Augustín de Jauregui in Chile to

draw up a table of organization for the fijo component of the Army of Chile and to forward it to Viceroy Amat for his approval. See AGI:AL 655, Reglamento que . . . propone el mariscal de campo Dn. Augustin de Jauregui . . . al Exmo. Señor Virrey del Peru Manuel de Amat, Santiago de Chile, April 25, 1776. The plan, which was forwarded by Amat on November 11, 1768, called for the creation of twenty-three fijo companies of fifty men each, or a total of 1,150 soldiers. Of these companies, six infantry and twelve dragoon companies were to form the Army of the Frontier to be permanently deployed in the south against the Araucanian Indians. The remaining companies were to be spread among the coastal presidios.

<sup>119</sup>AGI:AL 651, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, December 4, 1769, p. 1; Barros Arana, VI, 341; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 371-373.

<sup>120</sup>AGI:AL 658, "Proyecto proponer los medios que considera más útiles y proporcionados a la actual constitución de este Reyno para mejorar el pie y adelantar la instrucción de sus tropas de Milicias . . .," Lima, July 31, 1778, pp. 1-2; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 723-724.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-4; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 722.

<sup>122</sup>Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 371-373, 722-723.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 728.

<sup>124</sup>Mendiburu, I, 411-412.

<sup>125</sup>El expuru, Compendio, p. 10.

<sup>126</sup>AGI:AL 653, "Estado general que Manifiesta las Tropas Militianas . . . que en este Virreynato del Peru se han Alistado de Orden del Ex<sup>mo</sup> S<sup>or</sup> Virrey . . .," n.d. (cerca 1775).

<sup>127</sup>AGI:AL 645b, Luís Alvarez de Nava to Viceroy Amat, San Lorenzo de Barranca, October 5, 1770, pp. 1-3. The comments of the subinspectors general sent out by Viceroy Guirior in the following chapter demonstrate conclusively that these militia were largely non-existent.

<sup>128</sup>AGI:AL 653, "Estado general . . ."; Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, p. 89. Descriptions of the militia forces in the provinces at this time are quite rare. One such description by Miguel Feijóo, the corregidor of Trujillo, entitled Relación descriptiva de la Ciudad y Provincia de Trujillo . . . December 6, 1771, indicates that this town of 9,000, located north of Lima on the coast, had a command and staff group consisting of a governor at arms, field marshal, commissar general, and a sergeant major. The militia numbered



seven infantry companies with 350 men, a 30-man artillery company, and three cavalry companies with a total of 330 men, plus a "free company" of Indians. The remaining town in the province had an additional thirteen companies of cavalry numbering 630 men. Feijóo notes that all the militia of Trujillo were formed on "the old plan of war" indicating that the Cuban militia regulation had not been applied there. Apparently local nobles paid well for the privilege of becoming members of the command and staff groups, pp. 18-19.

<sup>129</sup>Gregorio de Cangas, "Descripción en diálogo de la Ciudad de Lima: entre un Peruano práctico y un visón Chapeton," La Causa de la Emancipación del Perú (Lima, 1960), p. 304. Cangas was a veteran officer serving on the training cadre for the militia of Lima. Cangas makes it clear that the militia was counted upon to come to the aid of the presidios if besieged.

<sup>130</sup>AGI:AL 644, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, October 26, 1770, p. 1.

<sup>131</sup>Aramburu, p. 329.

<sup>132</sup>Cangas, "Descripción en diálogo . . .," pp. 301-302.

<sup>133</sup>Vicente Rodríguez Casado, cited in Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. lii.

<sup>134</sup>Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America, 3rd ed. rev. (New York, 1968), p. 184.

<sup>135</sup>See note 40; Bailey Diffie, Latin American Civilization: Colonial Period (Harrisburg, Pa., 1945), notes that out of 170 viceroys ruling in America, 1535-1813, only four were born in America; of 602 captains-general and presidents, fourteen; of the 706 bishops, 105, but these men were given the less important dioceses (p. 488). In Peru the situation seems to have been better than this: 136 persons born in Peru held positions in the councils and audiencias during the same period; 98 served as archbishops or bishops; 63 as generals or brigadiers. Mendiburu, VI, 439-454. In addition to holding many militia posts, creoles in Lima dominated the audiencia. They were to become one of the prime issues in the dispute between the viceroy and the visitor-general (see the following chapter).

<sup>136</sup>Aramburu, p. 297.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid., pp. 329, 338.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 317. Aramburu noted that the Europeans, who were "so presumptuous in the handling of arms, became depressed" when they viewed the proficient militia exercises held in the main square.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., p. 331.



<sup>140</sup> AGI:AL 639, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 7, 1768, p. 1; ibid., April 30, 1769, p. 3.

<sup>141</sup> AGI:AL 639, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, April 30, 1769, p. 5; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 820-822.

<sup>142</sup> Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre, Plan del Peru, defectos del gobierno español antiguo, necesarias reformas, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1823), p. 16, felt that Amat sought to arm the lower classes by creating a militia and to utilize it to overthrow the crown and make himself King of Peru but that he never had time to realize this plan. Vidaurre was an erratic creole judge of the Audiencia of Cuzco who fled Peru prior to independence because of his liberal ideas. See Pike, pp. 41-43; Mendiburu, XI, 305-306.

### III. THE ARECHE VISITATION AND THE WARS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Spain's entrance into the Wars of the American Revolution against Great Britain caused the first major reorganization of the militia created earlier by Viceroy Amat. This reform was to be complicated, however, by the presence of the Visitor General José Antonio de Areche and the repercussions of several other Bourbon reform measures taken after 1776.

By the year 1776 the Spanish Crown was ready to put into execution a number of administrative changes which it was hoped would prepare the colonies for the war against Great Britain anticipated by the Secret Committee for Imperial Defense. On December 4, Manuel de Amat sailed for Spain and retirement.<sup>1</sup> His replacement, Lieutenant General of the Royal Navy Manuel de Guirior, the former Viceroy of New Granada, arrived in Paita on July 17, 1776, and began an overland trek to Lima to better acquaint himself with the country he was to rule. This appointment was for him the capstone of a distinguished career. On December 3 he made his public entrance into Lima and on December 13 was formally invested by the rector of San Marcos.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the capable José de Gálvez had replaced Julián de Arriaga as Minister of the Indies the previous year.<sup>3</sup> One of his first acts was to dispatch Brigadier General José del Valle

as Inspector General of the Army and Governor of Callao to replace Morales.<sup>4</sup>

The social and economic situation which Guirior inherited was discouraging. Agricultural production had failed to keep pace with local demands, and the viceroyalty was dependent upon imports of wheat from Chile to feed itself.<sup>5</sup> Trade would continue to decline after the "free trade" regulation of 1778. Whereas under the laws formerly in effect Callao was the only west coast port open to the register ships proceeding south from Panama, making it the entrepôt for the entire subcontinent, after this date Santiago and Guayaquil were permitted to trade freely with Spain, and the competition of Buenos Aires and Montevideo would cause a reorientation of trade patterns towards the Atlantic coast. Nevertheless, Callao remained the leading commercial port on the Pacific coast throughout the century.<sup>6</sup>

The social situation in Peru was explosive as well. The extortionate repartimiento system, whereby Indians were forced to buy worthless goods at inflated prices, had caused revolts to break out in the provinces of Chumbivilcas, Huamalies, Caylloma, Conchucos, Jauja, and Lambayeque, among others. In several of these revolts, the Indians had killed the corregidores and their families. In most cases, local militia or irregulars could put down the uprisings, which were generally small in size. However, pasquines, or lampoons disrespectful of royal authority kept appearing in public places long after the rebels had been put down.

The viceroy feared that not even military force could end this disrespect. In Cuzco, the scene of "disturbances too numerous to count," the militia had to be called out to garrison the city in an effort to restore peace.<sup>7</sup>

A combination of economic and military factors weighed in the decision of the crown to create the Viceroyalty of La Plata in 1776. The failure of the two military expeditions sent out from Lima to expel the Portuguese from the Sacramento Colony located west of the Spanish port of Montevideo and opposite Buenos Aires, was an admission that Peru could not administer this region with any degree of effectiveness. Moreover, the viceroyalty in Lima could not assist the silver cities of Potosí and Oruro quickly if the situation should require it. While Potosí was 400 mountainous leagues from Lima, it was only 194 leagues from Buenos Aires.<sup>8</sup> While Viceroy Amat had recognized these problems, he had recommended that Buenos Aires be placed under the control of Chile as a compromise.<sup>9</sup> By June, 1777 the expedition dispatched by the King under the command of Pedro de Cevallos had expelled the Portuguese from Sacramento and had established the Viceroyalty of the La Plata. The most damaging aspect of this creation to Peru was the subsequent decision of the crown to transfer jurisdiction of the rich Audiencia of Charcas, which contained the silver mines of Potosí and Oruro, to the new viceroyalty. In so doing, it removed from Peru two of its richest treasuries at the time when military and civil expenditures had reached all-time highs. The end result of the creation of the

new viceroyalty was to reorient commercial patterns and impoverish the Lima merchants, provoking a bitter competition for hegemony between Lima and Buenos Aires that was to endure throughout the century.<sup>10</sup> It was also to place serious financial limitations on future military reform.

A brief look at the finances of the viceroyalty of Peru at this time will indicate the condition. Total revenues, which in 1774 had been 3,986,908 pesos, by 1777 had dropped to 1,473,018. Expenditures, which had been 3,566,612 pesos in 1774, in 1777 stood at 2,070,053, causing a yearly deficit of nearly 600,000.<sup>11</sup> Military expenditures had increased yearly since the mobilization of 1762. By 1771 military expenditures reached an all-time high of 2,234,921 pesos.<sup>12</sup> One of the most damaging expenses was that of sending annual military subsidies (situados) to the outlying areas of the subcontinent for their defense. These were sent to the various presidial areas such as Valdivia, Chiloe, and Juan Fernandez. In addition, money was sent to Quito, Panama, and Buenos Aires. By 1779 the annual subsidy to Panama was nearly 300,000 pesos.<sup>13</sup> This was exceeded in size, however, by that sent to Buenos Aires which during the period of Guirior's viceroyalty reached the sum of four and one-half million pesos.<sup>14</sup> Although the Peruvian officials continually petitioned to be freed from the payment of these subsidies in order to apply the money within their own kingdom, there is no evidence that such requests were granted.<sup>15</sup>

It was this deteriorating economic situation which led the crown to institute the visitation of José Antonio de Areche to Peru in 1777. The use of the visitation had been highly successful in New Spain in 1765 where it was executed by José de Gálvez, who now sat as Minister of the Indies. To carry out the mission the crown accepted Gálvez's recommendation of his old associate Areche, whom he knew to have been dogged and loyal defender of the royal interest during his successful career as an administrator.<sup>16</sup> Since the financial health of Peru, notably its silver and crown monopolies, was a strategic link in the chain of events which were calculated to restore Spain to fiscal solvency, the king and his advisors considered the visitation to be a most important undertaking.<sup>17</sup>

José Antonio de Areche, Intendant of the Army, Councillor of the Army, and gentleman of the Order of Charles III, was appointed to his post on March 11, 1776. On March 21, 1777 he sailed from Acapulco with a group of functionaries who comprised his staff. On June 14 he arrived in Lima and found his instructions awaiting him.<sup>18</sup> The personalities of the viceroy and the visitor general were opposite in nature, and they would have likely clashed even under more favorable conditions than those which existed in Peru at the time. Manuel de Guirior was affable and conciliatory, a lover of wine and an epicure, who surrounded himself with the creole nobility which his predecessor Amat had shunned. Areche was harsh and uncompromising, two traits which made him one of the most hated men in Peru.<sup>19</sup> With the grant of the superintendency

of the royal tobacco monopoly and the royal treasury to Areche in June, 1780, the seeds of further discontent were planted between the two men. Loss of this power constituted a serious blow to the power and prestige of the viceroy since through control of the junta superior of the treasury he could gain valuable support in the interpretation of vague decrees, and escape sole responsibility for their evasion.<sup>20</sup> By dividing the supreme authority in Peru between two men who were unalterably opposed to each other the crown had also weakened the viceroyalty at a critical period in its history.

Areche first focused upon Guirior's close friendship with the creole elite of Lima in his campaign to discredit the viceroy at court. In a secret report to José de Gálvez, Areche compared Guirior unfavorably to Viceroy Amat, a strong authoritarian personality like Areche himself. Since Guirior's arrival, Areche accused him of having "handed over [the government] to the worst creoles of this America, who have debased it," an obvious reference to the group of wealthy landowners who controlled the audiencia and heavily influenced the viceroy on matters of policy.<sup>21</sup> These accusations by themselves had little effect. However, in light of the later Tupac Amaru rebellion, they were to provide the crown with a rationale for deposing the viceroy.<sup>22</sup>

One of the first projects to occupy the attention of the new viceroy was a verification of the size of the militia as it had been reported by Viceroy Amat. A royal order of November 18, 1775

informed Guirior that, according to its figures, the viceroyalty had a total of 96,396 militia, not including the nine transmontane provinces which were practically uninhabited. It also noted that the area forming a radius of fifty-three leagues around the capital reportedly had 7,239 infantry militia and 8,440 cavalry militia. The crown informed the viceroy that if this figure was correct, it was sufficient to defend Lima, but that in order to increase the effectiveness of these troops they were to be provided with training cadres to furnish them instruction in the handling and firing of weapons and military discipline.<sup>23</sup>

To this end, Viceroy Guirior ordered Inspector General José del Valle to inspect the number and quality of militia within the Audiencia of Lima and to send subinspectors to the more distant regions of the viceroyalty for the same purpose. Del Valle was told to apply the provisions of the Cuban regulation for the reorganization of the militia wherever it seemed advisable. He was also ordered to estimate the number of veteran officers needed to instruct these militia, and to estimate the cost of providing them. All of this was to be drawn up into a report which was to be forwarded to the King.<sup>24</sup>

In a preliminary report to the crown, Guirior noted that the number of militia estimated by Viceroy Amat was certainly sufficient to defend the kingdom against attack if the figure was accurate. But he went on to add that it was likely the subinspectors would find a "great reduction" in this number upon their inspection tours,



since Amat's figures had not been revised downwards since the outbreak of the Seven Years War. He went on to bemoan the fact that with only one fijo battalion in the viceroyalty he was unable to provide the militia with enough capable officers to direct their training. Moreover, Guirior stated that due to the presence of various castes within its ranks the fijo battalion itself was internally divided, but noted that he encouraged these rivalries since they acted to prevent the battalion from becoming a threat to the royal authority. As for the militia, Guirior said that he possessed no information to indicate that they had any aptitude for military service.<sup>25</sup> This problem, he said, was compounded by the fact that the "gowned Ministers and legists" in the kingdom refused to obey the military ordinances. He closed by asking the Council of the Indies to issue a declaration which would order that they be observed.<sup>26</sup>

The status of the fijo battalion at Callao had later been confirmed in a report of the Inspector General del Valle. The viceroy himself had toured the fortress somewhat earlier and had been appraised of the serious shortage of weapons in the coastal port cities. He ordered del Valle and Zini, along with the commissar of war and a military engineer Mariano Pusterta to form a commission to evaluate the needs of the storehouse and armory at "Royal Phillip" in order that steps might be taken to provide these necessities.<sup>27</sup> Subsequently, del Valle told Viceroy Guirior that the rate of attrition in the fijo battalion was reaching a crisis

situation. Growing numbers of soldiers were soliciting permission to retire from the royal service once their terms of enlistment were up, he noted, and all efforts to provide replacements for them had failed. He recounted one recruiting mission had turned up 165 men, but that these were "full of vices and evil habits" and not much good for service as a result. He felt that honorable men, be they Spaniards or Peruvians, had little inclination to serve in the army since they felt they could be financially more successful in other fields. He warned the viceroy that the battalion was 252 men understrength, and held that in light of the fact that it was the only body of troops which could be counted upon to support the crown in any and all circumstances, an additional 400 veteran troops were needed to bring it to strength. In view of this petition, Guirior wrote the crown asking for an additional 272 soldiers from the fijo battalion, maintaining that he had sufficient officers to train them.<sup>28</sup> By December the battalion was at a strength of 488 men.<sup>29</sup>

As the subinspectors of militia returned to Lima with their reports on the provincial militia it became clear to Viceroy Guirior that his suspicions had been correct. In a letter to the Minister of the Indies he informed Gálvez that the Cuban Militia Regulation had never been applied to Peru although this had been ordered by the King earlier. As a result, he felt they could not be compared either in appearance or skill to the militia of Cartagena or Panama, both of which he had observed in training and admired. He went on to warn the ministry that any officers of the

Peruvian militia who presented themselves at court should be regarded as members of the urban militia, and should not be considered to have the same degree of training and utility as members of the regular or disciplined militia, since in many cases the units they claimed membership in were imaginary.<sup>30</sup>

By July Inspector del Valle had completed his project concerning the status of the militia of Peru. It constituted the first searching examination of this component of the Army of Peru since their creation a decade earlier. Coming just prior to the entrance of Spain into the Wars of the American Revolution, it constituted a particularly appropriate guideline for the royal authorities to evaluate the success of the reorganization. The report divided into two parts, the first containing the measures recommended for improving the militia of Lima, and the second setting forth proposals for bettering the provincial militia in selected areas which del Valle felt were of the greatest strategic significance to the viceroyalty.

In Lima, del Valle recommended that the infantry militia be reorganized into five battalions and two free companies, and that the cavalry and dragoons be reorganized into three regiments. He also proposed that selected units along the coast be reorganized due to their strategic location. Basically, the inspector general proposed that each unit be increased in strength in conformity with the Cuban Regulation. (See Table 4.) This would mean that each fusileer company would be increased from seventy-five to ninety men apiece as prescribed by the regulation. The two grenadier companies in each regiment would be raised in strength

TABLE 4

UNIT ORGANIZATION UNDER THE REGLAMENTO FOR THE  
DISCIPLINED MILITIA OF CUBA, 1769

White Infantry Battalion											
Companies	Captains	Lieutenant, Veteran	Second Lieutenant	Sergeants			First Corporals			Soldiers	Totals
				First, Veteran	Second, Militia	Veteran	Militia	Second Corporals	Drummers, Veteran		
Grenadiers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	64	80
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	74	90
Totals	9	9	9	9	18	18	36	54	9	656	800

Command and Staff Group

1 Colonel  
 1 Sargento Mayor (Veteran)  
 1 Ayudante (Veteran)  
 2 Standard-bearers  
 1 Chaplain

1 Surgeon  
 1 Drum Major (Veteran)  
 1 Corporal, Gastador  
 6 Gastadores

TABLE 4 (cont.)

Pardo Infantry Battalion										
Companies	Captain	Lieutenants	Second Lieutenants	First Sergeants	Second Sergeant	First Corporal	Second Corporal	Drummers	Soldiers	Totals
Grenadiers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	64	80
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	6	6	1	74	90
Totals	9	9	9	9	18	54	54	9	656	800

Command and Staff GroupWhite

1 Ayudante Mayor, Suinspector  
 4 Ayudantes  
 5 Garzones

Pardo

1 Commandant  
 2 Standard-bearers  
 1 Drum Major  
 1 Corporal, Gastador  
 6 Gastadores  
 3 Fifers

TABLE 4 (cont.)

Cavalry Regiment										
Squadrons	Companies	Captains	Lieutenants	Second Lieutenants	Ensigns	First Sergeants	Second Sergeants	First Corporals	Second Corporals	Soldiers
		Totals								
1	Carabineers	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	First	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Second	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Third	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Fourth	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Fifth	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Sixth	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Seventh	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Eighth	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Ninth	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Tenth	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Eleventh	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
	Twelfth	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	44
Totals		13	13	13	13	13	13	26	26	572
		650								

Command and Staff Group

1 Colonel	1 Chaplain
1 Lieutenant Colonel	1 Surgeon
1 Sargento Mayor (Veteran)	4 Buglers (Veteran or Militia)
1 Ayudante Mayor (Veteran)	

TABLE 4 (cont.)

Dragoon Regiment											
Companies	Sergeants					First Corporals					Totals
	Captains	Lieutenants	Second Lieutenants	First Veteran	Second Militia	Veteran	Militia	Second Corporals	Drummers Veteran	Soldiers	
1	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	84	100
1	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	84	100
1	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	1	84	100
1	1	1	1	0	2	0	3	3	0	42	50
1	1	1	1	0	2	0	3	3	0	42	50
1	1	1	1	0	2	0	3	3	0	42	50
Totals 6	6	6	6	3	12	6	21	27	3	378	450

Command and Staff Group

1 Colonel	1 Chaplain
1 Ayudante Mayor (Veteran)	1 Surgeon
2 Standard Bearers	

Source: Adapted from Ordenanzas de S.M. para el régimen, disciplina, subordinación, y servicio de sus ejércitos, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1768).

from seventy-five to eighty men apiece. Such changes would raise the size of the infantry regiments from 1,350 to 1,600 men.

Del Valle also recommended that each of these regiments be provided with a training cadre. This was to consist of veteran officers who were to hold the key posts of sergeant major and adjutant. In addition, each regiment was to have eighteen lieutenants, eighteen first sergeants, thirty-six corporals, a drum major, eighteen drummers and four fifers. He recommended that these groups be put on pay status in order to assure their dedication to the task. He also included a list of three candidates for the posts of adjutant and sergeant major for the viceroy's consideration.

The training cadre proposed for the regiments of pardos and morenos was somewhat different than that proposed for the Regiment of Spanish Infantry above. For these regiments of castes, del Valle recommended the same increase in strength, and asked that the position of subinspector general be given to a veteran officer with the rank of adjutant major. To assist him, del Valle recommended that there be eight adjutants with the rank of lieutenants, and ten acting sergeants. The Battalion of morenos was to be increased in size from 675 to 800 men, and provided with an adjutant major, four lieutenants, and five sergeants for their training. The "free companies" were to be furnished with an adjutant and a lieutenant to oversee their training. Del Valle remarked that the Battalion of Merchants should remain on its present footing as an urban unit as well as the Regiment of Indians, but



recommended that the officer corps of this latter unit be retained on pay status in recognition of their efforts to stimulate these Indians in the pursuit of the glorious career of arms.

The report recommended that the Regiment of Dragoons be increased in size from three to four squadrons, and that each of the three companies in each squadron be raised in size from forty to fifty men apiece. In all, the regiment was to be increased from 360 to 620 men. These troops, which were drawn primarily from among the employees of the wealthy landowners of the Carabaillo, Lurigancho, and Magdalena valleys surrounding Lima, who possessed the finest horses in the capital, were a valued part of the inspector general's plan, due to their mobility in defending Lima against a seaborne attack. For this reason, the plan also specified that additional dragoons were to be added to the Regiment of Cañete, drawing up the employees of the white landowners of the Mala, Chincha, and Pisco valleys, and provided with training cadres similar to those specified for the Regiment of Lima. The Regiment of Dragoons of Chancay was also to be increased in size to 620 men, by drawing on the landowners of the Huarura, Barranca, and Pachivilca valleys. The report retained the Regiment of the Nobility and the "free companies" of lawyers and other groups as urban militia and made no proposals to alter their present formation. In total, the inspector general estimated that these eight regiments would reach a realistic total of nearly 6,200 soldiers available during peacetime to defend the capital.

To supplement this force, del Valle recommended that the size of the Callao garrison be increased. He felt that a veteran infantry regiment and a regiment of dragoons should be sent out from the Peninsula since, if an internal emergency arose, the absence of the battalion would leave Lima virtually defenseless against an attack by sea. The inspector general seemed to have anticipated the futility of such a request due to financial limitations. He submitted an alternative proposal suggesting that each disciplined battalion of infantry and cavalry militia be called to serve in the Callao garrison for a year, during which time they would be trained and paid as a *fijo* unit.

The second part of the plan identified areas of the coast and the Indian frontier where militia units were to be reorganized and placed on a disciplined basis. Del Valle specified the cities of Tarma, Jauja, and Cuzco since these were all centers of large Indian population where violence had broken out in the past. To the south, the report singled out the Arica-Arequipa region located forty-five leagues south of Lima, which embraced three seaports and which constituted the first inhabited area in the viceroyalty which an invader rounding the Cape Horn would encounter. According to this information, del Valle estimated that this region of approximately 216 leagues in circumference contained three infantry battalions, eight squadrons of cavalry, and five squadrons of dragoons. While he made no suggestions for changing the size of these units, del Valle did urge that training cadres be provided for them immediately, and that an additional training group be sent to the island of Chiloe.

The northern coast, including the city of Trujillo and the port of Paita, reportedly contained three infantry battalions and eleven cavalry squadrons which also were to be provided training. The province of Tarma located forty leagues east of Lima contained three squadrons of cavalry militia and three of dragoons, plus some "free companies" of infantry, none of which had received any training. Del Valle recommended that they be provided training groups since these militia were frequently required to serve against the Indians of the region. He advised the same consideration be given to the three battalions of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry and three of dragoons in the province of Jauja slightly to the east. Cuzco, located approximately 186 leagues southwest of Lima, held a reported three infantry battalions, and four cavalry squadrons within a circumference of forty leagues. The inspector general proposed that a large training cadre be stationed in Cuzco to provide training for all of the militia located along the Indian frontier.<sup>31</sup>

In his summation, del Valle spoke to the problem of neglect of the militia in Peru. The practice of leaving them untrained in their present state of ignorance, he warned, could have "pernicious results" if it was allowed to persist. He cited the fact that they had been created without the benefit of ordinances or military laws, and that consequently they showed no subordination, punctuality, or respect for their superiors. To end this state of "ignorance, confusion, and disorder" in which they found themselves, del Valle recommended that the viceroy solicit from the king an order requiring obedience to the Cuban Regulation which should be printed and

distributed throughout the viceroyalty.<sup>32</sup>

When the viceroy received the estimated cost of providing command and staff groups for these militia he called it "absolutely exorbitant" and complained that the condition of the Royal Treasury prevented its payment. The inspector general had estimated that 390 instructors would be required for the job, costing 258,694 pesos annually. Since only 54,468 pesos had been budgeted for instruction of the militia, the remaining 204,226 pesos would have had to be financed out of the royal treasury, which Guirior noted was in such a depleted state that it could not pay fixed expenses such as military pensions, which that year had risen to 345,918 pesos. Such a situation placed the viceroy on the horns of a dilemma. While he was forced to concede to the Minister of the Indies that the regiments of militia set out in the Estado General which was submitted annually to the crown were imaginary, he warned that the disturbances within the Audiencia of Lima itself had not been put down, and were "only in the early stages of formation at the present time." Nevertheless, faced with a treasury which could not bear any additional expense, Guirior notified Gálvez that he was forced to suspend execution of the Inspector General's plan pending royal approval.<sup>33</sup>

The reply which the viceroy received from the Ministry of the Indies regarding the plan warned of the great expense which the command and staff groups proposed by the inspector general would entail, and ordered the viceroy and his advisors to make

the final decision on the matter. To do so the viceroy formed a junta composed of the visitor general, the inspector general, and the military commandants to decide the issue. All of the various issues concerning the defense of the kingdom were to be discussed, and ways to reduce the cost of such a plan were to be proposed. To this end, Viceroy Guirior ordered del Valle to submit to him rosters of the regiment of infantry and cavalry in the provinces along with recommendations as to which should be retained and which should be abolished. The inspector was also asked to draw up rosters giving the rank, location, and pay status of all members of the command and staff groups presently serving on active duty in the viceroyalty.

On May 5, 1779, this state of the militia of Peru was submitted by the inspector general to the viceroy. The total strength of the militia was set at 66,716 men. The annual cost of providing their training was estimated to be 68,700 pesos. This report was discussed by the junta which met on June 28, and all of those assembled agreed that this total strength was imaginary. In the debate which followed over the issue of increasing the size of the training cadres for the disciplined militia as proposed by del Valle, the members of the junta felt that, although it entailed a significant expense, training cadres should be provided in Peru as they had been in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Cartagena, and Panama. All of the members of the junta agreed with the assessment of the inspector that the militia lacked training and obedience, and all felt that training cadres were necessary to provide these

virtues. The junta passed a resolution authorizing del Valle to review the militia of Lima and to reform them into battalions of nine companies each as specified by the Cuban Regulation. The inspector was further authorized to reorganize the officer corps, discharging those officers he felt to be incompetent and submitting three candidates for vacancies based only upon consideration of their capacity to lead. Since the Royal Treasury could not afford the cost of the salaries of the proposed training cadres, it was decided that the inspector should select members of the *fijo* battalion at Callao and place them in the regiments as he saw fit. It was also decided that subinspectors were to carry out periodic reviews of the provincial militia which had not previously been done and were to form additional companies where there was a sufficient number of persons to merit it.<sup>34</sup>

Earlier, the viceroy had created the Commandancy General of Artillery to bolster the defense of Lima. In recognition of its utility to the crown, the corps of artillery was granted a separate jurisdictional status from the other *fijo* companies, and placed under the command of Colonel Antonio Zini. Its size was set at four companies of 100 men each, and provided with a technical training cadre. A school and training ground was set up outside of Lima to teach the rudiments of physics and provide practice in the firing of weapons. The size of the companies remained at fifty men throughout most of the period, however, due to expense.<sup>35</sup>

On September 26, 1779, the declaration of war against Great Britain and on the side of the American colonies was published in Peru by Viceroy Guirior.<sup>36</sup> On the same day the viceroy published an edict ordering all citizens capable of bearing arms to present themselves in a general review before the inspector general unless they were excluded from service under the provisions of the Cuban Militia Regulation. The review was ordered for September 27.<sup>37</sup> The lack of attendance at the review left the viceroy shocked. In a letter to his executive secretary Pedro de Ureta, Viceroy Guirior held that the units were far below their listed strengths. He singled out the regiments of pardos and morenos as being especially deficient. This absence the viceroy interpreted as an abhorrence of military service on the part of these castes, which he termed "criminal and prejudicial" to the interests of the crown. Guirior ordered that a review be held the following day in which these castes were to be forcibly enlisted in their units or suffer the penalties prescribed for such unauthorized absence.<sup>38</sup> The viceroy presented the inspector general with several royal standards which he ordered placed at the head of these regiments to symbolize that it was the king's will that this enlistment take place. He simultaneously published an edict ordering all free castes to enlist in their respective units, and warning that those failing to do so would be considered as slaves of the crown and be forced to work perpetually on the public works of the king. The edict warned that any free caste who attempted to present himself as a

slave, or any master or scribe who abetted such an attempt to defraud the royal authorities would be sentenced to ten years in the presidio of Valdivia.<sup>39</sup>

The financial limitations placed upon the viceroy reduced preparations for the war to modest levels. Merchant ships were armed to patrol the coasts and warn of enemy ships approaching, and property owners were again asked to register their slaves, mules, and firearms which might be utilized in the event of an attack.<sup>40</sup> Circular orders were also sent to the coastal corregidores, ordering them to review the militia within their districts frequently, but not authorizing them to bring these units to strength. Due to the penurý of the Royal Treasury, considerable reliance was again placed upon the generosity of individual citizens to furnish the means to provide an adequate defense.<sup>41</sup> In a letter to the Ministry of the Indies, Guirior expressed the effects which the loss of the treasuries of Potosí and Oruro had had on the viceroyalty and that as a result of the constant requests for military subsidies Peru was "completely exhausted of wealth."<sup>42</sup>

As the war wore on, Viceroy Guirior became convinced that measures must be taken to improve the militia. He confided to Gálvez that "the gentle resolutions taken up to the present" to induce enlistment had not produced the desired results, and that he had been forced to use strict penalties to fill the battalions. He chided the ministry for not processing his requests for the promotion of promising militia officers with greater speed, and



remarked that only by rewarding these subjects and setting them off from their peers would any permanent change in morale be effected. He reminded Gálvez that the kingdom of Peru was wholly dependent upon this militia in the event of an emergency because "This vice-royalty establishes its defense on no other bulwarks than those of their courage, since as Your Excellency knows, there is only one battalion of veteran Troops, incapable of protecting their present barracks."<sup>43</sup>

Within his final limitations, the viceroy began to implement the reforms proposed by the inspector general and to place Peru on a wartime footing. On October 5, he ordered that the Cuban Militia Regulation be republished and distributed throughout the vice-royalty to provide a model for the reorganization of the militia of Lima. The Regiment of Spanish Infantry was the first to be reorganized along these lines and to be provided with a veteran command and staff group.<sup>44</sup> The Regiment of Dragoons was also re-established upon a provincial basis, while veteran training cadres were provided for the Regiment of Cavalry of the Villa of Arnedo in the province of Chancay, and for the Regiments of Dragoons of Carabaillo and Guacirán outside of Lima. Corregidores were also authorized to publish edicts ordering the enlistment of all residents of a certain age in order to bring their units to the strengths prescribed in the Cuban Regulation.<sup>45</sup>

Appeals were also made to persons of wealth to help outfit and equip the militia of Lima. Especially gratifying was the

response of the Real Tribunal del Consulado (merchants' guild) which offered to help as it had done previously in 1763. In January the Tribunal met and agreed to provide the cost of 1,000 uniforms and to pay the expenses of billeting two militia companies, one of infantry and one of cavalry, which were to rotate periodically in two barracks which were being built in the Plaza Santa Catalina at the expense of the cabildo (municipal council) of Lima. Besides agreeing to pay the salaries of these two companies, the consulado promised to pay the costs of outfitting and supporting 1,000 men if an expedition was sent into the field. By 1779 the consulado of Lima was spending an annual 600,000 pesos to support the militia of Lima and Buenos Aires, due to the default of the royal government in providing such expenses.<sup>46</sup>

By October, 1778 Viceroy Guirior again wrote to Gálvez and informed him about the progress of the militia reform. He stated that the receipt of a secret order dated January 24, 1778 which restricted him from incurring any extraordinary expenses had prevented him from providing training cadres for the militia companies outside of Lima as proposed by the inspector general, and that as a result the militia of Lima were "the only ones which merit this name of all those of the viceroyalty." He described the battalions of free castes as demonstrating the greatest amount of professionalism in this regard, and the artillery companies as exhibiting the least, although he expressed hope that the training by the fijo artillery company at Callao might soon improve this situation.<sup>47</sup>

Notwithstanding this limitation, by November, 1779, the viceroy showed general satisfaction with the way in which regular training had improved the militia of Lima. In a letter to the Ministry of the Indies in which he described a review held to honor the birthday of Charles III, Guirior spoke of the 5,396 militia which he reviewed as being motivated by a deep love for their sovereign and willing to sacrifice their lives for him. He concluded that these soldiers "are real and not imaginary" and that if they received regular training, the king could count on them to defend his dominions and to carry out his will whenever he requested it. He noted that in Lima this militia drilled on Sunday afternoons practicing maneuvers and handling weapons, and that they did it with "ardor and pleasure." He relayed to the crown the assurance of the inspector general that Lima could count on 3,989 infantry militia and 1,870 cavalry and dragoon militia "upon the slightest novelty" and that there were 1,400 cavalry militia available to reinforce them within four days of receiving notice.<sup>48</sup>

The viceroy also paid attention to increasing the number of presidial troops during this period, and especially to the strategic island of Chiloe which had been incorporated by Viceroy Amat. The fijo battalion at Callao was increased by 100 men to a strength of nearly 700 to replace a detachment of soldiers which had been sent to garrison the city of Arequipa during a period of internal disturbance. In addition, 200 troops were recruited for the garrison at Valdivia, while Valparaiso, Concepción, and Juan Fernandez each received detachments of fifty men and munitions from

a naval squadron outfitted in Callao and sent down the coast. Soldiers and munitions were also sent to Guayaquil at the request of the governor there.<sup>49</sup>

The example of preparations made on the island of Chiloe is illustrative of the importance attached to that island as a bulwark of defense in the South Pacific. In 1778 the crown sent Manuel Zorrilla, an Engineer Extraordinary of the Royal Armies, to survey the defenses of the island. In his report, dated October 26, 1778, Zorrilla noted the presence of 130 fijo troops on the island and recommended that this number be supplemented by three additional companies of 100 men each. He emphasized that the terrain and the numerous inlets on the island made further fortifications unnecessary, and recommended that it instead be defended by a mobile standing army.<sup>50</sup> In response to this report, Viceroy Guirior named Tomás Sheé, a former captain in the Regiment of Ireland as Commandant of Arms of the Province of Chiloe and Lieutenant Jacinto Iriarte of the Regiment of the Queen Mother as his second in command. The appointment of military men as military governors in frontier areas was an established tradition in Peru and most of the colonies.<sup>51</sup> On December 4, 1779, Sheé arrived in Chiloe where he discovered the fijo companies to be "badly disciplined and bored." In his report to the king, he cited the number of militia in San Carlos, the capital, at 2,674, but added that they could not be counted upon in an emergency unless additional regular troops were provided to train and officer them.<sup>52</sup> He

proposed that four companies of fijo troops totalling 210 men be raised to supplement this militia and provide them with instruction.<sup>53</sup>

The declaration of war against Great Britain also prompted the initial reorganization of the militia in Chile. The militia of that captaincy general totalled 15,856, all of which were urban except those of Santiago and Concepción which had been provided with training cadres from the presidial troops in these areas and were classified as provincials. The declaration of war was received in Santiago from Peru on October 5 and republished on November 8, 1777. Augustín de Jauregui, the president of the audiencia, immediately ordered that veteran training cadres begin training the militia of Santiago, La Serena, and Copiapo, and that the Valparaíso garrison be reinforced with an additional fijo company. The Cuban Militia Regulation was dispatched to Cuba and was followed in reorganizing the militia there. In Santiago the 200-man Battalion of Merchants and the Battalion of pardos which totalled 150 men, were both brought up to strength but were retained on an urban classification. Three new provincial regiments were created by Jauregui: the Regiment of Infantry "del Rey" numbering 800 soldiers, and two cavalry regiments, the Regiment "El Príncipe" and "La Princesa" both with 600 men apiece. The militia of southern Chile, while found to exist on an irregular basis, was at least battle-tested due to constant skirmishing with the Araucanian Indians of the area south of the Bío-Bío River. This component was backed by the Army of the Frontier stationed at

Concepción under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ambrosio O'Higgins. This detachment had been reinforced with a veteran infantry battalion and a cavalry detachment during the British occupation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and by 1780 the total strength of the regular component in Chile stood at 1,900 men.<sup>54</sup>

Since Peru never became a theater of the conflict between Spain and Great Britain, it was the increased demands for revenue which constituted the most significant aspect of the war upon the viceroyalty. While the war had led to the first major reorganization of the militia, the economic limitations produced by the need to send military subsidies to other parts of the empire in America reduced the scope of this reorganization to Lima and a few other selected areas within the audiencia.<sup>55</sup> In addition, the war was to have other repercussions in Peru. In an effort to finance the military expansion program, the visitor general instituted a series of new taxes which were to provoke serious outbreaks of violence. These in turn were to provide the issue which would split the viceroy and the visitor general still further apart, resulting in the ouster of the former at the hands of his rival. Such events split the royal government of Peru at a most critical period in its history immediately prior to the rebellion of 1780 which constituted the most serious threat the Spanish crown had experienced until that time. Insofar as the visitation acted to limit the military reform, it raises the issue of whether the Bourbon Reforms are to be viewed as part of a unit, each working to produce a certain end, or if at times they actually worked at

cross-purposes to one another.

One of the prime missions of José Antonio de Areche as the king's emissary to Peru was the reorganization of the Peruvian treasury which was felt to be producing far below its capabilities. The visitor sought every means to increase revenues, including the extension of royal monopolies to products which had previously been untaxed. In 1779 he devised a new tax which he called a "military contribution" and levied it upon free persons of color in an effort to finance the cost of the war. The fact that these free castes had never before in Peru been included as tributaries, which they argued the tax made them, offended their dignity and prompted them to revolt against royal authority.<sup>56</sup> The additional fact that the leaders of these tax revolts were also officers in the newly reorganized militia made them formidable opponents. The defeat of the new tax measures in turn set financial limitations on future efforts to reform the militia, since the tax was to pay for increased training cadres. It pointed up the fact that the Bourbon program was not a harmonious whole but that often Bourbon fiscal and military measures worked at cross purposes with each other, such as the creation of the La Plata viceroyalty had demonstrated. Perhaps most significant was the fact that the cost of the reforms fell upon those least prepared to pay and benefitted only a small minority. This provoked a small rebellion in Lambayeque which was only a prelude to more serious rebellions. It was these later rebellions which were to end the career of the Viceroy Manuel de Guirior.

In 1779 Visitor General Areche appointed a series of fiscales, or attorneys to traverse the viceroyalty in an effort to obtain a complete census of tributaries. Not only did such a census provide the crown with a list of potential conscripts for the militia, but it also gave the government an idea of what level of revenues might be expected in a particular area and helped it to regulate its expenses accordingly. For this reason the census was a fearsome and hated event. For the registration of the tributaries in Lambayeque on Peru's northern coast, Areche commissioned Juan de O'Kelly, the corregidor of the province of Saña who also held the rank of gentleman in the Order of Charles III and a captaincy in the artillery militia of Lima. O'Kelly was given the title of Lieutenant to the Captain General and, along with his aide, Juan Muñoz de Villegas, arrived in Lambayeque in November, 1779.

In his first meeting with the free persons of color in Lambayeque, O'Kelly explained that although they had not previously been called upon to pay such a tax, they must now be registered and meet their quotas or suffer the consequences. O'Kelly also met with the representatives of these castes, the captain of the Company of pardos libres Celedonio Oliva, and his lieutenant Manuel Bejarano. He attempted to impress upon them the fact that the "military contribution" did not constitute a tax, but only a donation "to maintain the troops which [Lambayeque] has, and should have . . . [to protect] against the enemies envious of America and its land, and useful productions." O'Kelly went on to explain how financially weak the kingdom was and the



benefit which this contribution would make to the crown. Before leaving, Oliva and Bejarano were informed that it was their responsibility to assemble the castes for registration the following day and that payment of the "contribution" was due and owing immediately.

Apparently Bejarano and Oliva were not impressed with this line of reasoning and instead returned to their people to formulate a plan of action to resist payment of this new tax. Although exactions had been coming at an increasing rate, in most cases the castes paid their share with little comment. This tax was particularly hateful, however. In the first place the money was to be used to pay the salaries of veteran training cadres who often treated the local militia with contempt and disrespect. More importantly, the tax was felt to be a disguised form of tribute. In a letter drafted to O'Kelly, the two militia officers argued that the contribution constituted merely another form of tribute, and that free castes in Peru had never been included as tributaries before. To consider them as such, the petition went on, was to imply that they held a lower standard of loyalty to the crown than did other groups and that they had been conquered by force of arms like the Indians. Both of these assertions were true, it went on, and constituted an affront to their honor as loyal vassals of the king. The letter added that the castes of Lambayeque had been given no proof by O'Kelly that the tax was being collected from the castes in Lima. The authors went on to profess the great loyalty which the castes held for the crown, proof of which they

maintained could be demonstrated by the fact that many of them continued to serve in the militia even though no salaries attached to these positions. The letter implied that if O'Kelly could prove that the castes of Lima were paying such a tax, that those in Lambayeque would follow suit. But they demanded proof in the form of a letter from the viceroy himself requesting this contribution, and noted they would accept this evidence from no one else.<sup>57</sup>

On December 4 Areche received a report from O'Kelly in which he included the letter from the free castes of Lambayeque. O'Kelly asked the visitor to reduce the quota to four pesos in Lambayeque and asked that proof that the tax was being collected in Lima be forwarded to him immediately. In his reply Areche again stressed the voluntary nature of the "military contribution," the purpose of which was to defray the expenses of the "distinguished Army Corps of this America." He noted that it was not necessary to adhere to a fixed quota if this would facilitate collection, but he admitted that he was losing patience with the action of these insolent Negroes. He threatened to send "500 disciplined and paid troops" to Lambayeque "for a few months" in order to "tear out this unjustified demonstration of insolence and disloyalty." All of this was bluster, however. The viceroyalty simply did not have the money or manpower to dispatch such an expedition. Areche admitted as much in his closing admonition to O'Kelly, notifying him to withhold further efforts to collect the revenue until the

viceroy had been appraised of the situation and could comment on it.

In a letter to the viceroy, Areche defended the "contribution" on the basis of precedent in the Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de las Indias which permitted the taxation of free castes, although he admitted that it had not been applied to Peru for centuries. Areche maintained that it had been peacefully collected in other areas of the viceroyalty, but neglected to mention the disruptions which it had provoked as well.<sup>58</sup> He described the Negroes as "disrupters of the public peace and enemies of the rights of the King." He cited the insulting manner in which they had allegedly presented the letter to O'Kelly "entering the house of the commissioner with an air of independence, their hats on their heads, throwing the letter on the table, and taking seats without being asked," in an effort to enlist the sympathy of the viceroy. The visitor admitted, however, that the sending of troops to put down this rebellion was impossible and did not request permission to do so. In his reply Guirior agreed that a legal basis did seem to exist for imposing the tax, but cautioned that in light of the fact that it had not been invoked for years that it would be wise to proceed with caution on the matter. No further instruction was given.

In a second letter to the viceroy Areche defended his conduct and described the scrupulous means by which he was proceeding in order to assure equity in the collection of the tax. He expressed

hope that the situation in Lambayeque would stabilize itself since he had ordered O'Kelly to establish a monopoly on the sale of brandy instead of attempting to collect the contribution. Areche warned the viceroy that by changing the method of collecting these revenues nothing had really been solved though. He noted that the crown's failure to make an example of the incident in Lambayeque might provoke other incidents in other parts of the viceroyalty. He suggested that the viceroy might therefore want to give the leaders of the Lambayeque uprising "some signal . . . at least . . . some visible sign of your displeasure," but there is no evidence that Viceroy Guirior complied with this request. Although he ordered the corregidor of Lambayeque and O'Kelly to denounce and reprimand the leaders of the insurrection, he stopped short of removing them from their militia posts, probably due to the furor which such a move would have provoked. His advice that these leaders atone for their actions by making voluntary contributions bears a ring of total unfamiliarity with the realities of the situation. In a subsequent letter to O'Kelly ordering him again to cease efforts to collect the tax, Areche explained that

. . . present circumstances do not permit the separation of the garrison troops from [Lima], which, to my understanding, would be the only means of bringing that miserable people to their senses, seduced by the ignorance and malice of those who confuse advice with coercion.<sup>59</sup>

The significance of the Lambayeque rebellion lies in the fact that it provided a model for other revolutionaries who sought, often successfully, to limit the government's power to tax. In Cuzco, for example, Lorenzo FÁrfan de los Godos, the son of a former

regidor (alderman) of that city and a member of the nobility, was inspired by the Lambayeque example. An employee of the hated customshouse which was to collect the revenues from these new taxes, Fáfán recruited a group of silversmiths and Indians who also harbored resentment against the government's economic policies and mining regulations. In one of the meetings, Fáfán recounted the ways in which the citizens of Lambayeque had resisted the implantation of the customshouse by O'Kelly and had finally forced the officials to return to Lima. According to his information, the people of Lambayeque, as soon as they received the dispatch regarding the customshouse

. . . they read it and tore it up, and did not admit [it]  
 . . . they were good men because without forming an alliance they resisted the establishment of the customshouse, they did not give the customs officials anything to eat, neither did they sell them the necessities of life with their silver until they became annoyed and left . . . one man had feigned insanity . . . and went from house to house with his small drum encouraging people to resist.

Farfán noted that in Quito three persons had persuaded the rest of the persons in the city to sign an appeal to prevent the establishment of a customshouse there. He was also aware that similar pressure carried on in Arequipa against the customshouse there had forced its closing as a mob estimated at 1,000 poured into the streets and captured control of the town for a brief time. Although veteran troops were sent from Callao to end this riot, it was notable that the leaders were given general pardons in order to pacify the situation.

These examples led Farfán to plan a similar resistance in Cuzco but the scheme failed when an Augustinian priest informed the authorities of the plan which had been told to him in the confessional. Subsequently the leaders were hanged, but efforts were made to interrogate one of them, Bernardo Pumayalli Tambohuasco, a young cacique of Pisac, to find out if any connection existed between him and José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, who in November, 1780, had captured and executed the corregidor of Tinta, Antonio de Arriaga.<sup>60</sup> Although no connection was ever proven, it is probable that the Indian leader had knowledge of both the Cuzco and Lambayeque rebellions, which constitute significant antecedents to the Indian rebellions which followed.

These tax rebellions had one of their most dramatic manifestations in Arequipa where a group of renegades had entered the city under the cover of night and had set fire to the new customshouse, seriously wounding an official in charge and making off with an estimated 3,000 pesos. At the same time the band ransacked the house of the corregidor and sent him into hiding. A plan to attack the Royal Treasury was postponed due to impending daybreak. The following day, in response to the rumor that the rebels were joining 2,000 sympathizers in the town of Santa Marta for a second assault upon Arequipa, the corregidor ordered two companies of infantry militia and one of cavalry to march out to meet them. After the battle, in which the rebels were

defeated, Guirior granted promotions to the senior militia officers for their bravery.<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, this victory had little effect on the rebels in Arequipa, and lampoons consistently appeared urging the citizens to riot. The Spanish corregidor, Baltasar de Semanat, notified the viceroy that he was incapable of handling the situation with the militia at his disposal. Although the viceroy favored sending a detachment of *fijo* troops from Callao to quiet the city, he vacillated since there was strong opposition to such a move by authorities within the city of Arequipa who hoped to end the rebellion through negotiations.<sup>62</sup> As a result the viceroy did nothing.

Such inaction in a situation where it was required to maintain respect for the crown was to Areche inexcusable. In a report to José de Gálvez he complained that

If this Chief [Guirior] was more disposed to make his justice feared, this measure of sending troops could possibly be put off until a later time, but since he does not, I request that it be done as quickly as possible. Without this show of strength or without another leader taking this command it will no longer be possible to reestablish [royal authority].

He also compared Guirior to his predecessor Viceroy Manuel de Amat to the detriment of the former

Viceroy Manuel de Amat, predecessor of the present viceroy, made himself feared throughout the entire kingdom because when he considered it opportune he would give distinct, rapid, and frank warnings of the consequences of an action. That leader was always observing of the actions, words, or inclinations of these inhabitants and . . . they were given sentences which made them live in perpetual fear . . . A completely distinct type of government succeeded him. Handed over to the worst creoles in the America, who debased it: liberty raised

its head; the inclination to boldness was recognizable . . . and from this was born all the present disorder and state of depression which threatens the territory of the Viceroyalty of Peru.

Areche urged the Minister of the Indies to use the resources at his disposal to put an end to these revolts, including the sending of veteran troops. "Similar examples cannot be left unpunished," he continued. Instead, "it would be fitting to magnify them by establishing here a contingent of regular troops at least equal to that of New Spain. Established and put at the orders of an expert leader everything is simple."<sup>63</sup>

Although the Arequipa revolt was subsequently put down by veteran troops sent from Callao,<sup>64</sup> the larger issue of the utility of the militia remained to divide the viceroy and the visitor general. While the viceroy had defended this component of the army since many of his closest associates were in the officer corps, the visitor ridiculed it in his messages to the Ministry of the Indies as being useless and a positive harm to the well-being of the kingdom due to the arrogance which membership provoked among the influential men of affairs of Lima.

Here all or almost all of the dress of the men is the militia uniform, with epaulets, and braid, and these manifest without a doubt that they serve no purpose: in the companies are the landowners, the merchants and the leading Men of Affairs of the Kingdom. Moreover, they are the contributors, since there are no royal revenues, and therefore the maintenance of an interior and external defense is contrary to this practice . . . We have done nothing more in establishing such bodies of militia than to create daring arrogance and pride; it is true that the companies never contain more soldiers than the officers which I have indicated, but these are enough to



provoke hatred towards an inactive government, and since this is surely and easily proven I have no doubt that Your Excellency . . . [will] establish in Peru that force which can competently regulate the militia in order to establish the respect of your command.<sup>65</sup>

In another secret report sent to the king, Areche elaborated on this theme of corruption which he felt was a threat to the vice-royalty.

There are more colonels, lieutenant colonels, and sergeants major [in Peru] than there are in the army of Spain since many regiments which have never been reorganized on the footing of the Cuban Regulation find themselves with two, three, and even four senior officers . . . There is a lieutenant colonel of the Battalion of Merchants who is at the same time a common soldier of the Regiment of the Nobility, and wears his uniforms alternatively. The civil occupations in the government are all full of Officers of higher and lower rank down to the lowest subaltern, and there is hardly a Country in the world where the soldiery is so disrespected due to this lack of values where persons of the lowest birth are so rewarded.

All these officers, using the term of the country, carry a baton signifying command and it makes one sick to see such persons with this insignia which before was respectable and one that was reserved for those who hopefully served man. The chief clerk of the notarial office of the Government is a lieutenant colonel and the senior notary is a sergeant major, although of a different regiment. Finally, for those who are not Militiamen, there is a general enlistment where the inhabitants of all ages, trades, and ranks of the country are given uniforms, excepting the boys, women, priests, and friars. And it makes one laugh to see in the morning a lawyer dressed as a judge and a little later in the uniform of a colonel or other military distinction.

One cannot count upon these militia for anything if it is necessary to call persons such as this to duty. This has been manifested by this Captaincy General at the repeated urgings of its inspector don Joseph del Valle about the regulation of the militia, and about a regiment of infantry and one of Dragoons coming from the Peninsula.

The result of such a situation, Areche maintained, was that there was a general loss of pride in the uniform which would not be revived until the officers of the militia were chosen on the basis of merit and bravery rather than influence. Only then, he

declared would the militiaman be obeyed and respected as he was in other parts of the world.

In his report to the king Areche also criticized Guirior for failing to punish the leaders of the insurrections which had engulfed "all the jurisdictions near and far from this capital." He mentioned the weapons that were distributed throughout the kingdom as constituting a potential danger, and cited several cases in which punishment had not been meted out as it should due to the inaction of the viceroy. He summarized by stating that although the crown spent 200,000 pesos annually on military expenses

. . . for all the purpose this expenditure has achieved it is as if it were never spent and the army hardly offends as much as this cost. Here a person diligently pretends to be a soldier because it is a great advantage to enter the Palace Guard, whether it be the Cavalry of Halberdiers, because in addition to having an extremely high salary it is a license to defraud, rob, and amuse oneself with the uniform in the basest endeavors. The Company of Cavalry act as mail runners for particular persons, they pursue fugitive Negroes at the order of their masters, they are constables, notaries, receivers, and in a word they do everything except what they are supposed to do.

By suppressing this useless expense and cutting back on the militia Areche estimated that the two or three regiments of veteran troops which he and del Valle had requested could be maintained "very comfortably" and he predicted that the land and its inhabitants would once more become the property of the res pública (commonweal) which he regretted to say was not presently the case. So emotional did the visitor become over the issue that he stated

"I began to write Your Excellency yesterday . . . [but] I am going to conclude since I am yielding to that lack of moderation which I knew by my pulse . . . "66

The above diatribe was but one of a series of reports in which the visitor sought to reduce the power and prestige of the viceroy and secure his downfall in the hope that his successor would be more tractable. In other letters he accused Guirior of disobeying royal orders, opposing the ministers of the Royal Council, interfering with the mission of the visitation, and numerous other actions against the crown. Faced with Areche's refusal to cooperate with the viceroy, whom Gálvez believed had tried to sabotage the visitation, and a deteriorating economic and social situation in Peru, the Minister of the Indies informed the king that he felt the viceroy should be removed and replaced with someone who could work more closely with the visitor.<sup>67</sup> The king quickly agreed to the wisdom of such a move, and appointed Augustín de Jauregui, the President of Chile, to replace him. It was clearly noted in his appointment that Areche was to retain his control over the Royal Treasury in order that he continue without impediment the task of its reorganization. On July 21, 1780, Guirior handed control of the viceroyalty over to his successor and sailed on October 7 to Spain to defend himself against the visitor's charges of malfeasance.<sup>68</sup> His departure preceded by one month the outbreak of the Tupac Amaru rebellion in which the crises that had been

developing since midcentury were to culminate.

In conclusion, the viceregency of Manuel de Guirior had not materially furthered the initial military reform begun by Viceroy Manuel de Amat. The financial drain of Spain's entrance into the Wars of the American Revolution in the form of military subsidies which Peru was required to send to other areas of the New World, plus the removal of the silver mines of Potosí and Oruro to the La Plata Viceroyalty, placed financial limitations on future military reform. For this reason, training cadres were never provided to the majority of the Peruvian militia units.

Other limitations plagued the reform also. The fact that Inspector General Morales had been diverted to Chile meant that Peru never received a true military commander until the arrival of José del Valle in 1776. As a result subinspectors-general were never dispatched to reform the interior militia until that time. The reform was also limited by the presence of Visitor General José Antonio de Areche and his successor Jorge de Escobedo who urged frugality continually and regarded the militia as an unnecessary expense. Escobedo charged that in some areas the militia rolls were larger than the census rolls even if twelve year-old boys were included.<sup>69</sup> Reports such as these give credence to the assertion that the strength of the militia was overstated and that a true reform of the army had not extended into the provinces. Moreover, the harsh taxes imposed by Areche to finance the reform had provoked outright resistance among certain of these provincial units.

By 1780 the Tupac Amaru rebellion was to test the true extent of the reform and prove the above assertions. The result was to further discredit the militia and to force a radical reorientation of the reform program during the last quarter of the century, in an effort to provide a more secure basis for both internal and external defense from attack. To a large degree this reorientation constituted a repudiation of all that had preceded it.

Notes

<sup>1</sup>Mendiburu, I, 447. Although Amat apparently left Peru a rich man, the residencia, or judicial review of his viceregency found him guilty of no wrongdoing. Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. cviii-cxii.

<sup>2</sup>Mendiburu, VI, 152.

<sup>3</sup>Aiton, p. 271.

<sup>4</sup>AGI:AL 654, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, May 2, 1776, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>Villarroel, pp. 102-189, passim.

<sup>6</sup>Diffie, pp. 429-432. By 1805 trade at Callao had a value of four million five hundred thousand pesos.

<sup>7</sup>Relaciones de los virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú (Madrid, 1867-1872). III. Relación que hace el Excmo. Sr. D. Manuel de Guirior . . ., Lima, August 23, 1780, pp. 39-40, 43-44; Mendiburu, VI, 160-161.

<sup>8</sup>Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 120-121.

<sup>9</sup>John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782-1810: The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata (London, 1958), pp. 37-40. This plan was rejected since Chile did not have an adequate economic base upon which to support Buenos Aires.

<sup>10</sup>The best treatment of this rivalry is Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 81, 145-146.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 86-87. This broke down as follows:

military subsidies	1,174,811 pesos
military salaries	288,338 pesos
extraordinary expenses	<u>771,772 pesos</u>
total expenses	2,234,921 pesos

<sup>13</sup>Relación de Guirior, p. 94. One contemporary source referred to the military subsidy as "an open money bag into which everybody dug with both hands, except those for whose benefit the subsidy had originally been established." Eugene H. Korth, S.J., Spanish Policy in Colonial Chile: the Struggle for Social Justice, 1535-1700 (Stanford, Calif., 1968), p. 214.

<sup>14</sup>The subsidy to Buenos Aires, for example, held at about 125,000-130,000 pesos annually until 1761, and about 200,000 during the rule of Amat. In 1774 it was set at 600,000 to cover the expenses of the creation of the viceroyalty by order of the crown. After that it often reached 850,000 pesos annually. The main reason for these defense expenditures was the size of the army in Brazil, which by 1776 stood at eleven regiments. Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 101, 103; Mendiburu, IV, 163, 169.

<sup>15</sup>Relación de Guirior, p. 94; Mendiburu, VI, 169.

<sup>16</sup>Vicente Palacio Atard, Areche y Guirior: observaciones sobre el fracaso de una visita al Perú (Seville, 1946), p. 8.

<sup>17</sup>The best study of Areche's efforts to put the royal treasury of Peru on a sound basis is Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, Reorganización de la Hacienda Virreinal Peruana en el Siglo XVIII (Seville, 1953).

<sup>18</sup>AGI:AL 1082, "Instrucción que debe observar don José Antonio de Areche en la Visita y arreglo de los Tribunales de Cuentas, Cajas y Ramos de Real Hacienda en los Reinos del Perú, Chile y Provincias de la Plata"; AGI:AL 1082, "Instrucción reservada para interior gobierno del Visitador General del Peru." Areche delegated the duties of the visitation in Chile and the La Plata regions.

<sup>19</sup>Palacio Atard, pp. 31-32, 34-36. For an article which emphasizes the positive aspects of Areche's personality, see Gates, pp. 14-42.

<sup>20</sup>Céspedes del Castillo, Reorganización, p. 11. The superintendency over the Royal Treasury, formerly held by the viceroy, gave its holder virtual fiscal autonomy over the viceroyalty by virtue of allowing him to decide where these monies should be spent.

<sup>21</sup>AGI:AL 1084, Secret report from Antonio de Areche to José de Gálvez, Lima, April 12, 1780, pp. 23-24. Areche referred to Lima as a "Babylon" controlled by the creoles whom he alleged ruled Viceroy Guirior. He cited their control over the audiencia, the post of majordomo in the palace, that of sergeant major of the Regiment of the Nobility, a creole militia unit which Areche characterized as "extremely useless," and other posts. He also criticized Guirior for practicing nepotism. Areche maintained that these creoles blocked his proposals for reform since they found the disorder in the viceroyalty more to their advantage. AGI:AL 645b, Report from Areche to the King, n.d., pp. 1-3.

<sup>22</sup>AGI:AL 640, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix, instruyendo de los principales acaecimientos en el Reyno del Peru con el fin de que le sirvan de gobierno estas noticias," El Pardo, March 28, 1783, pp. 1-15. In it the crown blamed the creoles of Lima for planning the rebellion as early as 1776, and held that Guirior either overtly aided them or did so through his refusal to take any action.

<sup>23</sup>Relación de Guirior, p. 92.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>AGI:AL 654, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, August 20, 1776, pp. 1-2. An anonymous description of Lima, written around 1776 corroborated Guirior's suspicion. The author stated that Amat had failed to discipline the militia of Lima and concluded that due to the great distance involved, militia from the surrounding provinces could not be counted upon to help a province under attack. Aurelio Miró Quesada, "Una descripción inédita de Lima en el siglo XVIII," Revista Histórica, XXVI (Lima, 1962-1963), 181-182.

<sup>26</sup>AGI:AL 654, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, October 20, 1776, p. 1.

<sup>27</sup>Relación de Guirior, pp. 56, 91.

<sup>28</sup>AGI:AL 654, Report of Joseph del Valle to Manuel de Guirior, Lima, October 1, 1776, pp. 1-2; ibid., November 3, 1776, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup>The actual strength of the battalion was 494 men, but twelve of these were cadets, 137 listed themselves as Spaniards, 320 as Peruvians and 37 foreign-born. Of the officers, thirty-one were Spaniards and eighteen were creoles. AGI:AL 655, "Libro de Serbios [sic] de los Oficiales, Primeros Sargentos y Cadetes del Batallón Fijo del Callao de Lima," Lima, December 30, 1776. In 1776 the creoles at court had sent the king a "Representación hecha por los Americanos al Rey Carlos III," Madrid, August 12, 1776, in which they had requested being allowed to enlist more widely in these fijo battalions. On November 15 the crown sent the Viceroy of Peru a circular order instructing him to end any discrimination in these battalions between Spaniards and creoles. AGI:AL 656, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, June 20, 1777, pp. 1-2.

<sup>30</sup>AGI:AL 655, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, February 20, 1777, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup>AGI:AL 658, "Relación del proyecto formado por el Inspector General de las tropas veteranas y de milicias del distrito de este Virreynato del Peru," Lima, July 31, 1778, pp. 1-16.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 15-16. Del Valle asked that the Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y caballería de la isla de Cuba of 1764 and the Real declaración sobre puntos esenciales de la Ordenanza de



milicias provinciales de España of 1767 be published in Peru. This was finally ordered by Guirior on October 5, 1779.

<sup>33</sup>AGI:AL 658, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, September 5, 1778, pp. 1-3.

<sup>34</sup>Relación de Guirior, pp. 92-93.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 105; AGI:AL 659, Guirior to Gálvez, October 5, 1779, p. 4.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 94-95; AGI:AL 659, Declaration of War against Great Britain, Lima, September 26, 1779.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 95-96.

<sup>38</sup>AGI:AL 659, Guirior to Pedro de Ureta, Lima, September 28, 1779, p. 1; AGI:AL 1483, Guirior to Ureta, Lima, October 5, 1779, pp. 1-2.

<sup>39</sup>Relación de Guirior, pp. 95-96.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., pp. 96-97.

<sup>41</sup>AGI:AL 1483, "Orden circular a todos los corregidores del Manuel de Guirior," Lima, October 5, 1779.

<sup>42</sup>AGI:AL 658, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, September 5, 1778, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup>AGI:AL 1483, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, October 5, 1779, p. 2.

<sup>44</sup>Relación de Guirior, p. 97. Those soldiers who held the rank of adjutant in the Regiment of Spanish Infantry prior to its reorganization were commissioned as lieutenant to meet the critical need for officers.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 97-98. The only persons excepted from militia service were those serving as lookouts and those working in the gunpowder factory.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 100; Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, p. 149. By 1784 the expenses of the Tupac Amaru rebellion had raised this sum to an estimated 1,702,234 pesos (p. 137). The cabildos of Peru were less generous in appropriating funds for defense. Moore cites the example of the cabildo of Lima voting to appropriate such funds only to have an open session reverse this decision. Similar examples occurred in Piura and Trujillo, pp. 127-128.

<sup>47</sup>AGI:AL 659, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, October 5, 1779, pp. 3-4.

<sup>48</sup>AGI:AL 1483, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, November 5, 1799, pp. 1-2; Relación de Guirior, p. 103.

<sup>49</sup>Relación de Guirior, pp. 105-109.

<sup>50</sup>AGI:AL 1493, "Relación . . . que manifiesta la situación geográfica, Producciones, y Estado Actual de defensa de la Provincia de Chiloe . . . por orden de 26 de Octubre de 1778," pp. 1-8.

<sup>51</sup>In 1753 the crown had sent out the first group of veteran officers to serve as military governors of provinces located along the Indian frontier. Others were sent to the mining towns of Huancavelica, Chuicuito, and Potosí. During the reign of Viceroy Amat, military governors were established in the coastal provinces of Cañete, Ica, and Arica, as well as in Tarma, Jauja, and Cajatambo which were felt to be critical to national security. AGI:IG 844, "Nota de los gobiernos militares del Perú," cited in Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, p. 91. Amat felt military governors could lead expeditions to assist Lima if the capital was threatened by attack. AGI:AL 653, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, September 10, 1774, p. 3. Generally civil governors were preferred by the crown since they were more economical.

<sup>52</sup>AGI:AL 1493, Report from Inspector General Tomás Sheé to Viceroy Manuel de Guirior, San Carlos, Chiloe, December 20, 1779, pp. 1-2.

<sup>53</sup>ANL:RA, Legajo 1 (1780), "Plan del costo que tendrán las quatro compañías de milicias que se proyecta emplear en actual servicio, durante la guerra . . ." San Carlos de Chiloe, December 26, 1779, p. 1.

<sup>54</sup>Barros Arana, VI, 316-317, 361-367, 389-393.

<sup>55</sup>ANL:RA, Legajo 1 (1780), pp. 1-19, lists the pay requests for all of the veteran training cadres in the viceroyalty. Their location and numbers are as follows: Juan Fernandez (56), Trujillo (4), Cañete (5), Ica (10), Huarura (6), Arnedo (7), Carabaillo (22), Piura (10), Arica (3), Arequipa (103), Chota (10), Chiloe (8), Cuzco (63). The figures in Cuzco and Arequipa reflect veteran detachments there.

<sup>56</sup>Palacio Atard, pp. 39-44.

<sup>57</sup>AGI:AL 1086, "Relación de la negativa de los Pardos de Lambayeque hacer la contribución militar," n.d., pp. 1-17.

<sup>58</sup> For example in Parinacochas, near Cuzco, Areche was forced to suspend an order calling up the local militia for fear that they would turn their weapons against the corregidor who had tried to collect the "military contribution." AGI:AL 1085, Antonio de Areche to Agustín de Jauregui, Cuzco, March 16, 1781, p. 3.

<sup>59</sup> AGI:AL 1086, "Relación de la negativa . . ." p. 17.

<sup>60</sup> Luís Antonio Eguiguren Escudero, Guerra Separatista del Perú, 1777-1780 (Lima, 1942), pp. 19-29.

<sup>61</sup> Mendiburu, VI, 161; Relación de Guirior, p. 45.

<sup>62</sup> Boleslao Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru y los Orígenes de la Independencia de Hispanoamérica, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires, 1967), pp. 153-162; Palacio Atard, p. 41.

<sup>63</sup> AGI:AL 1084, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, April 12, 1780, pp. 23-24, 28.

<sup>64</sup> The expedition which arrived in Arequipa on May 5 was described by the viceroy as a "liberating army" which was wildly acclaimed (Relación de Guirior, p. 47) although an historian of the subject has compared it to a column of prisoners (Palacio Atard, p. 41). The appearance of the troops apparently touched off new waves of violence, although Guirior insisted this was due to fear rather than any misbehavior on the part of the soldiers, Relación de Guirior, p. 47.

<sup>65</sup> AGI:AL 1084, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, April 12, 1780, p. 22.

<sup>66</sup> AGI:AL 645b, Report from Areche to the King, n.d., pp. 1-4.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4. In an annotation in the margin of this report, Royal officials at court state that they considered Areche to have proven his charges that Guirior tried to sabotage the visitation in an effort to further his own despotic authority, and note that his replacement Augustin de Jauregui should improve the situation.

<sup>68</sup> Guirior was successful in clearing himself of the charges levelled by Areche. See Palacio Atard, pp. 63-65.

<sup>69</sup> AGI:AL 1100, Report of Escobedo to the Crown. Lima, January 16, 1784, in Richard Konetzke, Süd-und Mittelamerika I: Die Indianerkulturen Altamerikas und die Spanisch-Portugiesische Kolonialherrschaft (Frankfurt-on-Main, 1965), p. 163.

#### IV. TESTING OF THE MILITARY REFORM: THE INDIAN REVOLTS OF 1780-1783

The Indian revolts which raged throughout Peru during the period were the culmination of a century of abuse of the natives at the hands of their Spanish conquerors. The early successes enjoyed by the rebels exploded the myth of infallibility which surrounded Spanish arms and brought into question the success and functionality of the military reform program. The rebellions also raised the question of militia loyalty and in certain cases found it lacking. Although the revolts were eventually put down, the campaigns brought to light serious deficiencies in the Army of Peru. Such shortcomings provoked a reorientation in the reform program after 1784 away from its former reliance on the militia.

On July 22, 1780 Viceroy Guirior was replaced by Lieutenant General Agustín de Jauregui, a career officer who had served in the Regiment of Dragoons of Almansa with distinction in Africa and the Caribbean before being appointed Captain General of Chile in 1773, where he had reorganized the militia and had energetically dealt with the problem of the Araucanian Indians.<sup>1</sup>

Jauregui was reminded that the Indian was to be his central problem by José Baquíjano y Carrillo, a leading creole intellectual, who in a welcoming speech, upbraided the Spanish government for its abuses and injustices to this sector of society. Moreover, Baquíjano

was speaking out against the entire concept of Spanish absolutism. As the spokesman for a new generation of Peruvian liberals, Baquíjano was symbolic of the influence of the Enlightenment which would become increasingly more apparent in the thought of creole intellectuals as the century wore on.<sup>2</sup> There can be no doubt of the truth in Baquíjano's statements. Indian tribute levels were being raised at the rate of one million pesos per year,<sup>3</sup> in an effort to meet military expenditures, which, one observer stated, seemed impossible to reduce.<sup>4</sup> The efforts of José Antonio de Areche to raise revenue levels through the imposition of new taxes also seems to have been successful. By 1779 Peru had a budgetary surplus of 1,694,209 pesos.<sup>5</sup> All of this was purchased at a heavy price, however. In the wake of the Indian rebellions the viceroyalty suffered a budgetary deficit of twelve million pesos which was increasing at about one million pesos per year.<sup>6</sup>

The effect of imposing the "military contribution" and increasing the number of crown monopolies had a demonstrable effect upon many persons throughout the viceroyalty. According to an anonymous resident of Cuzco, it was these taxes which precipitated the violent rebellions which were to engulf Peru, New Granada, and part of the La Plata.

A project of this nature, although its role appears to be very useful and advantageous to the Crown, has produced fatal consequences since then . . . because there is no monster so fearsome as a People, which, suppressed or deprived of its old liberty, hands itself over to despair and desperation. Then, what shall become of a Kingdom, and one so libertine and vice-ridden as that of Peru?

Although it seems unlikely that the visitor general would not have foreseen the results of his tax policies, he was apparently unwilling to reduce his quest for additional revenue in order to avert them. Also he made no effort to end the hated repartimiento system. Instead, circular orders were sent to all corregidores instructing them on what steps to take should the Indians of their district revolt.<sup>8</sup> These orders provoked a reply from the corregidor of Pasco who informed the visitor that many corregidores had been killed already, and that he was filled with "fear, perplexity, and a lack of confidence" at having to enforce these tax collections. He was told by the visitor to follow orders.<sup>9</sup>

The visitor in turn blamed the revolts on Viceroy Guirior. In a later defense of his conduct, Areche asserted that he had warned Guirior as early as 1775 of the possibility of Indian revolts, based on reports sent to him from territorial justices, but that the viceroy had refused to take any preventive action. According to Areche, there was also considerable talk of a major revolt to have been launched in 1777 ("the year of the three sevens"), which was supposedly to confirm the prophecies of Saint Francis and Saint Rose of Lima. Areche termed Guirior's refusal to take action at this time as "a crime of culpable omission."<sup>10</sup> It is true that the viceroy turned down proposals to secure the sierra region. One of these, proposed by Colonel Demetrio Egan, would have been composed of a body of militia stationed in Cuzco and the creation of several new presidios garrisoned with fijo troops was turned

down by the viceroy due to the expense involved. But it is wrong that the viceroy alone shoulder the blame for such a decision. As superintendent of the Royal Treasury the visitor general was perhaps in a better position to support the plan, but apparently did not do so. It seems that such plans were not supported by the crown either. Another measure proposed by the Viceroy of Buenos Aires, the Marqués de La Plata to create thirteen battalions of militia in Upper Peru, one-third of which were always to be on active duty, was turned down by the Ministry of the Indies for economy reasons.<sup>11</sup>

The man who was finally able to capitalize upon the discontent harbored by the Indian masses towards the Spanish colonial system was the young mestizo cacique or chief of Tungasuca in the province of Tinta near Cuzco, José Gabriel Condorcanqui. Condorcanqui often used the name Tupac Amaru since it was from an ancestor Felipe Tupac Amaru that they inherited their title of nobility. The concern of Tupac Amaru for the problems of the oppressed Indians stems from the year 1770 when he went to Lima in order to have the Spanish authorities there confirm his right to the title of Marqués de Oropesa, and there is some speculation that he came into contact with influential creoles in Lima who were also assertedly plotting the overthrow of the government.<sup>12</sup> At any rate, his occupation as a muleteer, transporting goods from Lima to Buenos Aires, exposed him to poverty and discontent, and also granted him an opportunity to test the popularity of his ideas.

When these began to fall on fertile ground he decided to initiate his rebellion.<sup>13</sup>

Tupac Amaru singled out as his target the powerful corregidor of Tinta Antonio de Arriaga who was well hated for his cruelty. Arriaga had recently run afoul of the powerful Bishop Moscoso of Cuzco whom he had accused of participation in the revolt of Fáfán de los Godos, and in so doing "practically signed his own death warrant."<sup>14</sup> On November 4, 1780, Tupac and a dozen accomplices seized the corregidor and forced him to write an order requisitioning all the funds in the treasury of Tinta and stating that all the inhabitants were to assemble in Tungasuca for a projected expedition to defend the port of Aranta from an attack by the English. The plan worked to perfection, and the assembled militia even garrisoned the plaza mayor as the Indian chief executed their corregidor on November 10. Such acquiescence implied a high degree of sympathy for the rebel and his program.<sup>15</sup> Proclamations calling for support were sent out to the Indians of neighboring villages and creoles and mestizos were also encouraged to join him.

On November 12 the news of the revolt was delivered in Cuzco by Fernando Cabrera, the corregidor of Quispicanchi. A junta de guerra (council of war) was immediately summoned by the corregidor of Cuzco Fernando Inclán Valdez, and it moved to place two regiments of militia in barracks to defend the city against an attack. Because of his military experience, the junta appointed the sergeant major



of the veteran detachment Joaquín de Valcarcel as military commandant. The former Jesuit college was converted into a military headquarters and all weapons and royal funds were gathered there for protection. At 3:45 a.m. in the morning of November 13 the meeting concluded and a runner was dispatched to Lima with the news.<sup>16</sup>

What followed in Cuzco was sheer confusion. The bishop stated that by November 16 many companies of mestizo militia had been formed but that few of them possessed firearms or any rudiments of military discipline. He felt that they sympathized with the Indians and actually posed a threat to the city. Moscoso noted that the citizenry was afraid and even turned down offers of commissions and fueros of the militia. He went on to say that even the officers who composed the command and staff group of the militia of Cuzco had not participated in the junta but had actually fled in panic from the city which made discipline among the militia an impossibility.<sup>17</sup>

The junta sent circular orders to all of the corregidores of the outlying provinces asking them to come to Cuzco with all the troops at their disposal. Cabrera in the meantime gathered a makeshift group of "Indians, mestizos, and Spaniards" and was joined outside of town by Tiburcio Landa, the corregidor of Paucartambo. Although the junta had requested that the pair wait until four hundred soldiers and a company of nobles was gathered in the city, recruitment was slow and Cabrera and Landa took off alone in pursuit of the rebels. On November 17 at about sunset

the Royalist force, which totalled 604 soldiers and about 700 Indian auxiliaries, reached Sangarara and decided to spend the night in the plaza mayor. Although they did not see any evidence of the Indians they apparently had been watching them the entire time. At 4 a.m. the Indians launched an attack which caught the Spanish forces unprepared. They retreated to the safety of the church where they took refuge. Tupac Amaru ordered the Spaniards to allow all creoles and women to leave safely but the Spaniards refused to comply with this ultimatum. When the Spaniards refused to surrender, the Indians set fire to the church and massacred the soldiers as they tried to escape the flames. All of the Spanish troops were killed except for twenty-eight creoles who were left wounded.<sup>18</sup>

The defeat of Sangarara exploded the myth of infallibility which had surrounded Spanish arms in Peru and encouraged the Indians to carry on the resistance. News of the massacre caused panic to break out in Cuzco which feared the Indians would now turn the attack against the city. This fear was checked somewhat by the arrival of 250 "very superior" militia from Abancay under the command of their corregidor Manuel Villalta on November 22. The junta met and named Villalta as commandant of the militia of the city, defeating a strong proposal by Bishop Moscoso to surrender the city to the Indians.<sup>19</sup> Subsequently, militia appeared from Andahuaylas, Paucartambo, Calca, and Urubamba. The clergy not only donated money, but men as well. A battalion of clerics was raised from among the priests, friars, and seminary

students of the city, and placed under the command of the dean of the cathedral chapter Manuel de Mendieta. The battalion received training from a fijo training cadre and was utilized as sentinels in the church towers during the night to prevent a surprise attack. In order to obtain new recruits and secure the loyalty of the Indians, the cabildo abolished payment of both the repartimiento and the sales tax, and excluded faithful Indians from service in the textile mills. In addition, work was begun under the auspices of the cabildo to collect and repair firearms and to dig trenches around the city. By the end of November Cuzco was defended by a force of about 3,000 men who had received some rudimentary military training in the handling and firing of weapons.<sup>20</sup>

The size of the rebel army commanded by Tupac Amaru was less important than the lack of military leadership possessed by its officers. In a letter written by a friend for the Indian leader the size of the army was estimated at 14,000 men, although this number fluctuated considerably.<sup>21</sup> Rumors were also spread that whites formed a part of the army, and it was believed that these might have been Englishmen, who planned to use the Indian rebellions to topple the Spanish colonies from within. Such assertions were never proven, however.<sup>22</sup> The real weakness of the rebel army lay in the fact that practically none of its members had any experience in handling weapons or the tactics of warfare necessary to defeat an opponent.<sup>23</sup> For example, after the Sangarara victory, Tupac Amaru chose not to invade Cuzco, but instead marched south into the Lake Titicaca basin thirty leagues south of the city.

It was not until he had reached the town of Ayaviri that he received word from his wife, Micaela Bastidas, that the Royalists were taking measures in Lima to secure his defeat. She urged him to counter-march towards Cuzco and capture that capital before the arrival of the troops from Lima. Tupac Amaru took this advice and turned back towards Cuzco. By December his army was in control of five provinces and close to controlling eight others. Only on the coast had he failed to win large amounts of followers, due to the large concentrations of Royalist troops in that region.<sup>24</sup>

On November 24 the runner from Cuzco arrived in Lima with the news of the execution of the corregidor Arriaga. That same day Viceroy Jauregui assembled his military advisors into a junta de guerra.<sup>25</sup> The junta ordered the inspector general to raise 200 militia from the Regiment of pardos libres which were to be placed under the command of Colonel Gabriel de Avilés, a future viceroy of Peru. Due to the shortage of fijo troops, it was decided that only a veteran command and staff group should accompany this militia, although Avilés was empowered to enlist additional troops along the way. The expedition was outfitted with 400 new rifles, 500 sabers, and 12,000 cartridges. On November 28 the expedition left Lima, arriving in Cuzco on January 1, 1781.<sup>26</sup>

The arrival of Avilés in Cuzco gave heart to the defenders of that city and also pointed up the weaknesses which the Indians had as yet not exploited. In a subsequent report to the Ministry of the Indies, Avilés stated that of the 12,000 soldiers defending

Cuzco, the vast majority were Indian irregulars and conscripts from the surrounding areas. Few of them, he noted, had any rudiments of military discipline. Avilés cited the example of the militia of Paruro which defied his order to divide in half with one group defending a certain position, stating that unless all could go, none of them would. He also referred to the conduct of the Regiment of Cavalry of Chumbivilcas which refused to march unless he named another commandant. Only the Company of Merchants was singled out as possessing the slightest bit of obedience.<sup>27</sup>

The inability of the Indian army to capitalize on this state of affairs was to prove its most serious mistake of the war. On December 19 Tupac Amaru had assembled his army in Tinta pursuant to marching on Cuzco. Apparently he was not aware of the fact that only 1,784 of the defenders of the city were members of the militia, the rest being irregulars. By December 28, after having devastated the countryside outside of Cuzco and encircling the city, Tupac Amaru waited in the Inca fortress of Sacsahuayman which overlooks it from the north. Yet he failed to attack and instead preferred to cut the city off from communication with the outside, perhaps hoping to starve it into submission. In the meantime, small detachments of troops left Cuzco to confront the enemy and frequently won victories. In an effort to stem the tide of defectors, the corregidores ordered anyone leaving the city without permission to be put to death.<sup>28</sup>

The arrival of Avilés in Cuzco on January 1 probably ended any chance which the Indians might have had to capture the city. His appearance marked a rapid buildup in the militia of Cuzco and improved the morale of the defenders of the city. Increasingly after that time the Royalist forces went onto the offensive and began to win victories in the lowlands.<sup>29</sup> Finally, after a bloody battle on January 8 in which the residents of Cuzco showed great bravery in defending their city, the Indians were forced to lift the siege and withdraw.<sup>30</sup> Avilés, however, due to a lack of fire-arms and the fear that the withdrawal was a trap, chose not to pursue the Indians. Had the Spaniards taken the offensive at that point, the rebellion might have never reached the proportions that it did.<sup>31</sup>

When news of the Sangarara massacre reached Lima the viceroy dispatched an additional two hundred troops to Cuzco. The junta also agreed that a formal expedition should be sent to that city as rapidly as possible. Visitor General Areche offered himself as commander of this expedition but was overruled by Inspector General del Valle who claimed that as the ranking military officer in the kingdom the command belonged to him. The viceroy, who was unable to leave Lima due to the war against Great Britain, conferred all his powers upon the visitor. On December 20 del Valle left with another 200 militia, and shortly thereafter Areche, accompanied by a judge of the audiencia, Benito de la Mata Linæres as his assessor, left at the head of another 400 troops.

These included fifty soldiers from the fijo battalion at Callao, twenty six members of the Viceroy's Cavalry Guard, forty two dragoon militia from the Regiment of Lima, 200 militia of infantry from the Regiment of pardos libres, and fifty men from the Regiment of morenos. The expedition also carried 3,000 rifles and six cannon.<sup>32</sup>

The first reports submitted by the visitor and the inspector general of the military campaign offer considerable information about the situation, especially the motives of the rebels as inferred by the Spaniards, and the success of the military preparations taken to combat these rebels. In describing the execution of the corregidor of Tinta, Areche expressed his contempt for the militia of that area who quietly accepted the fact that an Indian cacique was executing the corregidor under orders allegedly given him by the king. He described these soldiers as persons in a trance, oblivious to the fact that it was their own territorial judge being hanged. The fact that the militia were in sympathy with the actions of the rebel leader, only hardened his opinion that the militia could not be counted upon in any situation where a conflict of interest presented itself. Areche went on to cite the example of Cabrera and Landa disobeying the orders of the junta de guerra as an example of the lack of discipline among these forces, and concluded that the Sangarara massacre had therefore been avoidable. He stated that the militia which had come to defend Cuzco were soldiers in name only and expressed hope that the reinforcements sent from Lima could reach the city before long since the present

troops could not be relied upon if an attack should occur. In explaining his failure to obtain the command of the expedition, Areche analogized it to a similar situation faced by Gálvez in New Spain.<sup>33</sup> He also belittled the militia of Lima as cowards, noting that only the commandant of the Regiment of Dragoons of Carabaillo had volunteered to accompany Inspector General del Valle to Cuzco.<sup>34</sup>

In his report, Inspector del Valle spoke of the lack of cooperation which he had received from the corregidores of the provinces through which he passed on his way to Cuzco, who refused to supply him with Indian bearers to carry the arms and munitions. As a result, his own troops had to carry them, which delayed the expedition considerably. He attributed the success of the Indian leader in gaining recruits to his promise that all who died in his army would be reborn. He detailed the Indian tactic of keeping to the high ground where the Royalist troops were at a disadvantage, and went on to complain that his defenses in Cuzco consisted of only three or four cannon and some catapults. He implied that the rebellion would be over shortly, however, an opinion the visitor general also shared.<sup>35</sup>

Viceroy Jauregui was less optimistic than were his battlefield commanders over the prospects of quickly defeating the rebels. In his initial report to the Ministry of the Indies Jauregui estimated the size of the Indian army at 20,000, and noted that not only Indians, but mestizos and even Spaniards had gathered under the rebel standard. He stated that the situation



in Cuzco was uncertain since the militia of that city did not inspire confidence and because their supply of arms was scarce. He told the crown that he had first sought to deal moderately with the rebels in the hope that such a response would bring them to their senses and convince them to capitulate. But since then, the growing support for the rebellion had caused him to reject this tactic. He cited the example of the Indians' cutting the rope bridges which connected Cuzco with other parts of the viceroyalty as one which hardened his decision to put down the revolt by stronger means if necessary.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, the viceroy was an advocate of the moderate approach throughout the campaign, and in an effort to cut off popular support for the rebel, he ordered the abolition of the repartimiento without first waiting for royal approval for such a measure. Such actions, combined with his later pardon of certain Indian leaders, were to later lead to his ouster.<sup>37</sup>

It was this moderate approach, combined with the question of the role the militia was to play in the conflict, which set the visitor and the viceroy on a collision course similar to the one which had existed between Areche and Guirior. The issue of whether the militia should be called onto active duty to combat the Indian rebels brought up the question of the usefulness of this component of the army. The solution which emerged pointed up the fact that although an order might be made by the viceroy, it could not be implemented without the consent of the visitor. Such a humiliating

defeat on the issue was to diminish the prestige of the viceroy which was already on the decline. Since later events called into question the loyalty of the militia still further, the position of the visitor in the affair seemed to have been vindicated.

Viceroy Jauregui received numerous petitions from the various corregidores fearful of their provinces being invaded by the Indian rebels seeking permission to pay the militia and place them in barracks for the defense of the province. After conferring with the junta de guerra, the viceroy passed a circular order authorizing the corregidores to place up to two companies on active duty for a two-month period, during which time they were to receive instruction and training in the handling of arms. In this way he hoped the provincial militia companies would be ready to serve if an emergency should arise.<sup>38</sup>

The idea for such a plan had originally been proposed by the visitor general himself in a series of letters sent to the viceroy from Ica on January 3, 1781. In the letters Areche commented upon the weak state in which he observed the militia during his journey to Cuzco the previous year. He therefore proposed that two companies of militia be barracked in each provincial capital for its protection. After a company had served on active duty, Areche felt that it would be qualified to serve as a training cadre for the other untrained companies in the province. He also felt that by deferring militiamen from the payment of tribute and sales taxes, and making them eligible for military pensions would inspire

loyalty to the crown and offset the appeal of the rebel cause. He cited Cuzco, where the entire three militia regiments did not total over 300 men, and where officers commanded imaginary companies, as a prime example of the need for reform in this component of the army. As a concrete proposal, he recommended that the regiments of Cañete and Chincha be joined to those of Cuzco to bring the latter to strength. The cost of raising these militia in the provincial capitals could be controlled, Areche asserted, by adjusting their pay schedules according to the location of the province. Areas such as Cuzco, Arequipa, and Guamanga, he maintained, were strategically more important than other parts of the viceroyalty. Here, Areche felt, it would be wise not only to increase the size of their garrisons, but to increase them with "troops of a different kind" which he did not identify other than to say that they should be sent on field maneuvers with the fijo troops each year in order to sharpen their skills in the art of tactical warfare. Finally, the visitor voiced his criticism of the militia officers whom he observed in Peru. He recommended that the crown cease enlisting landowners, who sought only to use and profane the uniform for their own purposes, and instead seek out "the useful man" without regard to his social class or rank in society.<sup>39</sup> In this appeal the visitor was supported by Colonel Avilés who was a partisan of his.<sup>40</sup>

The viceroy responded to the visitor on January 12, disclaiming Areche's contention that he had first had the idea to call the

militia onto active duty in the provincial capitals. Actually, the viceroy stated, he had first expressed the idea in a letter dated January 4 which he had sent to the visitor. Leaving this aside, Jauregui asked the visitor to review the militia of Cuzco, and authorized him to bring to strength any unit which was deficient, utilizing the best men he could find, regardless of social position. He also stated that any vacant ranks in the officer corps, or ones held by inappropriate persons, were to be reclaimed by the inspector general and conferred upon subjects of known ability.<sup>41</sup>

When the visitor became aware of the fact that the viceroy had appropriated his plan to raise the provincial militia and had ordered it implemented without conferring with him beforehand, he was determined to abort the order by utilizing his power as superintendent of the royal treasury.<sup>42</sup> On January 23 he wrote to the corregidor of Guamanga, stating that he considered the order to raise two companies of militia in that province inappropriate since there was no immediate danger of an Indian attack. In a similar vein, he wrote to the corregidor of Huanta and ordered the plan suspended there since there were no sufficient training cadres available to train the militia which had been the whole purpose of calling them onto active duty.<sup>43</sup> In a letter to Inspector General del Valle Areche stated that he felt that raising these companies would serve only to increase the powers of the corregidores who would employ them to further their own corrupt ends.<sup>44</sup> Since del Valle held a similarly low opinion of the corregidores, he was

reluctant to take any action that would enhance their powers, and supported the visitor's bid to abort the order.<sup>45</sup>

Having done this, the visitor general attempted to explain his position on the matter to the viceroy. He asserted that Jauregui had misunderstood his earlier letter proposing that the militia be called onto active duty in the provinces. This proposal, he asserted, was not intended to be applied throughout the viceroyalty, but only in those areas which were facing the immediate threat of an attack. Secondly, he held that he had only offered the idea for the viceroy's consideration, and had never advocated that it be put into effect. He then set out a series of reasons why such a plan was unwise. In the first place, he noted that since the corregidores were nothing more than merchants, or perhaps judges, it stood to reason that they would not permit anyone not of their own choosing into the companies, and would probably restrict membership to their supporters and employees, whose loyalty they trusted. As a result, he held that

. . . these two companies placed under arms in a situation in which they had jurisdiction would be as useless as are all the Militia of the Kingdom, and they would serve only to strengthen the interests of their respective Commandants, who doubtlessly would be their own justices. The officer and [enlisted ranks] . . . would be sold to persons of the same persuasion, doubtlessly with little more military experience than the soldier.

The visitor general also felt that since the order left pay scales to the discretion of the senior officer in the province, an excessive number of persons would be enlisted and that this

would be difficult to verify in the more distant regions. He estimated that the minimum expense of raising two companies in each province would cost the royal treasury 2,206,600 pesos per year, and one the viceroyalty could ill afford. As an alternative, Areche advocated that "flying squads" of mounted militia be raised like those in New Spain, since they were more useful than infantry troops, were less costly to maintain, and could defend the provinces more competently.

Areche warned Jauregui that as a result of this circular order, corregidores were fabricating mythical invasions in their letters in order to be allowed to raise militia. He concluded that they did so because "they wish to have an armed force in their territory in order to better enforce their advantages over those of the King, and the public." To combat such a situation, the visitor concluded, it was necessary to distribute the *fijo* troops of Lima throughout the kingdom rather than situating them solely on the coast. He stated that the militiaman in the provinces who was not provided with any degree of training or made to live in a barracks, "always will be a man of little utility." Although Areche conceded that it was impossible for the crown to afford to maintain a large standing army in Peru, he felt that a medium-sized force, distributed in strategic parts of the viceroyalty, would be the best assurance of security for the kingdom.<sup>46</sup>

In his reply to the visitor, Viceroy Jauregui maintained that, notwithstanding his opposition to the scheme, Areche should support its implementation, since fatal consequences could stem from failing to take the necessary precautions in these areas. He went on to assert his belief that the corregidors would remain loyal to the crown, and that even if their ends were "toxic" and their intentions "far from the motives they profess" that this conscience would not allow him to refuse their pleas for help or let them suffer the same fate that befell the corregidor of Tinta. Jauregui then chided the visitor for having suggested the plan initially and later rejecting it. He stated that he had sent copies of Areche's letter to the king as proof of his support for the plan lest he should try to deny it at some future date. With this bit of blackmail concluded, Jauregui informed Areche that he had warned the corregidors that the order was to be executed and that full reports of its compliance were to be forwarded to him. He also claimed that he had arranged with the inspector general to have veteran training cadres sent out from Lima to the provinces. In a biting conclusion, Jauregui left no doubt that he, and not Areche, was the true ruler of Peru, nothing that "although in the future it may be decided to improve [the order] according to the reflections of Your Servant which are equal to mine, I consider it necessary that it be executed . . ."<sup>47</sup>

The following month Areche replied to Jauregui's letter, stating that he would support the scheme "at least as long as

the disturbances last," although he held that he did so against his better judgment. He cited the examples of Cuzco and Parinacochas where the militia had already exhausted the revenues from the tobacco monopoly and other funds traditionally used to pay them, and predicted that the order would cause an even greater strain upon the Royal Treasury. In a curious bit of insight, the visitor stated that the essential difference between him and the viceroy lay in their differing conceptions of the nature of a man before he was transformed into a soldier. Areche implied that Jauregui was an idealist, but held that the inhabitants of Cuzco fell far short of this ideal. He said that if only the viceroy could see these "fantastic ones" who straggled into Cuzco with their corregidors he would have a better idea of the material which the militia officers had to work with.

Areche maintained that all the militia, from the senior officers on down, were inexpert in all aspects of service at arms. He explained that when he had spoken of raising soldiers in the provinces he had been referring to fijo troops and not to the militia. He cited the example of the militia of Parinacochas as illustrative of the lack of fidelity on the part of these soldiers. There the corregidor had convened the tributaries in order to establish new tax rolls and had reportedly found a general eagerness on the part of these groups to also mobilize the militia. The corregidor inferred, since no invasion was imminent, that these



tributaries sought only to turn their arms against the king to avoid payment of these taxes, and as a result he ordered the suspension of the formation of these companies. Areche concluded that this example demonstrated to him that it was risky to mobilize the militia in certain regions unless the majority of the inhabitants were mestizos who were excluded from the payment of tribute. An area such as Cuzco, Areche concluded, was particularly inappropriate for forming additional militia companies, since most of its citizens were either laborers or muleteers and did not possess a sufficient number of horses to form "flying companies." Those who were not members of these occupations, Areche said, were all employees or dependents of the corregidores, and their becoming soldiers, Areche maintained, would cause more extorsions in the provinces than the Indian rebels themselves. He also neatly refuted the viceroy's claim to have conferred with the inspector about sending veteran troops out from Cuzco as training cadres. Areche stated that he had spoken with the inspector about this point and the latter had informed him that he could spare no soldiers for this task.<sup>48</sup>

At the same time the visitor wrote to the crown to try and overturn the order. As an alternative, Areche proposed that the crown send out *fijo* troops to the provincial capitals to periodically train and review the militia of these areas. In order to stem the abuse which arose from the corregidores being able to grant commissions in the militia, Areche proposed that the royal officials in these capitals be given the power to annually

review militia appointments to determine their suitability. Since the viceroyalty was short of fijo troops to perform training functions, Areche suggested that landowners, especially those on the coast, be granted regular commissions. This would, he calculated, double or triple the number of fijo troops in the viceroyalty, and provide sufficient officers to be dispersed throughout the kingdom to train the militia. In this way the visitor felt the crown could remove from the corregidores and governors the power of granting commissions which they abused, and grant it instead to a mature group of men whose fidelity to the king was unquestionable.<sup>49</sup>

The visitor probably did not expect the king to take any action to remand the viceroy's order to raise the militia in the provinces, nor did he need for him to do so. Instead, he notified his subordinate José Ramos to inform the corregidores not to obey such an order. Ramos wrote specifically to the corregidores of Chancay, Arequipa, and Moquequa, notifying them not to raise any militia unless the province was under a direct threat of invasion by the Indians. Areche also left the decision on payment of these militia up to the royal officials of the province as was his prerogative as Superintendent of the Royal Treasury. Thus he bypassed the corregidor and made enforcement of the order an impossibility, because the officials would not authorize payment, and the militia would not serve without it. Since it now was practically impossible to implement the order, Jauregui chose to withdraw it.<sup>50</sup> Undoubtedly this action caused the viceroy no small loss of prestige and demonstrated to him that he could only rule the viceroyalty with

the advice and consent of the visitor. By this time the viceroy had also fallen into disfavor at court for his refusal to use the full weight of the army to put down the rebellions, and the crown was beginning to consider replacing him.<sup>51</sup> In the margin of a letter sent by Jauregui to the Ministry of the Indies the king's representative noted that the king was so dissatisfied with the conduct of the viceroy that he refused to dignify his constant petitions with an answer.<sup>52</sup>

The central issue which divided the viceroy and the visitor concerning the utility of the militia was that of their loyalty. This was not such an issue on the coast, because there was a higher proportion of whites serving in the companies to counterbalance the large numbers of Negroes, and because garrisons of *fijo* troops were available to avert disorder. It was of some gravity in the interior regions, however, where at times the militia could be utilized by either the corregidores or other influential citizens to pursue their own ends which frequently were in opposition to the interests of the crown. The case of Oruro pointed up this danger and lent further credence to the growing belief that the militia in the interior of Peru was a positive threat to internal security.

In Oruro, a mining town south of La Paz, the position of alcalde mayor, or municipal justice, had been the personal possession of the Rodriguez family for eighteen years. The Rodriguez were a wealthy creole mining family of considerable importance in the

town and felt the office to be their personal possession. The annoyance of the Peninsular Spaniards at being excluded from holding this position was well known, and frequently they had accused the Rodríguez of seeking to make the post hereditary. Thus, when the incumbent died in office and an election was scheduled in 1781, no less than three Peninsulars filed for the position, which was to be filled by a vote of the cabildo. Feelings ran high in the town preceding the election, and members of the cabildo reported receiving death threats if they should dare to elect one of the hated Peninsulars to the position.

The militia in Oruro had been raised somewhat earlier by the corregidor, a Spaniard by the name of Ramón de Urrutia, in response to the violence which had taken place in the province of Tinta. While these 300 militia had ostensibly been raised and quartered to defend the town in the event of an Indian attack, actually they were on duty as much to insure that the creoles and other townspeople remained loyal to the crown as to protect the city against raids. These militia companies were wracked with internal dissension, however, due to the fact that the creoles in them received three reales pay per day, while the mixed bloods received none. Most serious of all was the rumor which spread among the companies that the Spaniards intended to kill the creoles when the opportunity arose. As the rumor went, these executions were to take place on February 9. As tension rose in the companies the night of February 8, a creole militiaman panicked, and in the company of his friends,

fled the barracks. With this outburst, the militia officers saw the chance to utilize this dissention to influence the upcoming election. Lieutenant Nicholas de Herrera, a former convicted thief, assembled his men with those employed by Jacinto Rodríguez, a member of the mineowning family and the creole candidate for alcalde mayor. Rodríguez, with Herrera's assent, told the militia that since the corregidor Urrutia intended to kill them that they should no longer obey him.

The following day corregidor Urrutia assembled the militia in the plaza mayor in an effort to demonstrate the falsity of the rumor. He spoke at some length on the subject and then asked the soldiers to return quietly to their barracks. When this appeal failed, he threatened to discipline them unless they obeyed him. Nevertheless, the militiamen refused to leave the plaza. Instead they remained in groups discussing the successes of Tupac Amaru and the evils of Spanish government in Oruro. As night began to fall, an estimated 200 creole militiamen climbed a hill outside of town and began to sound horns and other instruments in an effort to bring the Indians from the mines into town. The corregidor dispatched a force of forty Peninsulars and loyal castes to stop this activity, but they were unable to do so, and in fact several defected to the side of the creoles.

Somewhat later a rock-throwing crowd gathered in front of the house of José Endeiza, a Spanish merchant from Buenos Aires, where it was rumored that the Spanish residents of Oruro had hidden

350,000 pesos. Soon the creole militiamen stormed and ransacked the house in search of the money. During the struggle Endeiza and the other inhabitants of the house fired some 200 shots in its defense before being overwhelmed and killed. The invaders got away with an estimated 200,000 pesos. With this anarchy spreading, corregidor Urrutia and many Spaniards fled to Cochabamba for help. In his absence the cabildo proclaimed Jacinto Rodriguez as alcalde mayor.

With the arrival in Oruro of the Indians from the mines, the complexion of the struggle changed. Many of them became drunk and surly, turning against their creole sympathizers and insulting them. The city turned into a battleground. Each day the Indians killed more Spaniards and robberies reached the estimated sum of two million pesos. The creoles recognized the fact that the situation was getting out of hand, and tried to induce the Indians to return to the mines by paying them the sum of one peso apiece out of the royal treasury. This was not entirely successful, however, and the creoles laid aside their struggle with the remaining Spaniards in Oruro against this common threat to their hegemony. On March 19 alcalde Rodriguez pardoned all the Europeans in Oruro and exhorted them to unite with the creoles to prevent the Indians from destroying the city. He was able to take control of the militia and with their help gradually the Indians were forced out of Oruro. Similar situations in both Potosí and Cochabamba were averted by the strong leadership of the local governors.<sup>53</sup>

Revolts of the militia in areas such as Oruro were illustrative of the discontent with Peninsular rule which had manifested itself in the revolt of Tupac Amaru. What distinguished the Oruro rebellion from the Indian revolts was the fact that it was led by the creoles and mixed bloods, who actively appealed to the Indians to help sustain their position. As such it clearly demonstrated the assertion of the visitor general that militia under arms, especially in the more remote regions where mixed bloods and Indians predominated, could pose a distinct threat to Spanish government in America.

The Oruro incident was not a singular case of this discontent. On April 30, 1781, José de Vertíz, the Viceroy of the La Plata wrote to the Ministry of the Indies to inform it that the militia under his control were also dissatisfied with European control and were ready to emulate the example of the Indians of Peru if the opportunity should present itself. He stated that he feared they would not remain faithful if the British staged an invasion of Buenos Aires.<sup>54</sup> The rumor of an English invasion of the La Plata region in support of the Indian rebels had been gaining credence in Spain early in the year. On February 17 the crown had warned the Viceroy of Peru that Great Britain was preparing an expedition of 2,000 soldiers to invade Buenos Aires intended to supply the Indians with 15,000 weapons.<sup>55</sup>

The combination of the Indian rebellions and the threat of an English invasion added to the factor of militia disloyalty prompted the viceroy to seek additions to the fijo battalion.

In February of 1781 Jauregui wrote to the Ministry of the Indies seeking to bring the fijo battalion to strength, citing the depletions in its ranks due to the necessity of sending troops to Cuzco and Arequipa to combat rebellions in those cities. As a temporary measure, Jauregui had accepted the offer made earlier by the consulado to Viceroy Guirior to raise and pay for 1,000 soldiers for the duration of the war. He therefore ordered two companies of militia from the Regiment of Spanish Infantry, a company of pardos libres, and one of morenos libres to be called onto active duty and to be quartered in the former Colegio San Felipe, a Jesuit school located in the Plaza Santa Catalina. These 120 troops remained on active duty until the war ended in April of 1782. Since the threat of an English invasion did not materialize the remainder of the soldiers promised by the consulado were never activated.<sup>56</sup>

Viceroy Jauregui also sought to improve the status of the militia in Lima during the war. Although the del Valle plan had never been implemented due to a lack of funding, Jauregui maintained that he had done everything within his means to better this component of the army. The Regiment of Spanish Infantry had been reduced from its former size of 1,347 men to a battalion numbering 984, slightly over half the size recommended by the inspector general. The two mestizo companies "En Memoria del Rey" had increased in size from a recommended 180 men to 238. The Regiment of pardos libres had been placed at a strength in accordance with



the Cuban militia regulation of 1,600 men, although its strength was reduced to 1,133 due to the absence of several companies in Cuzco. The Battalion of *morenos libres*, which del Valle had recommended raised in strength to 800 men was similarly understrength at 402 due to the demands of the Indian rebellions. The total number of provincial infantry militia was 2,757, each having its own training cadre and a regular program of instruction. The Regiment of Dragoons had been elevated in size to 620 men in accordance with the Cuban Regulation. In addition, a second dragoon regiment with an equal number of men had been raised in the provinces surrounding Lima as the inspector general had recommended. A squadron of *pardos libres* with 240 soldiers, and one of *morenos* with sixty were also trained and placed on the footing of provincials. The total number of provincial militia of cavalry stood at 1,540 troops by 1784.<sup>57</sup> The reduction in size was in line with the overall emphasis placed upon economy during the period of the visitation, and reflects the financial strain imposed by the Indian revolts. Reorganization of the militia was apparently carried on in the provinces as well. Jauregui singled out the provinces of Piura, Ica, Arica, Chincha, Pisco and Trujillo as areas where he had disbanded several regiments, noting that he had abolished certain of these and had reduced the size of others "which served no other purpose than to increase the number of officers, creating an abuse of notable prejudice."<sup>58</sup>

In July of 1782 the petition of the viceroy to increase the size of the *fijo* infantry battalion at Callao was approved. The

battalion, which by that year was depleted to 612 men, was increased to a strength of 891, exclusive of the 100 soldiers which were detached in Arequipa, and reorganized into two battalions. By October the Regiment of Royal Infantry had been completely reformed. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the increase in size of this unit was the fact that the additional soldiers were drawn from members of "the principal families of Lima," who, the viceroy felt, deserved to be recognized not only for their own merits but those of their forefathers. Jauregui also appointed Captain Jacinto Iriarte to head the school of mathematics which had been begun earlier by Viceroy Amat and which now was composed of a class of twenty-six cadets.<sup>59</sup> It was at this point that the fijo battalion became a creole stronghold, giving these young men an alternative source of employment to the militia which had fallen into a certain disrepute due to the Indian rebellions.

Jauregui also related the fact that fijo training cadres had been dispatched to Arica, Chiloe, and Chile and that progress in training the militia of these regions had been made. However the crown's unwillingness to pay these instructors led the viceroy to express his doubt that the training program would ever be fully implemented and the reports of these instructors who deserted while en route to their destinations seemed to bear this out.<sup>60</sup> The emphasis on reducing defense expenditures also led the viceroy to abolish the post of commandant of cavalry and close the artillery factory at Bellavista.<sup>61</sup> Although the viceroy did increase the size

of the fijo artillery battalion by two companies to replace the training cadres which had been dispatched throughout the viceroyalty,<sup>62</sup> and undertook some additional fortifications,<sup>63</sup> a suggestion that Lima be fortified was abandoned on the basis of expense.<sup>64</sup>

Jauregui's failure to energetically prosecute the war against the Indians had brought him into some disrepute with the senior military men in the viceroyalty who tended to side with the visitor on matters concerning this branch of government. One of them, Colonel Demetrio Egan, who had remained in Lima to oversee the defense of that city during the war, reported to the Minister of the Indies that the declaration of war against Great Britain constituted the most serious threat the viceroyalty had ever faced, since he felt the lower classes in Peru would support a general uprising in favor of the invaders should an attack ever be made. Viceroy Jauregui, he confided, was not an aggressive enough leader for Peru in such troubled times. Egan, a veteran officer, challenged the viceroy's reliance upon the militia to put down such a disorder if it should occur. He stated that

The militia of this kingdom cannot be counted upon for Defense. Their stability is fraudulently stated to the King [and] has been nothing more than a means by which past Government emptied abundant wealth in the sending of officers, with counterfeit papers and without one soldier in many of the register ships, to deceive the Sovereign and Ministers and to further their pretensions.

Egan laid the blame for the Tupac Amaru revolt not on the alleged abuses of the visitation, which, he noted, "some would

like to believe." Instead, he asserted that it was the work of the creoles of Lima and Cuzco, whom, he felt, sought to emulate the example of the English colonists of North America, but who lacked the proper spirit to themselves carry out such a scheme. In this Egan inferred that the creoles had persuaded the Indians to fight their rebellion for them. He went on to also place the blame for the rebellion upon the Jauregui administration, whose indifference allowed these creoles to speak out freely against the policies of the king, even to the point of boldly venturing that Peru should have a "crowned head." For the above reasons, Egan was contemptuous of the creole militia of Lima, and asserted that the only brave and manly militiamen in the viceroyalty were the Negroes and mulattos of that city. Yet even these had limited value to the crown, he went on, since all of them were "godchildren, dependents, and employees of the major part of the most Renowned people . . . [Who] make an esteemed point of protecting them . . . and as a result it will be easy to seduce them." The solution to such a problem, according to Egan, was for the crown to send 5,000 veteran troops to Peru to offset the strength of the militia. These veteran troops he felt should be situated throughout the kingdom to hold down any demonstrations which might occur in support of the English. He warned that unless such measures were taken, Spain's enemies would make use of this dissatisfaction among the people and capture the kingdom.

Egan asserted that the arrival of Areche in 1777 gave the creole leaders of the rebellion a pretense to act, which they

did through the rebel Tupac Amaru. He cited the fact that the Indians did not immediately attack Cuzco or seek to control the bridge over the Apurimac River which allowed communications to continue between Lima and Cuzco, as proof that the creoles had masterminded the plot, since failure to do this indicated that the Indians desired to allow the creoles of Lima and Cuzco to remain in contact with each other in order to plan future strategy. Egan reiterated that Viceroy Jauregui was not the man to cope with such a situation since he was as much a captive of these creoles as his predecessor had been.

His will is equal to his courage, and without it being my nature to disparage it, it is not sufficiently energetic for the demands of the present circumstances. Today an active, efficient, military Leader, more feared than loved, is required, since the character of these people is more influenced by fear, which to them constitutes respect, than by temerity, in order to provoke in them veneration, love and blind obedience towards the King. The clientele of the present Viceroy are all managed and dominated by those who were the Directors of the past Government, and consequently they are opposed to the ideas of His Majesty and to his Service. If the King does not send a Military Leader here . . . who is equal in zeal, sagacity, justice, and civility to the Visitor, and if they are not closely united, nothing will ever improve, neither will the disorders and evils of the Kingdom ever be remedied. For security the [veteran] troops have to be first, and with them everything will succeed, and the King will be able to depend on these dominions. Today this is problematical if enemies appear because I suspect we are betrayed.

Egan went on to criticize the ineffective measures which the viceroy had taken since the declaration of war. He criticized the sending of training cadres to the provinces and the order calling up the militia, citing the soldiers of Lima as an example. There, he noted, the men had been placed in the barracks for fifteen days and they had not yet been given instruction in the handling and

firing of weapons. Thus, Egan asserted

. . . it will follow that they will not know how to fire, nor to discharge a second round, and they will shoot without good aim and consequently we will be forcibly defeated with a lesser number [of soldiers]. Add to this, Your Excellency, the effeminate character of the Creoles that we can hope to have . . . to the suspicion that we have of their lack of loyalty.

He closed this diatribe by stating that the creoles were driven by the twin desires to further their own interests and to obtain liberty of conscience for themselves. These ambitions, Egan stated, could only be destroyed by sending veteran troops to Peru and by appointing "a Governor of circumstance." Egan boldly proposed that the crown appoint Visitor General José Antonio de Areche to the position.<sup>65</sup>

The issue of leadership in the campaign against Tupac Amaru had been initially tested in the order of the viceroy to raise a provincial militia which had been defeated by the visitor general. It continued over the advisability of granting a general pardon to the rebels, which the inspector general and the viceroy favored, but which Visitor General Areche staunchly opposed.<sup>66</sup> Although such a general pardon was issued by Jauregui on December 12, it had little effect due to the actions taken subsequently by the visitor to defeat it. On March 12 Areche had written to Tupac Amaru, refusing to discuss any of the issues which the Indian leader had sought to resolve in an earlier correspondence. Instead, Areche threatened Tupac Amaru in the most brutal terms that if he refused to surrender himself to the royal authorities, he and his followers would be destroyed to the last man. This action sickened Inspector General del Valle, who later wrote that it was this rejoinder which ended

any chance of reconciliation, and changed the struggle into a war to the death.<sup>67</sup>

In a letter to Gálvez, Areche attempted to justify his actions. He noted that in Peru the Indian had always been treated too leniently. In an interesting dictum he noted

New Spain and Peru are poles apart: There everything is easy, here extremely difficult: There the vassal does not know to oppose that which he is ordered to do, here he knows nothing but disobedience. There everything or almost everything, as Your Excellency knows, has a method-simple, clear, and natural: Here there is no matter that is not full of inconsistencies; in short, there nothing is mistaken, here all is diverse. There inappropriate legislation is nevertheless observed and for the most part corrected; here it is disregarded to an extreme.

Such a statement reflected the frustrations which Areche was experiencing in attempting to fulfill the visitation and to end the rebellions which threatened its success. It was the opinion of the visitor that in order to defeat the rebels it would first be necessary to reduce the powers of the caciques who had been so influential in securing recruits for the Indian army. To do this, Areche suggested that the corregidores take over the collection of the Indian tributes themselves as had been done earlier in New Spain. Such an action, Areche maintained, would reduce the cacique to the status of an Indian with an entailed inheritance but without political power.<sup>68</sup> Such a response was indicative of the visitor's mentality. Never did he consider that it might be necessary to modify these tributes to end the disorders. This inability to see the true causes of the Indian rebellions and to cure them was the reason for the persistence of the rebellions long after the death of Tupac Amaru himself.



What eventually led to the defeat of Tupac Amaru was his failure to take the offensive which was taken away from him by the Royalist forces of Areche and del Valle which had arrived in Cuzco in the early part of 1781. Following the arrival of Avilés, Tupac Amaru had withdrawn with his army of 60,000 men to Tinta to prepare for an assault on Cuzco later that spring. On February 23 del Valle arrived in the city and began to prepare for a spring offensive of his own, designed to capture the Indian leader.<sup>69</sup>

The strategy of the Royalist forces was to attack the Indians from all sides. In February, Viceroy Vertíz of Buenos Aires had commissioned a force of veteran troops under the command of José Reseguín to march west of Cuzco and to prevent the rebellion from penetrating further into the La Plata region.<sup>70</sup> Orders were also sent out from Lima to the military commanders in Arequipa, Moquequa, and Tarma to raise expeditions and begin a march overland to Tinta where the rebels were taking refuge.<sup>71</sup> At the same time Inspector del Valle planned the formation of an expedition composed of five separate columns which would march from Cuzco in an effort to surround Tinta and prevent the escape of the rebels.

The decision to take the offensive and pursue the Indian army represented a significant stage in the war between the races. In a report to the Ministry of the Indies del Valle noted that the rebel leader would never consent to fight a major encounter in open territory since his army was badly organized and lacked firepower in comparison with the Royalist forces. Instead, Tupac Amaru sought



to keep his army in control of the mountain regions where his troops, because of their familiarity with the terrain, held a decided advantage. Del Valle felt that his forces could not pursue the Indians into these regions because they were not equipped to fight in this type of terrain, and that only faithful Indians could dislodge them from these mountains, "which the rebels traversed as if they were plains." The fact that Tupac Amaru controlled all but sixteen of the caciques in Peru, and held all of the provinces which bordered on the Andean passes into the La Plata region, meant that he must be captured in Tinta before he could be allowed to escape into the highlands and regroup.

Del Valle's expressed strategy to prevent this occurrence was to divide his 15,000 man army into five columns, each of which would follow a different route towards Tupac Amaru's headquarters in Tinta, with a rear guard following behind to aid any column which encountered unexpected resistance on the march. He described the maneuver as "forming a type of noose which would tighten as it approached the rebel refuge."<sup>72</sup> On March 9 del Valle set out at the head of the expedition which totalled 15,210 troops (see Table 5). An additional detachment of 1,846 men was dispatched to Calca, Quispicanchi, and Urubamba to seal off the passes in the mountains to prevent the escape of the rebel. A rearguard of 1,000 soldiers, composed of the militia of Cuzco plus some fijo troops from Lima remained in Cuzco to protect the city from attack.<sup>73</sup>

TABLE 5

EXPEDITION SENT FROM CUZCO AGAINST  
TUPAC AMARU, MARCH 1781

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Commander in Chief: Field Marshal José del Valle  
Major General: Captain Francisco Cuellar

First Column

Commandant: Sergeant Major of Cavalry Joaquin de Valcárcel  
Second: Colonel of Militia Marquis de Rocafuerte

Dragoons of Cotabambas	100
Dragoons of Calca	60
Dragoons of Urubamba	100
Dragoons of Abancay	25
Dragoons of Andahuaylas	25
Indians of Tambo and Calca	<u>2000</u>
	2310

Second Column

Commandant: Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Campero  
Second: Lieutenant of Infantry José Varela

Light Cavalry	200
Cavalry of Cuzco	150
Cavalry of Quispicanchi	200
Cavalry of Andahuaylas	200
Infantry of Lima	200
Indians of Maras, Chincheros	<u>2000</u>
	2950

Third Column

Commandant: Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Villalta  
Second: Colonel of Militia Matias Baulen

Infantry of Lima	100
Infantry of Andahuaylas	300
Infantry of Abancay	200
Company of Cacique Rosas	200
Company of Lebu	100
Indians of Tinta, Altos	<u>2000</u>
	2900

TABLE 5 (cont.)

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Fourth Column

Commandant: Corregidor of Paruro Manuel Ruíz de Castilla

Second: Colonel of Militia Isidro Guisasola

Infantry of Cuzco	100
Spaniards and Indians	<u>2900</u>
	3000

Fifth Column

Commandant: Colonel of Infantry Domingo Marnara

Second: Corregidor of Cotabambas Jose Acuña

Third: Corregidor of Chumbivilcas Francisco Laysequilla

Veteran Infantry	100
Spaniards and Indians	<u>2900</u>
	3000

Sixth Column

Commandant: Colonel José Caveró

Second: the Justicia Mayor of Paucartambo Francisco Zeleira

Spaniards and Indians	550
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Reserves

Commandant: Colonel of Dragoons Gabriel de Avilés

Second: Captain of the Army José León

Third: Colonel of Militia Gabriel de Ugarte

Veteran Infantry of Lima	300
Infantry of Guamanga	<u>200</u>
	500

Grand Total	15,210
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Source: AGI:Audiencia de Lima 1044. Report from del Valle to Galvez, Cuzco, March 1, 1781, pp. 9-12. While authorities differ as to the size of this army, they agree that at least 14,000 of the troops were loyal Indians. (Fisher, p. 212.)

Nevertheless, the march from Cuzco to Tinta demonstrated the inability of the Spanish government to provision an army in the field. Such a handicap was to cause widespread desertion within the ranks which was ultimately to weaken the endeavor. The march was made in the middle of winter, and often the soldiers travelled in a blinding snowstorm which piled snow up to their knees. After a month of travel, del Valle stated that "our troops handle themselves with the greatest bravery, and the Pardos and Negroes of Lima have made a joke of the snow . . ." The lack of provisions was to become a more serious matter. In his report to the viceroy, del Valle noted that he had been forced at one point to turn his own supply of meat and biscuit over to his troops, whose provisions were exhausted. He went on to say that since the rebels had occupied the territory earlier that attempts to purchase cattle from the neighboring farms was most difficult, and that by March 12 Colonel Avilés had only been able to secure seven head of cattle for his 2,760 soldiers. This was not the only limitation, del Valle related. In one instance, he noted that only fifteen tents and 6,000 pesos had been provided for a detachment of 3,000 men. Medicines and doctors were practically nonexistent. He mentioned that there were only two surgeons for the entire army and that they had only brandy and iron oxide with which to treat the soldiers. Del Valle explained the lack of discipline in the ranks by the fact that army recruiters had told the militiamen that they would only have to serve twenty days, when in fact the campaign lasted four

months, and that as a result many of them deserted. He noted that no review of the soldiers had been held prior to their leaving Cuzco to determine these deficiencies. He mentioned that only a small part of the expedition were men of "honor and circumstance" and that most of the troops were "rustics incapable of subjection and good order." He also stated that the extreme shortage of disciplined militia and fijo troops in his force left him with insufficient men to act as a training cadre. Finally del Valle complained that the soldiers had not received pay on any sort of a schedule. He noted that during the entire campaign he had only received one full salary.<sup>74</sup>

Notwithstanding these limitations the Royalist army converged upon Sangarara by April, and encamped outside the rebel compound, where Tupac Amaru waited with an army estimated at 10,000 foot-soldiers and 4,000 cavalry. An attempt by the Indians to launch a surprise attack upon the Spaniards was defeated, which disheartened the Indian leader and convinced him to flee to Tinta. Before leaving he wrote his wife a plaintive letter, stating that "Many, and very brave soldiers are coming against us. There is left to us no other remedy than to die." He then left his fortress with several trusted lieutenants. Once this decision to flee had been made, the Royalist troops moved quickly to capture the rebel leaders. Tupac Amaru's wife and two of his sons were captured on the road to La Paz. Tupac Amaru himself fled to the town of Lanqui where he hoped an ally would assist him in making his way

to Buenos Aires, from where he hoped to rebuild his army. Instead his confederate informed the Spanish soldiers of his whereabouts and the rebel leader was captured not long thereafter with thirty-two of his captains.<sup>75</sup> Tupac Amaru was subsequently taken to Cuzco and later charged with treason. On May 15 he was sentenced to death by Visitor General Areche who ordered him to witness the execution of the members of his family prior to having his tongue cut out and his body dismembered by tying his limbs to four horses which were driven simultaneously in different directions.<sup>76</sup> In such a fashion did the visitor seek to intimidate any others who might seek to question the authority of the crown.

Nevertheless, the death of Tupac Amaru failed to stem the tide of Indian rebellions in Peru. Led by his brother Diego Tupac Amaru and many of his generals who had escaped, the Indians continued to wage a war of attrition which claimed an estimated 80,000 lives and continued until 1783 before it was extinguished.<sup>77</sup> After the death of Tupac Amaru, General del Valle was forced to raise another army to pursue these other rebels since once the campaign ended his troops had practically all deserted.<sup>78</sup> The focus of the second campaign was to be on Puno, a small town located on the northwest bank of Lake Titicaca. Described as "a little island of loyalty in a sea of rebellion," Puno was strategic to both sides since it was situated on the route between Cuzco and La Paz, and from it an army could control the approach to the latter.<sup>79</sup>

The defense of Puno prior to this time had been valiantly directed by its corregidor Joaquín Antonio de Orellana, who had organized and deployed an urban militia against the Indian armies trying to capture it. General del Valle had hoped to lead an expedition to Puno to repopulate that city and prevent its falling into the hands of the rebels. In May, the general left at the head of an army of 15,000 men, but due to the same limitations which had hindered the Tinta expedition, the rate of desertion was phenomenal and forced the expedition to return to Cuzco. So high was the desertion rate that only 1,100 soldiers and 450 Indians reached Puno out of the original number.<sup>80</sup> This fact combined with the freezing weather and lack of food led del Valle to return to Cuzco and abandon Puno to the Indians.

The failure of the Puno expedition was consequential to the war for several reasons. In the first place, it allowed the rebel forces to gather in the entire Titicaca basin pursuant to an attack on La Paz which they considered their prime objective. In this sense it prolonged the rebellion considerably. Secondly, the abandonment of Puno thoroughly discredited General del Valle as a battlefield commander. Areche sought to force the general to return to Lima in order that the viceroy might appoint the visitor general in his place, but Jauregui refused to do this.<sup>81</sup> Finally, the expedition had proven the limitations of a Spanish army to wage war at these altitudes and weather conditions. The inability of the coastal militia to fight at these heights was one more limitation on this component whose utility had already been seriously placed in doubt.<sup>82</sup>

The report filed by General del Valle in defense of his actions was a stinging indictment of the support which a battle-field commander received from the royal officials in Peru and a statement of the limitations of the military reform program to that date. He stated that while Charles III had recognized the needs of his royal armies throughout the century, his subordinates had failed to implement his policies. Del Valle cited the financial limitations which he had suffered, and held that "to make war and to successfully conduct the difficult measures which it requires, one needs money, money, and money." He stated that although there had been sufficient funds in the royal treasury to outfit and provision his army, that due to the corruption and inattention of the Paymaster General José de Lagos this was not done. Del Valle also blamed the recruiters who enlisted many soldiers under false pretenses. These inexperienced soldiers, he held

the major part of whom had never had a rifle in their hands . . . believe that War was a pure diversion: that in it one would experience no hunger, cold, rains, anxieties, nor any type of labors: that they would acquire riches from plundering the enemy, having persuaded themselves that they could keep all that they seized.

As a result of these misconceptions, del Valle noted that 1,950 soldiers had deserted in one day, and that he returned to Cuzco with only 1,449 soldiers out of the entire number which had left earlier. Part of the problem, according to the general, lay with the exorbitant taxes levied by the visitor, and the failure of the royal officials to exclude the soldiers from the payment of tribute. This, along with the failure to pay them for the use of their animals,



he maintained, accounted for the "incredible aversion of the mestizos and Indians" to military service. He closed by asking that the crown judge his actions in terms of the military situation which he faced, and with the knowledge that rarely in the century had a field commander been so badly equipped to do battle.<sup>83</sup>

The turning point in the Indian wars came with the siege of La Paz. The Indian rebels, led by Tupac Catari, who claimed a relationship to the deceased Tupac Amaru, laid siege to the city with a force of 14,000 soldiers. Twice the rebels besieged the city for periods of 109 and seventy-five days. Although the sieges resulted in the death of 20,000 Spaniards and 40,000 Indians, including one-third of the population of the city, it did not fall to the Indians. Finally a force sent from Buenos Aires arrived to break the siege and provision the city.<sup>84</sup> The success of the Spanish inhabitants of La Paz to hold the city against overwhelming numbers of Indians proved to them the superiority of their arms and gave them increased courage in their ability to defeat the natives. Conversely, the inability of the rebel forces to capture La Paz was a shattering blow to their aspirations which marked the beginning of the end of the Indian rebellions.

In January, 1782, Diego Tupac Amaru had met with General del Valle in the town of Siquani, following the promise of a general pardon, and had surrendered his sword on behalf of 30,000 of his supporters.<sup>85</sup> The death of del Valle on September 4 of that year removed one of Diego's staunchest allies from the scene, and helps

to explain the execution of the latter not long thereafter.<sup>86</sup> On August 23 Viceroy Jauregui had written to Gálvez to report that the Indian revolts had been crushed and that the viceroyalty was quiet once again.<sup>87</sup>

The cost of the Indian wars were staggering. The public debt of the viceregal treasury, which prior to 1780 had stood at five and one-half million pesos, had risen to eight and one-third million by 1784.<sup>88</sup> In human terms the losses were equally significant.

One anonymous account of Peru following the wars states that

In the two years following the war a very considerable scarcity of livestock and other edibles was noticeable, of baize, of all sorts of clothing and merchandise of the country, as a result of the damage and ruin which Peru suffered . . . The houses were ruined, funds consumed, some families destroyed . . . The Royal Treasuries were empty, and in debt throughout Peru, taking the Treasure of the King to defray the expenses of the war, and although the amount it cost is not known with certainty, it is public knowledge that Millions of pesos were taken from them.

Later Visitor Escobedo was to verify that the Indian rebellions had cost Peru 2,582,979 pesos.<sup>89</sup>

The results which stemmed from the Tupac Amaru rebellion are several. Three of the most significant of them, all of which form part of the Bourbon program, include the abolition of the hated repartimiento system, the replacement of the corregidor as an administrator by the intendant system in 1784, and the creation of an audiencia in Cuzco by 1787. The need for such reforms was clearly spelled out by Gabriel de Avilés, who had succeeded José del Valle as commandant of the Spanish Army in Cuzco in 1782, and

who was charged with the problem of pacification.<sup>90</sup> Gálvez assured him confidentially that the entire system of Spanish administration in Peru was to be changed as a result.<sup>91</sup> To oversee the implantation of this new program of reform the crown named Jorge Escobedo, the subdelegate of Areche in Potosí, as visitor general, and ordered Areche to return to Spain.<sup>92</sup> Much of the success of the Bourbon program in Peru can be attributed to the efforts of this capable administrator.<sup>93</sup>

The revolts also provided the first test of the wisdom of the military reform program. One of the first conclusions to come out of the rebellion was the futility and danger of creating a militia in the interior provinces. Consequently, all plans to do so were dropped. In his Memoria, Viceroy Jauregui noted that "the interior provinces find themselves defenseless, because it is neither convenient nor feasible in them to give the proper organization to militias, because almost all the inhabitants are Indians and mestizos."<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless, it is incorrect to assume that all of the militia which fought in the campaigns against Tupac Amaru were cowardly. Most of the desertions experienced by battlefield commanders occurred among untrained recruits from the provinces. The provincial militia of Lima, which served in the campaigns in Cuzco, gave a generally good account of themselves and were rewarded for their bravery.<sup>95</sup> Regardless of this fact the militia emerged from the wars with a generally tarnished reputation, due in part to such occurrences such as the Oruro uprising, where their presence

constituted a real threat to Spanish government, and the belief that the creoles of Lima, many of whom were prominent in the militia of that city, had masterminded the revolts.<sup>96</sup> Even Tupac Amaru had disparaged the fighting ability of these militia, stating that they were useful only "to kill sparrows and eat cornmeal mush."<sup>97</sup> One observer held that all the militia really cared about were their military privileges, since the lack of lawyers and judicial inexperience common in the provinces allowed them to use these privileges to rob the public at will.<sup>98</sup> Another commentator stated that the soldiers were libertines whose depredations had to be endured during wartime but not in time of peace.<sup>99</sup> Observers also felt that the victory over the Indians was due to luck and not military skill.<sup>100</sup>

The best blueprint for reform within the Army of Peru came from the pen of Visitor Areche, who, for all his shortcomings as an administrator, held a generally clearer conception of what was required to perfect the defenses of the viceroyalty than his contemporaries. In a report to the crown on this subject, Areche proposed that the crown send at least three veteran regiments to Peru, whose officers he hoped would be "Swiss or German Catholics" who presumably would possess Prussian military virtues which they would impart to the soldiers of the viceroyalty. The mission of these troops, Areche stated, would be to protect the coast of Peru "from the Cape Horn to the south of New Spain" from the incursions of the enemies of the Spanish crown. To finance the sending of

these troops, and to further weaken the powers of his enemy the viceroy, Areche proposed that the companies of halberdiers and cavalry of the Viceroy's Guard be abolished and their salaries applied to pay the salaries of these incoming troops. He cited as precedent the example of Lieutenant General Villalba who had extinguished a similar mounted company in New Spain on the basis of expense. As for the fijo battalion, Areche proposed that part of it be utilized to fill vacancies in the veteran regiments and that the rest of the soldiers be sent to garrisons distant from their homes where temptations to desert were less, and where the loyalty of these soldiers would be more assured.

Areche also suggested that the veteran training cadres both in Lima and the provinces be abolished since they do not "put forth one useful thing" and were too expensive to maintain. In their place he suggested that three companies of mounted fusileers be created and that detachments from them be sent to Cuzco, Guamanga, Arequipa, Trujillo, La Paz, Charcas, Chile, Buenos Aires, and Potosí to insure the security of these regions. He estimated that the total increase in cost of developing such a program would be 194,160 pesos, a small sum in view of the improved defense it would provide.

Although the visitor general did not recommend the wholesale abolition of the militia component, he did urge that it be reclassified on an urban basis as it had been previously. The reason for this, he declared, was that presently regiments were raised in remote regions where, due to the distance from the provincial capitals and

between the companies themselves, they were useless as tactical units in time of war. The result of such a policy, the visitor declared, was to create companies which consisted of nothing more than officers, who frequently utilized their military privileges for their own ends. Areche felt that an urban militia should be retained in the towns and cities of the viceroyalty to supplement the ranks of the veteran regiments in time of war, and noted that the reduction of military privileges granted to urban militia would act to limit the aforementioned abuses. Areche concluded that by extending royal authority in the form of veteran troops throughout the viceroyalty, the crown would reap the numerous benefits of increased respect and veneration for the king, although it might increase expenses slightly. Should military expenditures need to be cut even further, Areche proposed that the position of inspector general, which had been vacant since the death of del Valle, be abolished and the duties assumed by the senior officer of the veteran regiments.<sup>101</sup>

In February of 1783 the crown secretly notified the Viceroy of New Spain that it was relieving Jauregui of his duties as Viceroy of Peru and was appointing in his place the commanding general of the interior provinces of New Spain, Teodoro de Croix, who was ordered to embark for Lima immediately.<sup>102</sup> The replacement of Jauregui by Croix signalled not only displeasure on the part of the crown of the conduct of the former, but a new philosophy concerning royal administration in Peru. Whereas the viceroyalty had previously been ruled by men of iron will such as Amat and Areche, in the future,

the crown noted, Peru would be governed "on the base of a policy of regeneration and appeasement, of construction and reform."<sup>103</sup> Moreover, it would continue to be governed by two persons rather than one, since Escobedo as visitor general, inherited all of the powers granted to Areche. But whereas before this had been a coequal partnership, the balance of power seemed to be shifting in favor of the visitor as the king's representative. In a secret report to Escobedo, Croix was described by the Minister of the Indies as a man of "laudable docility," and one whom he could work easily with.<sup>104</sup> The implication seemed clear: from now on Peru was to remain more closely under royal supervision, in an effort to prevent the factions of the past from recurring.

Secondly, the king notified the incoming viceroy that he was forthwith dispatching two complete veteran regiments to Peru in order to dispel the illusion "that our arms and power are not what they were presumed to be and that they be respected and feared."<sup>105</sup> That the crown should follow such a course which had been recommended to him by Egan and Areche, the two foremost opponents of the militia reform, was a tacit admission that the king regarded the militia of Peru, especially in the interior, as useless. Such a measure was also a drastic departure from the recommendations made earlier by the Secret Committee on Imperial Defense, which had specifically sought to develop the militia as an alternative to the prior tradition of using garrison troops as the basis of colonial defense. That the crown recognized the limitations of militia in regions of

large Indian and mixed blood populations such as Peru was reflected by the guidelines drawn up in July, 1787, by the Consejo de Estado or Council of State, headed by the Conde de Floridablanca, to co-ordinate Spanish imperial policy, which held that

The militias and fijo units of America are useful against enemy invasions but are not so to maintain internal order; since as natives born and educated with maxims of opposition and jealousy towards Europeans, they can have alliances and relations with the persons of the country and castes who disturb or disrupt the public peace which ought to be kept in mind, and much more so when the leaders of these corps also are natives, and even castes, Indians, mestizos, and others who comprise that population . . . It is important to always have veteran troops in the principal areas of America . . . with the purpose that they contain and support the fijo corps and militia in any cases which occur.<sup>106</sup>

The significance of the statement is clear: from now on veteran troops were to be employed not only to support the militia, but to protect the interests of the crown when these diverged from those of the militia. The original program of military reform had been undertaken to defend the colonies against external aggression. The new problem of internal subversion, symbolized best by the figure of Tupac Amaru, called for new forms of defense, which in Peru were to constitute a virtual repudiation of the reform which had earlier been instituted.



Notes

<sup>1</sup>Mendiburu, VI, 342-343.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., II, 351; Pike, pp. 33-35. Baquíjano, the Conde de Vistaflorida was a creole born in Lima and educated in Spain. One of the most enlightened men of the viceroyalty, he was influential in founding the Mercurio Peruano and was active in the Sociedad de amantes del país.

<sup>3</sup>Lillian Estelle Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, 1780-1783 (Norman, Oklahoma, 1966), p. 19.

<sup>4</sup>Cangas, "Descripción en diálogo . . .," p. 34.

<sup>5</sup>Lillian Fisher, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup>José Fernando Abascal y Sousa, Memoria de gobierno del virrey Abascal, Edición preparada por Vicente Rodríguez Casado y José Antonio Calderón Quijano (Seville, 1944), pp. 194-196, 217-219, 321.

<sup>7</sup>BL: "Copia de carta escrita a un Sr. ministro de Madrid por un vecino del Cuzco," Cuzco, September 1, 1782, in "Relación de los hechos más notables acaecidos en la Sublevación general fraguada en los Reynos del Perú, por el Yndio José Gabriel Tupac Amaru . . .," pp. 15-17.

<sup>8</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Circular order to all corregidores from Viceroy Agustín de Jauregui, Lima, January 15, 1781.

<sup>9</sup>AGI:AL 1039, Letter from Juan José Abelfuertes, corregidor of Pasco, to Areche, Pasco, March 22, 1780, pp. 3-4.

<sup>10</sup>BL: "Defensa de su conducta escrita por don Joseph Antonio de Areche . . . presentada al Consejo de Indias en 17 de Marzo de 1787," in "Relación de los hechos más notables," pp. 84-92.

<sup>11</sup>"Proyecto del Coronel Demetrio Egan . . . para la seguridad interior de las provincias del reyno del Peru," Lima, October, 1779, pp. 211 ff.; AGI:AC 716, Letter from the Marqués de la Plata to Gálvez, La Plata, February 4, 1781, both cited in Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 91-92.

<sup>12</sup>Lillian Fisher, pp. 35-36, 228-229.

<sup>13</sup>Leona Ruth Auld, "Discontent with the Spanish System of Control in Upper Peru, 1730-1809," Doctoral dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1963, p. 84.

<sup>14</sup>Lillian Fisher, p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 44-45; Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, pp. 443-444.

<sup>16</sup> BL: "Oficio que dirigió la Junta de Guerra de la ciudad del Cuzco al Excmo. Sr. Virrey Dn. Augustin de Jauregui con propio destinado a informarle del estado en que se halla la dha Ciudad con el lebantimiento [sic] de Josef Gabriel Tupac Amaru," Cuzco, November 13, 1780, in "Dialogo sobre los sucesos varios acaecidos en este Reyno del Peru . . . Año 1786," pp. 145-146. This document is reprinted in Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, pp. 896-898.

<sup>17</sup> Letters from Bishop Manuel de Moscoso to Antonio de Areche, Cuzco, November 21, 1780 and November 29, 1780, in Rafael José Sahuaraura, Estado del Perú; código escrito en 1780 y que contiene datos importantes sobre la revolución de José Gabriel Tupac Amaru (Lima, 1944), pp. 149-158. Sahuaraura was an Indian priest of Cuzco accused by Bishop Moscoso of being in favor of the rebels, and this book formed his defense against that charge.

<sup>18</sup> AGI:AL 1084, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, December 22, 1780, p. 4; Lillian Fisher, pp. 102-104; Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, pp. 449-450.

<sup>19</sup> AGI:AL 1084, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, December 22, 1780, p. 4; Lillian Fisher, p. 105.

<sup>20</sup> Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Tupac Amaru, la revolución precursora de la emancipación continental (Cuzco, 1949), pp. 168-169. Almost half of the money raised to defend Cuzco was donated by the Church. AGI:AC 37, "Sumario general de las datas de esta cuenta . . .," Cuzco, December 31, 1780. In Lima also the clergy donated heavily to end the rebellions. AGI:AL 664, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, March 16, 1783, pp. 1-3.

<sup>21</sup> Lillian Fisher, p. 111. Lewin states that these figures are more impressive when one remembers that San Martín liberated Peru with a force of 4,414 soldiers. Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, p. 431.

<sup>22</sup> Cornejo Bouroncle, p. 172; Lillian Fisher, pp. 115-116. For the discussion in Parliament to invade South America at this time, see The Parliamentary and Constitutional History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803 (London, 1814), XX, 932.

<sup>23</sup> Lewin explains (pp. 436-439) that the Indians in Peru were never allowed to possess firearms and were not given them when conscripted for military expeditions. As a result, Tupac Amaru's army lacked organization and tactical planning in addition to weapons and provisions.

<sup>24</sup>Lillian Fisher, pp. 109-112.

<sup>25</sup>AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, February 15, 1781, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>Relaciones de los virreyes, III, Relación que hace el Excmo. Sr. D. Agustín de Jauregui . . . a su Sucesor Excmo. Sr. D. Teodoro de Croix desde 20 de Julio de 1780 hasta 3 de Abril de 1784, pp. 144-145.

<sup>27</sup>AGI:AL 1483, Report from Gabriel de Aviles to José de Gálvez, Cuzco, January 28, 1783, pp. 1-2.

<sup>28</sup>Lillian Fisher, p. 121.

<sup>29</sup>Informe relacionado que el cabildo, justicia, y regimiento de la ciudad del Cuzco hace a V.M. con documentos, de los principales sucesos acaecidos en aquella ciudad desde principios del Año de 1780 hasta últimos de 783, in Relaciones de los virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú, III, pp. 337-345; AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, February 15, 1781, pp. 1-2.

<sup>30</sup>Lillian Fisher, pp. 123-125.

<sup>31</sup>"Copia de carta escrita a un Sr. ministro de Madrid . . .," p. 23; Relación de Jauregui, p. 147.

<sup>32</sup>Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, pp. 454-455; Relación de Jauregui, pp. 148-149; Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, 2nd ed. (Mexico City, 1965), p. 129.

<sup>33</sup>AGI:AL 1084, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, December 22, 1780, pp. 4-7. While Gálvez was visitor-general in New Spain, he had requested command of a detachment of soldiers being sent to San Luis Potosí to put down an Indian uprising in favor of the Jesuits, but had been denied this by Viceroy Croix.

<sup>34</sup>BL: Letter from Antonio de Areche to Fernando Marqués de La Plata, Viceroy of La Plata, Lima, February 1, 1783, p. 31.

<sup>35</sup>AGI:AL 1044, Report from del Valle to the King, Cuzco, March 1, 1781, pp. 1-4; BNL: Documentos sobre la rebelión de Tupac Amaru. Areche to Gálvez, Cuzco, April 30, 1781, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup>AGI:AL 659, Jauregui to Gálvez, no date, pp. 1-2; AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, February 15, 1781, p. 8.

<sup>37</sup>Lillian Fisher, pp. 117-118.

<sup>38</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Circular order to all corregidores from Augustin de Jauregui, Lima, January 15, 1781, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup>AGI:AL 660, Areche to Jauregui, Ica, January 3, 1781, p. 3; AGI:AL 1041, Areche to Jauregui, Ica, January 3, 1781, p. 3; AGI:AL 1085, Areche to Jauregui, January 3, 1781, pp. 1-3.

<sup>40</sup>AGI:AL 660, Gabriel de Avilés to Jauregui, Ica, January 3, 1781, p. 1; AGI:AL 660, Avilés to Jauregui, Cuzco, January 13, 1781, p. 3. In this letter the general stated his feelings that it was a particular disposition of God that the Visitor has come, in order that with his authority and perspicacity he can inter this cancer which consumes this body politic; where everyone wants to rule, and all differ in their mode of thought, and all complain reciprocally . . .

<sup>41</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Jauregui to Areche, Lima, January 12, 1781, pp. 1-4.

<sup>42</sup>Barros Arana, VI, 394, note 55.

<sup>43</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Areche to the corregidor of Guamanga, Guamanga, January 23, 1781, p. 1; AGI:AL 1085, Areche to the corregidor of Huanta, Guamanga, January 25, 1781, pp. 1-2.

<sup>44</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Areche to del Valle, Guamanga, January 23, 1781, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup>Letter from del Valle to two friends in Lima, dated October 3, 1781, cited in Sir Clements R. Markham, Travels in Peru and India (London, 1862), p. 128. Del Valle stated that if they were informed that the rebels were approaching their town, they would rather see the defeat of the King's soldiers than send away a single Indian who might owe them a yard of cloth.

<sup>46</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Areche to Jauregui, Guamanga, January 28, 1781, pp. 1-4.

<sup>47</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Jauregui to Areche, Lima, February 28, 1781, pp. 1-3.

<sup>48</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Areche to Jauregui, Cuzco, March 16, 1781, pp. 1-6.

<sup>49</sup>AGI:AL 1085, Areche to Gálvez, Cuzco, March 20, 1781, pp. 6-9.

<sup>50</sup>Relación de Jauregui, pp. 151-152.

<sup>51</sup>AGI:AL 640, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix, instruyendo de los principales acaecimientos en el Reyno del Peru con el fin de que le sirvan de gobierno estas noticias," El Pardo, March 28, 1783, pp. 1-15.

<sup>52</sup>AGI:AL 1041, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, January 16, 1783, p.3.

<sup>53</sup>Auld, pp. 109-129; Fisher, pp. 140-171.

<sup>54</sup>Lillian Fisher, p. 172.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., pp. 116-117; AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, May 5, 1781, p. 1.

<sup>56</sup>AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, April 25, 1781, p. 1; AGI:AL 1494, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, June 16, 1783, p. 1; AGI:AL 663, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, June 16, 1783, p. 1; ANL: Real Tribunal del Consulado, legajo 10, cuaderno 150 (1780), pp. 1-17; Relación de Jauregui, p. 189.

<sup>57</sup>Relación de Jauregui, pp. 192-193.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>AGI:AL 664, Jauregui to Gálvez, April 16, 1783, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup>Relación de Jauregui, pp. 190-191. For specific examples of these desertions, see various letters in ANL:RH, legajo 2 (1781). These pay records give a good overview of the actions and attitudes of these training cadres.

<sup>61</sup>AGI:AL 1496, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, November 22, 1781, p. 1; El Moralista Filathetico Americano (Lima, 1819), p. 376. This work contains numerous royal orders and cédulas, listed in chronological order. The order abolishing the cavalry commandant is dated June 2, 1781.

<sup>62</sup>Relación de Jauregui, pp. 191-192.

<sup>63</sup>AGI:AL 662, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, July 5, 1782, pp. 8-91 Relación de Jauregui, p. 194.

<sup>64</sup>The king had ordered Jauregui to read a plan of defense titled Lima Inexpugnable, written in 1740 by Pedro de Peralta y Barnuevo, a leading intellectual of Lima. The plan, which entailed massive fortification of the city, was vetoed by the junta de guerra. See Luis Antonio Eguiguren Escudero (Lima, 1966). AGI:AL 662, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, May 31, 1782, p. 1; Relación de Jauregui, p. 204.

<sup>65</sup>AGI:AL 1493, "Relacion del Coronel Dn. Demetrio Egan de los alborotos del Peru al Sr. Jose de Galvez," Lima, February 20, 1781, pp. 1-11.

<sup>66</sup>For an example of Areche's thinking on the "soft line" adopted towards the Indians, see BNL: Legajo C416, Documentos sobre la Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, Areche to Jauregui, Lima, September 7, 1781, pp. 10-13.

<sup>67</sup>BL: "El mariscal de campo D. José del Valle escribió y firmó en el Cuzco en 30 de Sete. de 1781 un manifesto . . .," p. 8. Del Valle stated that if he had made such a brutal reply, which made a surrender and peace impossible, Areche would have denounced him and declared that he sought to continue the war for his soldiers' personal gain. "But as he was the visitor, I kept quiet; and on my part, to make me hated, he said I was ungovernable. If he had heard Tupac Amaru in terms of humility, misfortunes like those of La Paz and others and their revolts would have been avoided."

<sup>68</sup>AGI:AL 1040, Areche to Gálvez, Cuzco, March 20, 1781, pp. 1-10.

<sup>69</sup>Lillian Fisher, pp. 129-130. It took del Valle and Areche almost three months to make the trip from Lima to Cuzco, whereas Avilés made it in one month. Had Tupac Amaru attacked the city before February, he might well have been able to capture it.

<sup>70</sup>Lillian Fisher, p. 172.

<sup>71</sup>BL: "Relacion de los hechos mas notables acaecidos en la Sublevación general . . .," p. 297.

<sup>72</sup>AGI:AL 1044, del Valle to Gálvez, Cuzco, March 1, 1781, pp. 5-7.

<sup>73</sup>AGI:AL 1040, Areche to Gálvez, Cuzco, March 20, 1781, p. 5.

<sup>74</sup>AGI:AL 1040, del Valle to Jauregui, Campo de Tinta, April 8, 1781, pp. 1-2; BL: "El Mariscal de Campo D. José del Valle escribió . . .," pp. 1-3.

<sup>75</sup>AGI:AC 63, del Valle to Gálvez, Campo de Tinta, April 8, 1781, p. 3; Lillian Fisher, pp. 214-220.

<sup>76</sup>Lillian Fisher, pp. 222-223.

<sup>77</sup>BL: "Decada 4ª de la escena en la revelion de Jose Gabriel Tupac Amaru," Cuzco, May 22, 1781, pp. 1-15.

<sup>78</sup>AGI:AC 63, del Valle to Gálvez, Siquani, June 25, 1781, pp. 1-10.

<sup>79</sup>Lillian Fisher, p. 258, Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru, p. 431.

<sup>80</sup>Lillian Fisher, p. 274.

<sup>81</sup>BL: "Carta que el Sr. Visitador Dn. Josef Antonio de Areche escribió al Sr. Inspector General sobre el abandono de Puno," in "Dialogo sobre los sucesos varios acaecidos en este Reyno del Peru . . .," pp. 322-323.

<sup>82</sup>AGI:AL 1041, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, October 16, 1781, pp. 4-8; AGI:AL 1041, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, August 4, 1781, pp. 2-3; AGI:AL 1086, Areche to Gálvez, Lima, October 17, 1781, pp. 3-8.

<sup>83</sup>AGI:AC 63, del Valle to Gálvez, Cuzco, September 28, 1781, pp. 1-26. In another defense of his conduct, written two days later (BL: "El Mariscal de campo D. Jose del Valle escribió . . .," p. 7), the Inspector general noted that it had been the viceroy and not the visitor who had finally freed the militia and Indian auxiliaries from paying tribute, while serving in the army. This was one more evidence of Areche's unwillingness to sacrifice revenue during the war. Del Valle related the story of a meeting between Areche and Tupac Amaru after the capture of the former. When Areche asked him to declare the names of his accomplices, Tupac Amaru replied, "There are only two. You and I. You for having oppressed the Kingdom with excessive contributions, and I for wanting to free it from such vexations."

<sup>84</sup>Lillian Fisher, pp. 281-312.

<sup>85</sup>ibid., pp. 348, 365-368.

<sup>86</sup>An anonymous observer of Cuzco reported that Diego Tupac Amaru rode into town beside del Valle dressed in the uniform of a Colonel in the Spanish Army. BL: "Copia de carta escrita a un Sr. ministro de Madrid . . .," p. 28. Colonel Gabriel de Avilés, a future Viceroy of Peru, was named as commandant in Cuzco in his place.

<sup>87</sup>AGI:AL 662, Jauregui to Gálvez, Lima, August 23, 1782, p. 1.

<sup>88</sup>Céspedes del Castillo, Reorganización, p. 42.

<sup>89</sup>BL: "Relación de los hechos más notables . . .," p. 330; "Informe del visitador . . .," in Relaciones de los virreyes, III, 442.

<sup>90</sup>AGI:AL 618, Gabriel de Avilés to Gálvez, Cuzco, September 30, 1782, pp. 1-2; ibid., Cuzco, January 28, 1783, pp. 1-3.

<sup>91</sup>AGI:AL 618, Gálvez to Avilés, September 22, 1783, pp. 1-2.



<sup>92</sup>Palacio Atard, p. 55.

<sup>93</sup>See the report from Escobedo to Gálvez, Lima, October 20, 1785, in Relaciones de los virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú, III, 369-444.

<sup>94</sup>Relación de Jauregui, p. 171. This assertion was supported by the audiencias in these areas also. The Audiencia of Charcas, for example, stated that, since the officers and men of the militia were of the same race, discipline of one by the other was impossible. AGI:IG, Audiencia of Charcas to the Ministry of the Indies, Plata, June 15, 1781, pp. 1-3.

<sup>95</sup>An observer in Cuzco, an avowed partisan of Areche, reported that the pardos libres of Lima were unspeakably cowardly during the campaign, and that only the Battalion of Merchants of Cuzco acted with any bravery among the militia there. He also felt that the corregidores as a group demonstrated more bravery than the regular officers, whom he accused of leaving their bravery in Spain and retaining only their uniforms. BL: "Carta que un sugeto vecino del Cuzco y apasionado del Sr. Visitador escribió a otro confidante suyo vecino de Lima . . ." Cuzco, July 3, 1781, in "Dialogo sobre los sucesos varios acaecidos en este Reyno del Peru . . .," p. 29.

Nevertheless, when Jauregui asked Avilés to draw up a list of the soldiers who had particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting, the list included thirty-three militia officers, seventeen regular officers, eleven adventurers, and nine corregidores. He also cited the militia of Arequipa, Paruro, Paucartambo, Guamanga, and Abancay for special recognition. AGI:AL 664, "Relación que explica los meritos que han adquirido, y las acciones en que se han hallado los Oficiales del Exercito, Caballeros Aventurosos y oficiales de milicias que han servido en esta Ciudad . . .," Cuzco, September 16, 1782, pp. 1-23. For other examples of particular bravery see the Informe relacionado que el cabildo, justicia y regimiento de la ciudad de Cuzco hace . . . in Relaciones de los virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú, III, 345 ff.

<sup>96</sup>AGI:AL 640, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . .," El Pardo, March 28, 1783, pp. 1-15; BNL: Documentos sobre la rebelión de Tupac Amaru. Areche to Gálvez, Cuzco, Paril 30, 1781, pp. 8-9.

<sup>97</sup>Tupac Amaru to Joseph Paredes, Canon of the Church of La Paz, Chuquibamba, January 26, 1781, cited in Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, "Sentido social de la rebelión de Tupac Amaru," Letras No. 50-53 (Lima, 1954), p. 173. The Indians later changed their opinion of these troops as their losses began to mount. See AGI:AL 1041 "Carta de los Naturales del Pais al Rey," December 4, 1781, pp. 16-18.



<sup>98</sup>AGI: Estado 74 "Informe de las causas de Rebelion de Tupac Amaru del Dn. Francisco Martínez y La Costa al Virrey del Peru," San Felipe, August 30, 1781, pp. 1-2.

<sup>99</sup>BL: "Década 4<sup>a</sup> de la escena en la revelion de Jose Gabriel Tupac Amaru," pp. 14-15.

<sup>100</sup>BL: "Copia de carta escrita a un Sr. ministro de Madrid," pp. 27-28.

<sup>101</sup>AGI:AL 1086, "El Visitador y Superintendente general de la Real Hazienda del Peru informa a S.M. con varios Planes y documentos el número y clase de tropas que juzga necesarias para cubrir las atenciones de aquella America y poner en una justa subordinacion a sus vasallos . . .," Lima, November 14, 1782, pp. 1-15.

<sup>102</sup>AGI:AL 640, "Expediente reservado sobre que se restituya a España el Virrey del Peru Dn. Agustín de Jauregui," El Pardo, February 10, 1783, p. 1. Secrecy was held necessary to insure that the creoles suspected of fomenting the rebellions did not hear of the ouster and provoke more trouble.

<sup>103</sup>AGI:AL 640, Gálvez to Jorge Escobedo, El Pardo, February 15, 1783, p. 1.

<sup>104</sup>Emilio del Solar, Insurrección de Tupac Amaru, sus Antecedentes y Efectos (Lima, 1926), p. 165.

<sup>105</sup>AGI:AL 640, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . .," p. 14.

<sup>106</sup>Gobierno del Señor Rey Don Carlos III, o instruccion reservada para dirección de la junta del estado que creó este monarca; dada a luz por don Andrés Muriel (Madrid, 1839), pp. 261-262.

## V. THE CULMINATION OF THE MILITARY REFORM

As a direct result of the financial drain of the Indian rebellions and the inadequacy of the interior militia during these wars, the size of the Army of Peru was reduced after 1784. Perhaps more significant was the fact that two complete veteran regiments were sent from Spain to assume their task of garrisoning the major provincial capital in order to prevent further insurrections. Such a development meant essentially that the plan of military reform proposed by the Committee for Imperial Defense in 1763 had not succeeded in Peru. The shift back to increased dependence upon regular troops was instead a reversion to the defense system which had been employed prior to the Seven Years War. However, the difficulty of maintaining regular troops in America was to provoke further changes in the structure of the army after 1787 which would bring it more into line with the historical and geographic realities of the kingdom. By 1796 the Army of Peru had achieved a structure which was to remain essentially unchanged throughout the balance of the colonial period.

The keynote of the period following the end of the Indian rebellions in Peru was reconciliation between the viceroy and the visitor general, in the hope that the viceroyalty could be restored to a stable economic and social footing.<sup>1</sup> Jorge de Escobedo, who replaced Antonio de Areche in 1782, has been described by one

historian as "the prototype of . . . the ideal American administrator."<sup>2</sup> His counterpart, Teodoro de Croix, was chosen primarily for his flexibility rather than his administrative genius.<sup>3</sup>

The end of the rebellions did not mean that the problems which had caused them no longer remained. The departing judge Benito de la Mata Linares informed Gálvez that Peru was still financially in desperate straits, and that the deep rift between creoles and Spaniards still existed. He also detailed the corruption of the church which he held was extraordinarily powerful, and noted that certain corregidores were still clandestinely collecting the repartimiento contrary to the law.<sup>4</sup> During the viceroyalty of Teodoro de Croix the Bourbons took several steps to alleviate these social and economic problems. Mining was given renewed attention in an effort to repair the damage done during the rebellions. In an effort to improve the administration of this important resource, the Mining Ordinances of New Spain were introduced, the mining guild was reorganized, and a school of metallurgy was established. During the viceregency of Croix's successor, Viceroy Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, the Nordenflicht mining mission was sent from Germany to Peru to implant new technological advances, but its overall impact was slight.<sup>5</sup> Several important scientific expeditions sent to Peru had a higher degree of success.<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps the most important of the Bourbon administrative reforms introduced into Peru following the Indian rebellions was

the Intendancy system, which had been implanted earlier in 1782 in the La Plata Viceroyalty and had been judged suitable for use in Peru also by Escobedo.<sup>7</sup> The system ousted the corrupt corregidores and replaced them with a group of professional administrators who were given higher salaries and special instructions upon their arrival in 1784. In addition, the administrative boundaries of Peru were redrawn, replacing the numerous provinces with seven intendancies in an effort to increase efficiency through decentralization.<sup>8</sup> They were not, however, granted increased military powers.<sup>9</sup> Escobedo retained the intendance of Lima for himself, sharply circumscribing the powers of Viceroy Croix, who, in 1790 spoke out strongly against the system and urged that it be discontinued.<sup>10</sup> This advice was not followed by the crown, however.

Concurrently with the above reforms it was decided to reduce the size of the Army of Peru, to reinforce the size of its regular component, while decreasing the size of the *fijo* and militia sectors. There were two reasons for such a change. The first stemmed from a deep-seated distrust of the creoles who controlled these *fijo* and militia sectors, and the other was based upon the financial limitations imposed by the Indian rebellions. The crown had first spelled out its doubt about the creoles' loyalty in a secret report to Viceroy Croix. In it the king expressed his opinion that the Tupac Amaru rebellion had been planned as early as 1776 by the creoles of Lima, who had been aided in their endeavors because of the hatred existing throughout Peru of the

"military contribution" and other taxes imposed later by the Visitor Areche, and by the inaction of Viceroy Guirior, who refused to take any action against these subversives. The king went on to note that the situation did not improve under Viceroy Jauregui since he, like his predecessor, fell also under the control of the creoles who dominated the audiencia. He explained that the "shameful peace" resulting from the pardon of Diego Tupac Amaru convinced him that Jauregui was proceeding upon a course which would lose the kingdom through concessions to the Indians and which required his dismissal. To stem this trend, the king told Croix that he was sending two regiments of the army to Peru. He ordered the viceroy to station them throughout the kingdom to insure that the will of the sovereign was obeyed.<sup>11</sup> To implement this order he named Brigadier General Manuel de Pineda as Inspector General and Governor of Callao.<sup>12</sup>

By the first of May, 1784, the frigates Aquila and Santa Anna had anchored in Callao harbor with the first contingents of these troops. By August the Regiment of Soria with 1,276 soldiers, and the Regiment of Extremadura numbering 1,285 had disembarked in Peru. These 2,561 troops, when added to the fijo soldiers in the vice-royalty, brought the size of the regular component in Peru to 6,089 troops.<sup>13</sup>

The financial strains of the Indian rebellions also provoked a decrease in the size of the army after 1783. The superintendent of the Royal Treasury informed Croix in 1784 that in the previous year military expenditures had exceeded revenues set aside for this purpose by 488,205 pesos.<sup>14</sup> To decrease this expense and help

support the cost of the veteran contingent, the crown ordered that the Viceroy's Cavalry Guard be reduced in size from 150 to thirty-five men, and that the Company of Halberdiers be decreased from fifty-two to twenty-five.<sup>15</sup> Visitor General Escobedo had urged the previous viceroy to abolish the veteran training cadres in the provinces as well. He argued that the regular component of the army had consumed 730,546 pesos out of the 771,408 pesos spent on military salaries the previous year, and that the veteran troops from Spain could train the militia in these areas as well as these training cadres at a great savings in cost.<sup>16</sup>

These urgings for a reduction in the size of the army were supported by a report which Viceroy Croix had requested Inspector General Pineda to make on the status of forces in Peru. Pineda had sent out subinspectors to report on the condition of the provincial militia, and they had returned the information that the coastal militia was badly understrength, with only Cañete and Chancay possessing complete regiments. He also reported that the training cadres in these regions were below strength and as a result they served no useful purpose, since there was an insufficient number to train the militia of their districts. He cited as an example the southern coastal region embracing the towns of Arequipa, Moquequa, and Arica, which contained three battalions of infantry militia and thirteen squadrons of cavalry and dragoons, and whose entire training group consisted of only a sergeant major, an adjutant, and four lieutenants. He noted that the northern region

of Trujillo, Lambayeque, and Piura had about the same ratio of militia to instructors, and that the entire Indian frontier had only three sergeants and three adjutants. Pineda blamed the situation on Visitor Areche, who, he stated, cut back the training cadres to the point where, due to their small size, he "caused the expenditures to be useless."

According to Pineda, the fallacy in creating a militia in these provinces lay in the fact that administrators assumed that these companies were made up of residents from the provincial capitals, whereas in fact most of them were individuals who lived either on large ranches or in small villages situated some distance from each other. Because they could not be away from their fields or due to the distance involved it was practically impossible to gather them together for any period of time to give them suitable instruction. In the frontier regions, he felt the situation was even worse due to the terrain and because many of the soldiers were either muleteers or transient laborers who never maintained a fixed residence for training purposes. He stated that the militia regulations were exceedingly difficult to carry out in Peru since the region was geographically so different from Spain and Havana.

Pineda remarked that some of the same problems of transiency existed among the militia of Lima also. He therefore recommended that the Regiment of Spanish Infantry and the Regiment of pardos be retained at their present strength and in a disciplined classification, but that the Battalion of morenos be reduced in size to

three companies and its membership be restricted to freemen. He felt that for the same reasons the Company of morenos of cavalry could be abolished, but that the companies of pardos should be retained since their members all owned their own mounts. He considered the mestizo companies "En Memoria del Rey" to be the most useful of all the companies in Lima, and urged that they be retained on a disciplined basis. Finally, Pineda recommended that due to the dispersion of its members who lived on haciendas and large estates the Regiment of Carabaillo be disbanded and its members be incorporated into the Regiment of Dragoons of Lima.

As for the other areas in Peru, Pineda recommended that training cadres be retained in the cities of Chancay, Huarura, Arequipa, Moquequa, Arica, Camaná, Trujillo, Lambayeque, and Piura, and that their size be increased in order to better their efficiency. The only exception to this rule was Cuzco, where Pineda felt a detachment of veteran troops should be stationed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Aside from these regions, the inspector recommended that the militia companies should be reclassified as urban, and that an end be put to the practice of awarding commissions to men who sought them only for reasons of vanity.

Pineda remarked that "a great hatred for the military career" was evident among the young men of Peru, which he attributed to the low pay in the fijo companies and the practice of granting titles



in the military orders to those wealthy enough to buy them rather than to those who deserved them on the basis of experience or merit. He warned that if the situation were not changed, veteran regiments would refuse to come to Peru and the career at arms would fall to men of undistinguished birth and reduced competence. He argued that Peru required an expanded number of training cadres along its lengthy and undefended coastline to mount an adequate defense in case of an invasion. He warned the junta de guerra not to make the mistake of placing too much reliance on the veteran regiments to provide the kingdom with a defense. These regiments, he noted, were scheduled to remain only for a period of four years, and that during this period death, desertion, and retirement would reduce the strength of these bodies until they were practically nonexistent. Europeans coming to America, he said, all hoped to enrich themselves by one means or another, and for this reason the soldiers would desert in order to make their fortunes. He predicted that in two years the two regiments would number no more than a battalion, and cited the example of the second battalion of the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima as an example that levies were generally unsuccessful as an alternative means of keeping a regiment at strength. He also warned that the promise of the crown to send another pair of regiments in four years was also illusory since the cost of such a shipment would be too high to justify. For the above reasons, Pineda recommended that the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima be increased in size as a

hedge against this attrition.<sup>17</sup>

Viceroy Croix had convened a junta de guerra on August 6 to consider these various proposals regarding the army. Escobedo spoke of the "deplorable situation" of the royal treasury and all of the assembled members agreed that it could not bear the expense of training cadres for the provincial militia, although all agreed that by abolishing them, the defense of the viceroyalty was weakened considerably. In a series of economy measures, the junta passed a resolution deactivating the militia in Cuzco, Tarma, and Jauja, and ordering that these troops be replaced by detachments from the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima. A measure was also passed permitting veteran sergeants and corporals to transfer into the fijo regiment when their tour of duty was completed. The officer corps of the militia regiments of pardos and morenos was also ordered removed from pay status and the size of the fijo artillery detachment was ordered reduced from 138 to ninety-three men. In addition, the junta agreed to retain the fijo troops on Chiloe and in Valdivia due to their strategic importance and approved a petition of the viceroy to utilize the command and staff group of the dragoon Regiment of Carabaillo as a fijo dragoon company for his own use.<sup>18</sup>

On August 16 the junta was again convened by the viceroy to discuss a 1781 order of the king that a disciplined militia be created in Peru capable of defending the kingdom against external aggression as well as providing internal security. Croix stated that Viceroy Jauregui had not put his order into effect

during this viceregency, either because he was too preoccupied with the Indian rebellions or because he was awaiting the arrival of Inspector General Pineda.<sup>19</sup> The members of the junta agreed that the reform should therefore be carried out with a minimum of delay, and a vote to replace the training cadres in certain of the provincial capitals with veteran detachments was passed. It was then decided to send the balance of the veteran troops, including the second battalion of the Extremadura Regiment to La Paz, six companies of the second battalion of the Soria Regiment to Cuzco, and the remaining three companies to Arequipa. The *fijo* troops on duty in those areas were ordered to return to Lima.<sup>20</sup> Veteran troops were also ordered out to the eight garrisons in the provinces of Tarma and Jauja.<sup>21</sup>

The junta then took up the issue of the *fijo* Royal Regiment of Lima. Visitor Escobedo recommended that the second battalion of this unit be disbanded on the grounds that it was below strength and not necessary to the defense of the kingdom, but this proposal was opposed by Inspector Pineda and the regimental commander who both felt it should be retained and brought to strength. A written vote on the proposal to disband it was taken, however, and it passed, due to the support of the viceroy for the measure. A second proposal to allow all officers and cadets from the second battalion to be incorporated into the first also passed.<sup>22</sup> The visitor was unsatisfied with this victory though, and proposed that in addition to these measures that the regiments of pardos

and morenos be reclassified as urban militia and deprived of their veteran training cadres on the grounds that this training would eventually cause them to be superior in skill to the companies of whites, but this proposal was voted down. At the same time he recommended that the companies "En Memoria del Rey" be also reduced to urban status, but this too was tabled. When Escobedo later took this proposal to the crown, he was informed that a disciplined militia was essential to the security of Peru and not to interfere further in the matter.<sup>23</sup> As a result of this deemphasis of this component, Croix only formed a few additional urban militia companies during the balance of his viceregency.<sup>24</sup> Although he was aware of their limitations, in certain areas they were the only forces which the crown possessed to meet an enemy attack.<sup>25</sup>

The effect of the decision to limit the size of the *fijo* and militia components of the Army of Peru in favor of the veteran troops coming from Spain tended to breed animosity between these two groups. Such hostility was common between regular and militia troops, since the former demanded respect and obedience from the latter on the grounds that they were Peninsulars and soldiers of the king and the militia were not always willing to grant them this veneration. Often quarrels broke out in a town between the senior veteran officer and his militia counterpart over the question of who should take command in the absence of the civil authority. In Arequipa, for example, the commandant of the veteran detachment

asserted in a letter to the viceroy that the claim of the ranking militia officer to such a command was comparable to a child who had never attended school seeking to be a teacher.<sup>26</sup>

Such hostility was exhibited in the so-called "Revolt of the Muchachos" which occurred in the town of Chuquisaca (Sucre), where a detachment of Spanish troops had been stationed in 1785. During the Tupac Amaru rebellion the inhabitants of the city had been formed into a militia unit with the name of the Cuerpo de Patri-cios or the Corps of Nobles.<sup>27</sup> This unit was disbanded in 1785 with the arrival of the veteran troops, much to the dismay of the members of the unit who had attached great pride to membership. Not long thereafter violence broke out between the soldiers and the townspeople. On the evening of July 21, a soldier named Alonso Pérez, who had been provoked by taunts from a crowd of boys, fired into the crowd, killing a mestizo by the name of José Oropesa and wounding several other persons. The death of Oropesa provided rallying point for the people against the hated Spanish troops, and the next day large groups gathered in the town square, shouting insults and throwing rocks at the barracks. At the same time another group went to the house of Ignacio Flores, the president of the Audiencia of Charcas, to demand that Pérez be tried for murder for the death of Oropesa. Flores accompanied the party to the square in an attempt to get the crowd to disperse but by the time he arrived, the soldiers had begun to fire in an attempt to drive off the mob. This resulted in the killing of

several more persons and the dispersal of the group, but the following day the people again assembled outside of the barracks calling for justice. Only the appearance of Flores, who promised the people that the Cuerpo de Patricios would be reestablished, succeeded in ending the demonstration.

Flores, a creole, was supported in his attempt to reinstate the militia unit by another creole, Juan José de Segovia, the recently appointed rector of the University of San Francisco Xavier in the city. The pair won the approval of the audiencia to reform the unit, and in August the petition was sent to the Marqués de Loreto, the Viceroy of the La Plata. The viceroy, a Peninsular, opposed the measure, with the active support of Arnais, another Peninsular who was an attorney of the audiencia. Loreto therefore notified Flores that the defense of Chuquisaca would remain with the veteran troops and not with the militia. Pérez and some of the other soldiers were ordered reassigned to other areas to calm the situation.

The issue did not end there, however. Because of their support of the militia, which the Spaniards considered a threat to the public safety, Flores and Segovia were harassed and driven from public office. Arnais succeeded in getting the archdeacon of the cathedral chapter to revoke Segovia's rectorship, and an investigation of Flores was begun in Buenos Aires, although he died before it could be completed.<sup>28</sup> The reason for the denial of the petition indicated that the crown was aware of the hostility existing between veteran and militia soldiers in Peru and did not want to

elevate a body which might turn against the crown at some future time. Moreover, it demonstrated that creoles who supported such a militia were considered to be disloyal and would be treated accordingly.

This deemphasis of the creole militia came during a period of intense creole nationalism which was fed by the ideas of the Enlightenment which had entered the Viceroyalty of Peru. The spirit of scientific enquiry in Europe which was transferred to Peru in the form of scientific expeditions, manifested itself in the Sociedad de amantes del país (Society of lovers of the country) whose membership included most of the literary and intellectual talent in Lima. The society also published the Mercurio Peruano, a literary, scientific and historical journal, which one author has referred to as "the mouthpiece of a nascent Peruvian nationality."<sup>29</sup> In addition, Lima produced the first daily newspaper in America, as well as several other important publications, all written and published by the creole elite of that city. This creole aristocracy also used their control of the *cabildo* to make limited gains in the control of municipal government as well.<sup>30</sup>

Such creole nationalism also manifested itself in the widening gulf between creoles and Peninsulars, and Peru was rife with rumors of revolt, most of which had no basis in fact.<sup>31</sup> This conflict was most clearly shown in the writings of the time, which often provide a lucid commentary on these social conditions. The militia which had been created by Amat were a source of pride to

these creoles. Esteban de Terralla y Landa, a social critic whose patron was the Viceroy Croix, noted in his work Lima Por Dentro y Fuera (1792) that by becoming a soldier a man of lower-class origin could improve his status, and that otherwise he was treated no better than a Negro.<sup>32</sup> It was therefore understandable that the militia did not welcome the arrival of the veteran regiments from Spain whose power and authority they viewed as a detriment to their own ambitions. Such contempt is described by Terralla y Landa in his account of a celebration held in Lima on October 10, 1789, honoring the coronation of Charles IV in which the members of the Soria and Extremadura regiments participated.

Twelve Soldiers follow the Procession  
 with rich dazzling Uniforms:  
 brilliantly braided suits  
 demonstrating in their splendor and arrogance  
 although they are not equals of  
 [the soldiers of] France,  
 they come to Peru, because they receive  
 as much applause as a grandson of Phillip.  
 In this manner then, Uniformed,  
 and in very well harnessed Liveries,  
 they bravely authorize the parade  
 in order to give more lustre to that Trophy.<sup>33</sup>

The split between creoles and Peninsulars was widened after 1789 by the reaction which took place in Peru to the French Revolution, which led to repressive actions on the part of the authorities that the creoles resented. These had begun as early as 1783 with the confiscation of Baquijano's welcoming speech for Viceroy Jauregui, and were continued by Viceroy Croix who ordered the burning of books suspected of containing subversive ideas and opposed reforms in the curriculum at San Marcos.<sup>34</sup> This repression of



liberal ideas was continued by Viceroy Francisco Gil y Lemos, the former Viceroy of New Granada, who replaced Croix on March 25, 1790. Gil felt that his period of rule had been during the "most calamitous epoch of the world."<sup>35</sup> The presence of British and American whalers offshore were not only smugglers and potential aggressors, he felt, but also visible symbols of successful revolution.<sup>36</sup> In his Memoria Gil noted that by the end of his term the threat of Indian rebellion had passed into history. What he considered to be the most serious challenge to Peru was the French Revolution and its dangerous ideas of liberty, fraternity, and equality. To meet this challenge he banned numerous books and established a secret police to ferret out those suspected of sedition.<sup>37</sup> He was especially contemptuous of higher education for the creoles whom he suspected of disloyalty. When he was harangued on his views by some creole students at San Marcos one day, Gil asked the rector if it was true they were being taught science. When the rector replied that they were, Gil replied "Tu, tu, tu, let them learn to read, write, and say their prayers, for this is as much as any American ought to know."<sup>38</sup>

When the news that the junta de guerra had voted to reduce the size of the *fijo* Royal Regiment of Lima to one battalion reached the creoles who held officerships in the second battalion, they petitioned the viceroy for its retention and demonstrated their anger with the policy of denying creoles adequate opportunities for advancement in the military. Four creole officers, Captains Antonio Suárez, Stanislao de Cabrejas, Jacinto Iriarte, and Joseph de

Mannilla wrote Croix "in the name of all" of their number who were similarly affected by the measure to emphasize the dedication and valor which had characterized their service and to argue that abolition of the second battalion would leave Lima undefended at a most dangerous period. The four signatories held that the second battalion constituted only a small additional cost to the Royal Treasury, and that the small savings obtained from disbanding it hardly justified the ruin of such a commendable unit. They also warned that it was dangerous to place too much reliance upon veteran troops, since the climatic and geographic conditions in Peru would serve to raise the rates of death and desertion, especially if these soldiers were detached in the interior provinces. The authors stated that royal preference for these veterans was "most prejudicial to the service of the Sovereign" since it gave the creole nobility no chance to serve the king at arms. The four warned that such a policy might well mean that these loyal servants would refuse to answer the call if the battalion should later be reformed in an emergency.<sup>39</sup>

The representation did little good. By December the inspector general reported to the crown that the Battalion of Infantry at Callao had been disbanded along with the second battalion of the Royal Regiment of Lima and the competent members of the second battalion integrated into the first battalion.<sup>40</sup> This meant a reduction in the size of the *fijo* component of the Army of Peru from 6,140 to 3,678 soldiers, constituting an annual savings of

579,570 pesos (see Table 6). At the same time, the visitor warned Gálvez that due to death and desertion the Soria and Extremadura regiments were both below strength, and that the soldiers were "broadly disliked" by the people of Peru. He noted that if the regiments were brought to strength it would erase the savings created by the reduction in the number of training cadres and *fijo* units.<sup>41</sup>

By the following year the predictions regarding the attrition of the veteran regiments made by Inspector General Pineda were being fulfilled. In an indignant report to the viceroy, Pineda stated that the second battalion of the Soria regiment which had been detached to Cuzco and Arequipa was diminishing at an alarming rate. He noted that at the present rate of decline, the battalion would decrease from a present strength of 1191 soldiers to an estimated 675 by the end of 1785, and to no more than 559 by the end of the following year. Similarly, Pineda predicted that the first battalion of the Regiment of Extremadura could be expected to lose 251 out of its total strength of 625 soldiers and an additional forty-one by the end of 1786, reducing its strength to 333 men by that time. In addition, he held that the Royal Regiment of Lima, which had been reduced in size to one battalion with a strength of 610 men, would lose 164 of these by 1786, leaving it at a strength of 446 men. The cause of this was not merely death and desertion, Pineda emphasized, but the royal order of the crown which, due to the drastic underpopulation of the Peninsula, permitted those

TABLE 6

THE REFORM OF THE FIJO COMPONENT OF THE  
ARMY OF PERU, 1784

Strength and Expense Prior to the Reform		Units	Strength and Expense After the Reform	
Expense	Strength		Strength	Expense
137,000 pesos	510	1st Btn.Rl. Regt. Lima	724	194,748
95,988	369	2nd Btn.Rl. Regt. Lima	-	-----
9,931	3	Command Group, Lima	3	9,931
28,920	103	Artillery Garrison, Callao	93	29,448
-----	---	Artillery Garrison, Cuzco	26	9,000
14,652	36	Artillery Command Group	--	-----
14,352	43	Command Group, Battalion of Spaniards	43	14,352
1,128	4	Command Group, Companies of Tailors (Mestizos)	4	1,128
24,607	53	Command Group, Regiment of Dragoons of Lima	50	20,707
19,391	49	Command Group, Regiment of Dragoons of Carabaillo	--	-----
2,089	5	Command Group, Militia of Cañete	--	-----
3,242	8	Command Group, Militia of Huarura	--	-----
3,362	8	Command Group, Militia of Ica	--	-----
3,362	8	Command Group, Militia of Chancay	--	-----
660	2	Officers, Indians of Lima	2	660
6,424	15	Command Group, mulattos of Lima	15	6,424
8,520	82	Mulatto Officers	50	4,284
5,400	7	Unattached Officers	15	11,100
65,400	151	Viceroy's Cavalry Guard	34	13,680
15,600	51	Halberdiers of the Viceroy's Guard	25	7,800
13,488	66	Garrison in Jauja	--	-----
36,024	144	Garrison in Tarma	--	-----
4,402	9	Command Group, Militia of Piura	--	-----

TABLE 6 (cont.)

Strength and Expense Prior to the Reform		Units	Strength and Expense After the Reform	
Expense	Strength		Strength	Expense
2,289	5	Command Group, Militia of Trujillo	--	-----
4,272	13	Command Group, Militia of Arica	--	-----
1,704	4	Command Group, pardos of Lima	4	1,704
2,106	23	Pardo Officers	13	1,290
216,665	1,177	Militia of Cuzco	---	-----
51,532	373	Garrison in Valdivia	373	51,532
39,710	207	Garrison on Chiloe	207	39,710
328,908	1,276	Regiment of Soria	1,276	328,908
337,728	1,285	Regiment of Extremadura	642	168,864
1,498,958	6,089		3,600	915,270
2,866	-----	Prizes to each corps	-----	2,866
6,922	51	Retired and Invalid	78	11,040
1,508,746	6,140	Totals	3,678	929,176
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Summary

	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Annual Expense</u>
Strength and expense before the Reform	6,140	1,508,746 pesos
Strength and expense after the Reform	<u>3,678</u>	<u>929,176</u>
Reform and savings that result	2,462	579,570
	=====	=====

Source: AGI:AL 1494 "Cotexto del Gasto anual, pie y fuerza del Exercito que antes de la última Reforma hecha por Junta de Grra en Dec<sup>to</sup> de 9 de Sept<sup>re</sup> de 1784, havia en la conprencion de este Virrei-nato y el estado actual que oy se reconoce con demon<sup>on</sup> de la dif<sup>a</sup> del ant<sup>or</sup> yd pres<sup>te</sup>."

soldiers who had completed their tours of duty in the veteran regiments to return to Spain. The combination of these factors would, he estimated, reduce the size of the veteran and fijo components to around 1,338 men by the end of 1786, or a 50 per cent reduction in strength. He noted that the reform of the army which he had supported had been made with the expectation that the veteran component would be retained at full strength. Since this was obviously not the case, he warned that the defense of the viceroyalty would become perilously weak in the coming years.<sup>42</sup>

By 1787 the situation which Inspector Pineda had warned of earlier had presented itself and Viceroy Croix requested permission from the crown to disband the Soria and Extremadura regiments. He also asked that he be allowed to increase the size of the Royal Regiment of Lima by two additional battalions to 1,358 men (see Table 7). He stated that while Peru presently contained four regular battalions that three could effectively defend the viceroyalty if six companies were detached in Cuzco, three in Arequipa, two in Tarma, one in Jauja, and the remaining fifteen in the Lima-Callao area. He noted that if the Soria and Extremadura regiments were disbanded and their members transferred into the fijo Regiment of Lima additional money could be saved due to the pay differential between fijo and regular troops.<sup>43</sup>

Such a request was not at the same time an invitation to the creoles to assume the defense of the viceroyalty. Croix expressed certainty that the members of the regiments would seek positions in

TABLE 7

ORGANIZATION OF A VETERAN INFANTRY REGIMENT

Battalions											
Companies		Captains	Lieutenants	Second Lieutenants	First Sergeants	Second Sergeants	First Corporals	Second Corporals	Drummers	Soldiers	Totals
First	Grenadiers	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	1	54	63
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
Second	Grenadiers	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	1	54	63
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
	Fusileers	1	1	1	1	2	4	4	2	64	77
Totals	18	18	18	18	18	34	70	70	34	1132	1358

TABLE 7 (cont.)

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<u>Command and Staff Group</u>	
<u>First Battalion</u>	<u>Second Battalion</u>
1 Colonel	1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Sargento Mayor	1 Ayudante Mayor
1 Ayudante Mayor	2 Flag Bearers
2 Standard Bearers	1 Chaplain
1 Chaplain	1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon	1 Corporal, Gastadores
1 Corporal, Gastador	6 Gastadores
6 Gastadores	1 Master Armorer
1 Master Armorer	2 Fifers
1 Drum Major	
2 Fifers	

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Source: Adapted from Ordenanzas de S.M. para el régimen, disciplina, subordinación, y servicio de sus ejércitos . . ., 2 vols. (Madrid, 1768).



the fijo regiment once their terms of service were ended if allowed to do so. He was also aware that the creoles, whom he characterized as "weak, unaccustomed to work, and incapable of withstanding the hardships of war," would also try to pack the battalions with their own kind in an effort to create a vehicle to serve their own ambitions. To prevent this from happening, Croix proposed that the command and staff groups, officer corps, and enlisted ranks in the new battalions be limited to 50 per cent creole membership, reserving the other half for Peninsular Spaniards. In addition, as a security measure, he sought to limit the number of creole officers who served in any one company. Nevertheless, Croix admitted that the lack of interest in military service among the Spaniards in Peru would make this difficult to achieve, and he urged that the crown send annual shipments of recruits from Spain to preserve the balance between the two groups.<sup>44</sup> In order to facilitate the retention of regular soldiers, Croix made an exception to a rule of the church forbidding the marriage of these troops, and issued an order allowing commanders to issue marriage licenses to soldiers under their command.<sup>45</sup>

Croix convened a junta de guerra to work out the mechanics of the transfer. The junta decided to allow all officers and men from the two regiments to join the new fijo battalions if they would sign up for a six-year period. Although this also entailed a reduction in pay, Croix noted that it did not deter "large numbers" of soldiers from making the switch. However it was still necessary to make a "rigorous levy" in the various provincial capitals in an

effort to bring the new battalions to strength.<sup>46</sup> By 1788 the fijo Regiment of Lima was at a total strength of 1,402 men, 663 below its prescribed strength of 2,065.<sup>47</sup>

The crown approved Croix's petition to disband the veteran regiments and to expand the size of the fijo battalion, but it attached two stipulations to such approval.<sup>48</sup> First, it held that each regular officer passing into the new regiment must pay the crown a benefice, a practice followed earlier in New Spain, to help cover the cost of maintaining the new unit. Secondly, the crown held that during peacetime the size of each of the fijo battalions should be reduced from nine to seven companies, and that during wartime its strength could be increased by attaching twenty-five militiamen to each company to bring it to strength.<sup>49</sup>

At first Croix refused to enforce this provision, since he feared that it would cause "untold hardship" to the officers of the six companies which would be abolished. He told the superintendent of the Royal Treasury that he would not dare to order such a measure because of the anger which it would provoke among those affected.<sup>50</sup> The commandant of the detachment of the Royal Regiment of Lima in Cuzco wrote to the crown and expressed the opinion that such an order would increase the workload of a regiment which was understrength and overloaded with duties. He noted that these two extra companies in each battalion were often used as manpower pools to replace soldiers that had been detached throughout the viceroyalty whose number had declined due to desertion, sickness, or death. Their

loss, he warned, would place the loyalty of the entire regiment in question.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, the reform proceeded as requested, and by the end of the year 1790 Croix notified the king that the companies had been disbanded in each battalion.<sup>52</sup>

Although the arrival in Peru of the news of the French Revolution provoked an increased attention to defense after 1789, it also marked a period of decadence within the Spanish empire, during which the reduction of the size of the Army of Peru continued. The death of the capable Gálvez and later of Charles III on December 14, 1788, left the leadership of the empire in the hands of the latter's incompetent son Charles IV, and placed the success of the Bourbon Reforms in jeopardy. In Peru Viceroy Croix was granted a commission in the Spanish Royal Walloon Guards in honor of his services and relieved of his duties as viceroy. His successor, Lieutenant General of the Royal Navy Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, arrived, according to one informed source, to guide Peru through the golden age of the colonial period.<sup>53</sup>

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the military reform program, the period was less idyllic, in that the militia was increasingly discredited and, contrary to Croix's hopes, the creoles captured numerical control of the *fijo* regiment. Yet at the same time, the Army of Peru remained the largest Spanish force in America. In the Viceroyalty of New Granada, for example, the army had a total strength of 9,990 *fijo* and disciplined militia troops out of a population of approximately a million and a half persons, giving it a soldier to

citizen ratio of about 1:150. New Spain at this time had an army of 35,400 soldiers out of a population of five million, giving it about the same soldier-citizen ratio as New Granada. The Army of Peru, on the other hand, numbered about 25,000 *fijo* and disciplined militia troops, out of a population estimated at just over a million, giving it a ratio of about 1:40.<sup>54</sup> Conditions, however, dictated that this number must be reduced to achieve the savings necessitated by the financial condition of the viceroyalty.

Accordingly, by 1790 the Royal Regiment of Lima had been decreased by 597 men to a strength of 1,468.<sup>55</sup> On the basis of an order from the king the following year that all militia units be reclassified as either urban or disciplined in order that the crown could better assess New World defenses, the Peruvian authorities estimated the size of the militia at 57,787 men, including 34,714 infantry militia, 18,811 cavalry militia, and 11,262 dragoons. Of the total, only 19,000 were classified as disciplined, possessing a regular training cadre, standard table of organization, and regular training. The rest of the militia were classified as urban whose status and privileges had been substantially curtailed in 1786 in an effort to stem the abuses resulting from these *fueros*.<sup>56</sup>

During the viceregency of Viceroy Gil y Lemos the reduction in the scope and function of the militia which he had carried out in New Granada earlier was continued in Peru. Gil had objected to a militia for the reasons that it was expensive and ineffective,

but also because he felt it posed a positive threat to internal security because of its impact on the Indian.

. . . to have [the Indians] live among the professionals, to fortify the capital and maintain it in a constant state of war, is to teach them what they do not know; it is to make them think about that which otherwise would not occur to them; it is to force upon them an appreciation for their own power, and on the occasion in which they employ it, they may perceive their advantage. Therefore, if in addition to the indispensable appropriations which the King must make for the security of these domains against the exterior enemy, the interior defense is placed on a comparable footing, <sup>its</sup> maintenance will not only become useless but dangerous.<sup>57</sup>

There were two reasons for such an attitude on the part of the viceroy. The first was their lack of loyalty,<sup>58</sup> and the second was the belief that the militia officers frequently used their commissions for personal gain. Such an assumption was supported by travellers such as the German naturalist Alexander von Humboldt who noted that all the principal residents of the interior towns in Peru were officers in the local militia and that they made "extraordinary sacrifices of money" to obtain these commissions.<sup>59</sup> These and other accounts implied that gain as well as prestige was a factor in seeking these positions.

In a report to his successor, Viceroy Gil stated that the coastal provinces of Peru constituted the real bulwark of loyalty to the crown, and that this fidelity weakened progressively as one passed eastwards into the mountains. The militia of the interior, he felt, were useless, and served only to provide a subterfuge for rich men of Lima to hold commissions in nonexistent companies for their own ends. Gil felt that the garrisons on the Indian frontier,

however, should be maintained to prevent attacks by the savages of the Mattogroso region on the frontier settlements of Tarma and Jauja, and that large numbers of troops, both regular and militia, should be maintained along the coastal valleys and especially in Lima, which was, he felt, "the real source of respect for and conservation of our possessions."<sup>60</sup> He cited the disciplined militia units of the capital as a prime reason for this situation, and urged that the thirty-eight companies of Spaniards on Chiloe, as well as the militia regiments in Cuzco and Arequipa also be given a disciplined classification since, although they did not have permanent training cadres, they received regular training from the *fijo* garrisons in those areas.<sup>61</sup>

In September, 1792, Viceroy Gil sent to the crown a report of subinspector general Gabriel de Avilés, the former military commandant of Cuzco, whom Gil had asked to assume the duties of Inspector General Pineda who had returned to Spain. In his report Avilés stated that he had carried out an inspection tour of the militia in the viceroyalty which convinced him that the units located on the coast and in certain interior towns ought to be retained due to their utility in combatting seaborne expeditions and Indian rebellions respectively. In the other regions of the viceroyalty, Avilés recommended that the companies of militia no longer be permitted to remain in an urban classification, but that they be abolished altogether. He stated that their presence was prejudicial to the best interests of the crown since there was an insufficient number of reputable persons, meaning whites, in these areas who

could be granted commissions with any degree of confidence in their loyalty. On the other hand, the practice of awarding commissions in these companies to residents of Lima had resulted, Avilés felt, in a complete lack of training and discipline, since these persons never ventured out to the provinces. As a result, all the crown had succeeded in producing was a large group of men who wore the uniform only to serve their own interests and who often sailed to Spain to trade on its value there.

As an alternative to this inadequate system, Avilés recommended that these companies be abolished and that the subdelegates instead raise ad hoc companies to serve as auxiliaries in the event of an emergency. If and when these companies were raised to combat a coastal invasion, Avilés urged that they be placed under the command of local landowners rather than regular officers. He cited the experience of the Tupac Amaru rebellion as an example of the desertion which occurred when these militia were placed under officers other than their employers or local officials.

As for the coastal militia, Avilés held that it was practically impossible to unite the various militia regiments into a tactical unit for combat purposes, since the coast was 500 leagues in length and because the existing troops could cover only one-third of this at most. Since the terrain, distance, and lack of a settled population precluded traditional offensive maneuvers in what Avilés referred to as "the European manner," he reasoned that it would be better to restrict the function of this coastal militia to the

protection of the towns and villages along the coast. Avilés urged the viceroy to request that the crown pass an order forbidding the creation of any further militia in these interior regions in an effort to prevent "persons interested in disorder" from using the commission as a means to promote their schemes.<sup>62</sup> He attached a table in which he recommended that fifty-eight militia regiments, totalling 18,841 men, be abolished, retaining a total of 40,088 militia which he deemed both useful and necessary to the defense of the kingdom.<sup>63</sup>

The subsequent history of the militia in Peru reflects the recommendations of Inspector Avilés. Between 1793 and 1799 the cutbacks in the urban militia in the interior caused a drop in that component from 49,010 to 29,725 soldiers, while the new emphasis placed upon the disciplined militia of the coast led to an increase in that sector of the army from 10,881 soldiers to 29,725 by the end of the century. While the size of the Army of Peru fluctuated somewhat prior to independence, the relative strength of the urban and disciplined militia remained the same, reflecting the fact that agreement had been reached by the authorities as to their organization and mission. Subsequent increases in the size of the urban militia just prior to independence do not reflect a change in this thinking as will be explained subsequently. By the turn of the century, therefore, the military reform had been essentially culminated. (See Table 8.)

The declaration of war against France, published in Peru on August 12, 1793, gave Avilés the opportunity to set up a plan of



TABLE 8

## THE MILITIA OF PERU, 1787-1816

<u>1787</u>		
Total Infantry Militia		31,945
Total Cavalry Militia		9,436
Total Dragoon Militia		<u>10,086</u>
Total Disciplined	17,000	
Total Urban	34,467	
Grand Total		51,467
<u>1791</u>		
Total Infantry Militia		34,714
Total Cavalry Militia		18,811
Total Dragoon Militia		<u>11,262</u>
Total Disciplined	19,000	
Total Urban	38,787	
Grand Total		57,787
<u>1793</u>		
Total Infantry Militia		27,230
Total Cavalry Militia		10,955
Total Dragoon Militia		<u>10,825</u>
Total Disciplined	10,881	
Total Urban	38,229	
Grand Total		49,010
<u>1796</u>		
Total Infantry Militia		23,045
Total Cavalry Militia		11,217
Total Dragoon Militia		<u>9,032</u>
Total Disciplined	-----	
Total Urban	-----	
Grand Total		43,294

TABLE 8 (cont.)

1799

Total Infantry Militia		26,412
Total Cavalry Militia		13,223
Total Dragoon Militia		<u>13,808</u>
Total Disciplined	23,718	
Total Urban	49,725	
Grand Total		53,443

1802

Total Infantry Militia		26,737
Total Cavalry Militia		12,936
Total Dragoon Militia		<u>13,140</u>
Total Disciplined	23,114	
Total Urban	29,299	
Grand Total		52,413

1816

Total Infantry Militia		41,077
Total Cavalry Militia		13,925
Total Dragoon Militia		<u>15,568</u>
Total Disciplined	29,026	
Total Urban	41,544	
Grand Total		70,570

Sources: AGI:AL 673 Croix to Sonora, Lima, March 31, 1787, pp. 1-2; AGI:AL 703 Gil to the Campo de Alange, Lima, February 26, 1792, p. 1; Hipólito Unanue, Guía Política, Eclesiástica y Militar del Virreinato del Peru (Lima, 1793, 1799); Estado Militar de España, Año de 1799 (Madrid, 1799); BNL:Mss. D4717 "Estado que manifiesta el pie y fuerza de los cuerpos de Milicias Provinciales Disciplinadas y Urbanas . . . que hay en el Virreynato del Peru . . .," Lima, July 19, 1802; "Estado que manifiesta el número de Cuerpos de Ynfantería que tiene el Virreinato del Peru . . . Año de 1816," Memoria de Abascal, plate 8, following p. 336. "Estado que manifiesta el número de Cuerpos de Caballería y Dragones de Milicias Provinciales Disciplinadas y Urbanas que tiene en el Virreinato del Peru . . . Año de 1816." Ibid., plate 10, following p. 352.

defense which would be consistent with the above reorganization, whereby responsibility for defense would be decentralized and increased attention would be given to the coastal militia. Viceroy Gil stated that although a seaborne invasion remained a dangerous possibility in an area with as extensive a coastline as Peru, he had not mounted a single cannon in any part of the kingdom during the war against France, since he did not feel that the coastal presidios themselves could turn back an enemy.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, he did not feel that they would have to. Instead, he relied upon the arid coastal deserts and the disciplined militia of the littoral to discourage any enemy penetration.<sup>65</sup>

On August 19 Viceroy Gil convened a junta de guerra to discuss preparations for the war against France. Ideally, Gil noted, Peru should have a large navy to cover the coast and encounter an attacking force before it could stage a landing, but he recognized that the extension of this coast made this impossible. Nevertheless, he reiterated that even with a small army, the geographic barriers of Peru posed a formidable obstacle to an enemy expedition which had been forced to travel 15,000 leagues to launch an attack.

Viceroy Gil then went on to relate the plan of defense which had been devised by Inspector Avilés, proposing that this extensive coast be divided into three separate commandancies general, each of which was to be placed under the command of a veteran commandant who would have the overall military responsibility for the area. Each of these three commandancies would in turn be subdivided into

military districts which would be presided over by a veteran command and staff group consisting of a senior officer, a subaltern, a sergeant major, three corporals, and a drummer, who would be charged with the task of disciplining the militia of that region.

The plan proposed that the northern command extend from Tumbés to the Santa River, with Trujillo as the capital of the commandancy, and that training cadres be placed in the towns of Trujillo, Huarura, Lambayeque, and Paita. The central commandancy was to run south from the Santa River to Ica, with Lima as its capital. Besides Lima and Ica, training cadres were to be placed in Santa and Chancay. The southern commandancy was to extend south from Ica to the border with Chile, with its headquarters in Tacna, and training cadres located in the towns of Nasca, Camaná, Tacna, and Moquequa. Funds were to be appropriated to pay the expense of thirty mounted militia who were to serve each commandancy as couriers to relay the news of an invasion from district to district.

The plan concentrated upon the defense of the major coastal towns and cities on the theory that an enemy could not sustain itself on the arid desert unless it could take possession of these areas. The training groups located in each city would be responsible for putting the militia of that region under arms, commanding these forces in battle, and handling other matters related to defense. Each of them would be directly responsible to the district commandant who would be empowered to act as a judge in cases concerning the militia, and who would coordinate all military activities in his

commandancy. Should an enemy land, Avilés planned to use small mounted militia units ("flying squads") to keep them pinned down along the coast and to deprive them of the facilities of the cities. He hoped to thereby force a retreat through a loss of morale rather than by military superiority.

Avilés reasoned that if an attack was launched against Lima it would be done by a large invading force. He conceded that the artillery at the fortress "Real Felipe" was insufficient to deter such an invasion, but reasoned that it would at least force a landing to be made at a point farther removed from the city. For this reason he ordered a "flying squad" composed of sixty mounted dragoons to be placed in a barracks situated on the coast which would patrol it from dusk to dawn in order to prevent a nighttime attack bent on firing and sacking the city. As a second line of defense, Avilés divided the city of Lima into several sections, each of which became the responsibility of a particular militia regiment. At a given signal, the regiment was to assemble at a designated location to defend the city walls. In an effort to equalize the firepower of these regiments and provide them leadership, companies of the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima were to be dispersed among the various militia companies when they were so positioned. The overall command of the militia during an attack was to be placed in a major general of the army. In addition, Avilés recommended that the fortress at Callao be reinforced by 400 fijo troops and 1,100 militiamen in the event of a siege. He also exempted from militia

service a small army of mechanics and tradesmen whose job it was to supply and feed the soldiers.

On August 24, 1794, the Avilés plan was approved by the crown, and Gil named as commandants of the northern and southern districts the veteran officers Colonel Joaquín Valcárcel and Salvador Cabrito, while keeping command of the central district for himself. At the same time he ordered four of the six *fijo* companies which had been detached to Cuzco in 1784 to return to Lima, along with the two detached in Arequipa, in order to increase the strength of the garrison. Training cadres were dispatched to the various cities outlined by Avilés and the viceroy noted that local citizens had raised money to arm and outfit the militia in many of these areas. The viceroy himself presided over a mock invasion of the coast outside of Lima in which 3,000 militia participated, and at its conclusion announced his satisfaction with their ability to defend the capital.<sup>66</sup>

In 1796 Viceroy Gil was replaced as viceroy by the energetic former Captain General of Chile, Ambrosio O'Higgins. During his viceregency and that of Gabriel de Avilés, who replaced him in 1801, the military institution in Peru remained essentially unchanged from the status which it achieved under Viceroy Gil. Both held similar views on defense strategy, and both recognized the utility of maintaining a disciplined militia on the coast to defend against an enemy invasion by sea.<sup>67</sup> The optimism voiced by Gil in the capacities of this coastal militia seems to have disappeared

under O'Higgins, however. Whereas in 1797, after taking office and being informed of the outbreak of war against Great Britain, O'Higgins boasted that he could raise 8,000 militia in Lima at any given time, two years later he had changed his opinion of this component of the army.<sup>68</sup>

In a report on the condition of the viceroyalty in 1799, O'Higgins informed the crown that the 20,000 militia which were supposed to exist in the provinces were imaginary, lacked arms, discipline, and the slightest semblance of soldiers. He stated that he could not depend upon them for defense and that the *fijo* Royal Regiment of Lima was "the only hope and confidence of this Kingdom." The viceroy had hoped to place the squadron of dragoons "María Luisa" of Carabaillo in a *fijo* category to act as a "flying squad" to cover the coast north and south of Callao harbor, but this proposal was rejected by the crown on financial grounds.<sup>69</sup> He warned the king that the coastal militia could be expected to flee into the interior in the event of an invasion, and that an enemy would proceed towards Lima without opposition. He retained his faith in the militia of Lima to defend it though, stating that they were professional enough to withstand the rigors of war. A proposal by O'Higgins to convert the *fijo* troops in the viceroyalty to militia in an effort to save on expenses was also made, but apparently was not accepted.<sup>70</sup>

For the above reasons, O'Higgins took no extraordinary measures to defend the coast from attack during the war. In a letter to the crown he cynically stated that these wars were always terminated

before such measures as casting cannon and erecting fortifications were completed.<sup>71</sup> He did, however, appoint Lieutenant Colonel Gavino Gainsa and a detachment of thirty dragoons to take control of the northern commandancy, and ordered Bartolomé María de Salamanca, a career naval officer and the Intendant of Arequipa, to assume command of the southern district. Salamanca subsequently placed that region in the best state of defense which it had ever experienced.<sup>72</sup> In addition, O'Higgins assumed control of the defense of Chile, which brought him into conflict with Gabriel de Avilés, the captain general of that region, who succeeded in having the Captaincy General of Chile declared independent of the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1798.<sup>73</sup>

By the year 1801 when the aged Marqués de Avilés succeeded O'Higgins as Viceroy of Peru, the apparent decline in the morale of the army was widespread. Avilés conceded that he had been generally unsuccessful in the raising of additional militia due to the widespread aversion to this service and the ease with which enlistment could be avoided in the less populated regions of the viceroyalty. He also noted the presence of deep dissatisfaction in the *fijo* component of the army because of low wages and slow promotion. As a result, he disclosed that many of the Spaniards in the regiment had either deserted or resigned to make their fortune elsewhere. He disclosed that of the 1,000 replacements which had been enlisted following the peace with Great Britain, practically all were Americans, whom he considered to be inferior soldiers. He frankly admitted that not over 10,000 Spaniards



could be found in all America to fill the fijo battalions. The creoles in this regiment, he noted, were reluctant to perform garrison duty on Chiloe and in Tarma and Cuzco, and that as a result he had been forced to utilize militia soldiers to perform these duties.<sup>74</sup>

Such frank admissions demonstrate not only Avilés' lack of aptitude for government but also the fact that by the turn of the century the defense of Peru was largely in the hands of the fijo regiment in Lima, which by this time was essentially a creole unit. The balance between Spaniards and Americans encouraged by Gil and Avilés had not been maintained. This characteristic also manifested itself in the fijo Regiment of Artillery which was increased in size in 1802, and commanded by Colonel Joaquín de la Pezuela, the subinspector of that branch of the army, who himself became viceroy in 1816.<sup>75</sup>

The history of the militia in Peru after 1800 demonstrates a continuing lack of confidence in their abilities on the part of the Spanish authorities. Viceroy Abascal, who assumed the viceroyalty in 1805 held that they were better in Lima than elsewhere simply because in the provinces whim and influence counted more towards promotion than did merit and seniority, and that the small likelihood of an enemy striking in these distant regions meant that discipline was relaxed and that disorder prevailed.<sup>76</sup> In his Memo-  
ria Abascal detailed the failures of the military reforms, stating that since their inception the provincial militia had been under-

strength and officered by men who sought only to enrich and glorify themselves through the use of the uniform. He noted that the various economy measures had prevented training cadres from being assigned to them and that as a result discipline could not be maintained. He blamed the authorities for appointing subinspectors who were either too old or who lacked an interest in the militia, and who consequently failed to travel to the provinces to oversee the formation and training of these companies. For this reason he felt that neither their number or quality could be counted upon.

Abascal admitted that while the coastal militia had been given training cadres and were theoretically in a disciplined classification, that certain areas still lacked this instruction. He noted that to rectify this situation he had resorted to the device of calling up 10 per cent of the coastal militia and assembling them for field maneuvers outside of Lima, in the hope that this would familiarize them with tactics and the rigors of warfare. In general he admitted that his efforts to use the militia to put down disturbances in Quito and La Paz had been a failure and that he had been forced to detach large bodies of *fijo* troops to garrison both of those areas.<sup>77</sup>

Nevertheless, the increasing number of rebellions in favor of independence which occurred in Upper Peru after 1810 forced Viceroy Abascal to order the reformation of the militia of this region which had been deactivated by Avilés after 1784. This was done, however, not to provide this chaotic area with an efficient

means of defense, but rather to retain its loyalty through the granting of commissions and fueros which had been taken away from the inhabitants years earlier and which the Spaniards and creoles demanded be reinstated. Not only were the militia given their old privileges back but Viceroy Abascal decreed that to reduce desertion they should be granted pieces of land in fee simple at the end of a campaign.<sup>78</sup> Such concessions attest to the strong desire to retain the loyalty of these militiamen whose fidelity to the crown had always been suspect since the conclusion of the Indian wars. Nevertheless, the surge for independence was too strong to be deterred by such measures. In 1818 Viceroy Pezuela recommended in a letter to the crown that the interior militia of Peru be disbanded altogether on the grounds that as mixed bloods who had received training in the handling and firing of weapons, their defection to the insurgents could be "extremely fatal to the State." He proposed instead that detachments from the fijo regiment in Lima be sent to garrison these interior towns and cities to preserve them for the crown of Spain.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless the militia remained intact throughout the preindependence period simply because Spain could not afford the expense of maintaining a larger standing army.

Under the capable Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, the most capable military man to govern Peru since Manuel de Amat, the viceroyalty offset the absence of an interior defense by strengthening its coastal defenses.<sup>80</sup> During the turbulent period

following the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, the loyalist Abascal worked hard to ingratiate himself with the influential sectors of Lima society and won their support.<sup>81</sup> Much of this effort was devoted to healing the widening breach between Spaniards and creoles in Peru. Within the army this enmity had been accentuated by the policy practiced by the viceroys following the Indian rebellions, which attempted to restrict the number and rank of the creoles within the *fijo* regiments in Peru. Although this measure had failed to keep the creoles from dominating the regiment by 1800, the senior grades within the officer corps of the army were generally restricted to Peninsulars except in certain areas where creoles dominated the militia companies due to a lack of Spaniards to fill such positions.<sup>82</sup> Accordingly, the army lacked internal unity.

With the appointment of the creole José Manuel de Goyeneche as the head of the Royalist armies sent to subdue the rebellions in Chuquisaca and La Paz in 1809, Abascal showed himself to be willing to appoint creoles to positions of responsibility in the Spanish colonial administration without regard to their place of birth.<sup>83</sup> The creole officers whom Abascal appointed in turn willingly took orders from a creole general and his presence did not provoke the animosity between these two factions which Peninsular generals had been prone to do.<sup>84</sup> In addition, Abascal recreated the urban militia Regiment of the Nobility and renamed it the Regiment "de la Concordia Española," in the hope of providing a

vehicle for the Spaniards of Lima to express their loyalty to the king and to serve as a counterweight to the creole-dominated *fijo* Royal Regiment of Lima. Abascal's stated purpose in so doing was to end the "hateful rivalry between the Spaniards of both Hemispheres," although the creation of the regiment only provoked a massive criticism from the creoles who ridiculed the unit and tried to destroy it once it had been established.<sup>85</sup> Accordingly, the regiment failed in its purpose of reconciling the two groups and instead served only to drive them further apart.<sup>86</sup> By 1816 Viceroy Abascal noted that the rivalry between creoles and Peninsulars seemed to be on the increase, and had manifested itself especially between the members of the *fijo* and militia troops.<sup>87</sup>

Nevertheless, by the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century the Army of Peru was as strong as any within the Spanish empire in the New World. This was due largely to the efforts of Abascal, who had finally created the first proper army within the viceroyalty in response to the threat of independence which had begun to sweep the continent.<sup>88</sup> (See Table 9.) By 1810 the kingdom of Peru was described by one contemporary historian as "an arsenal."<sup>89</sup> Even enemies of the crown attested to the strength of the Peruvian army.<sup>90</sup> By the end of the century it had become the single largest item in the budget, consistently consuming over half of the total revenues of the viceroyalty.<sup>91</sup> Moreover, it had been changed substantially in structure since midcentury. Whereas prior to this time a proper militia did not exist in Peru, by the end of

TABLE 9  
THE ARMY OF PERU, 1816

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1. Regular Troops

Regiment of Royal Infantry of Lima	1,278
Battalion of Infantry of Chiloe	380
Company of Infantry of Mainas	51
Company of Dragoons of Cuzco	35
Training cadres detached for the instruction of the disciplined militia	<u>241</u>
Total	1,985

2. Infantry Militia

a. Disciplined

Lima

Battalion of Spaniards	1,359
Battalion of pardos	1,299
Companies of morenos	447

Ica

Battalion of Ica	361
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Cuzco

Regiment of Cuzco	926
Regiment of Noble Indians	1,156

Trujillo

Companies of Trujillo	495
Battalion of Piura	731
Regiment of Lambayeque	1,005

Arequipa

Regiment of Arequipa	1,786
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Tarma

Regiment of Tarma	970
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TABLE 9 (cont.)

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<u>Chiloe</u>	
Regiment of Castro	1,599
Companies of Chiloe	633
<u>Guayaquil</u>	
Regiment of Guayaquil	880
Battalion of pardos	<u>440</u>
Total	14,087

## b. Urban

Tarma	
Cuzco	
Guamanga	
Huanuco	
Mainas	
Arequipa	
Puno	
Total	26,990

Note: Veteran training cadres were situated in Lima, Piura, Lambayeque, Trujillo, Santa, Chancay, Cañete, Ica, Nasca, Camaná, and Tacna. In Cuzco and Arequipa the veteran garrisons performed this training function.

## 3. Cavalry Militia

## a. Disciplined

<u>Lima</u>	
Squadron of pardos	214
Companies of morenos	89
<u>Chancay</u>	
Regiment of Chancay	432
Regiment of Huarura	445
Companies of Santa	565

TABLE 9 (cont.)

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<u>Cañete</u>	
Regiment of Cañete	374
Regiment of Chincha	599
<u>Ica</u>	
Regiment of Ica	670
Regiment of Nazca	566
<u>Cuzco</u>	
Regiment of Cuzco	1,950
<u>Trujillo</u>	
Regiment of Trujillo	622
Regiment of Ferriñafe in Saña	839
<u>Piura</u>	
Regiment of Querrecorilla	231
Companies of Tambogrande	92
<u>Arequipa</u>	
Regiment of Arequipa	770
Regiment of Camaná	582
<u>Chiloe</u>	
Regiment of Castro	226
Free companies	<u>136</u>
Total	9,402
b. Urban Militia	
Tarma	
Huancavelica	
Trujillo	
Arequipa	
Puno	
Guayaquil	
Total	4,523



TABLE 9 (cont.)

## 4. Dragoons

## a. Disciplined

Lima

Regiment of Lima	801
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Chançay

Company of Huarura	57
Company of pardos	60

Sana

Squadron of Pacsamayo	766
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Piura

Squadron of Amenotape	570
Companies of Tambogrande	218

Arica

Regiment of Arica	1,150
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Camana

Regiment of Mages	534
Regiment of Anasi y Chales	441
Regiment of Carabelli	542

Guayaquil

Squadron of Guayaquil	<u>398</u>
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Total	5,537
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## b. Urban

## Lima

Tarma

Cuzco

Guamanga

TABLE 9 (cont.)

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Trujillo	
Arequipa	
Puno	
Guayaquil	
Total	10,031
Grand Total	
Regular Troops	1,985
Militia	
Infantry	41,077
Cavalry	13,925
Dragoons	<u>15,568</u>
Total	72,555

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Note: The Regiment "de la Concordia Española" created by Abascal in Lima was duplicated in Tarma, where four companies "de Concordia" were formed in the mining town of Lauricocha to keep the peace. Companies were also formed in Huancavelica, La Paz, and Potosí for the same purpose.

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Source: "Estado que manifiesta el número de Cuerpos de Ynfantería de Milicias Provinciales Disciplinadas y Urbanas que tiene el Virreinato del Peru . . . Año de 1816," Memoria de Abascal, plate 8, following p. 336; "Estado que manifiesta el número de Cuerpos de Caballería y Dragones de Milicias Provinciales y Urbanas que tiene el Virreinato del Perú . . . Año de 1816," ibid., plate 10 following p. 352; "Estado de las Tropas Veteranas qual tiene el Virreinato del Perú, con distinción de Cuerpos, y fuerza de que constan . . . Año de 1816," ibid., plate 11 following p. 368; BNL: "Noticia de los cuerpos de milicias del Virreynato del Perú y provincias adyacentes que tienen tropa veterana, incorporada en ellos para su instrucción . . ." Lima, May 12, 1814.

the century a large disciplined militia was deployed along the coast and in the larger interior cities.

Yet beneath this veneer of invincibility, Spanish authorities continued to question the true extent of the military reform and the commensurate ability of the army to withstand an enemy attack. Even in Lima, where the reform enjoyed its most substantial success, the schism between creoles and Peninsulars threatened to tear it asunder. One observer noted that

Whenever a city is garrisoned by a military force, the inhabitants as well as the soldiers must submit to the will of the commanders. Such was the state of Lima: many of its soldiers, it is true, were residents of Lima, but many were from different parts of Peru, and nearly the whole of the officers were Spaniards. Those who were not were under the suspicious eye of jealous masters.<sup>92</sup>

Such an explanation, however, fails to take into consideration the loyalty of these creoles to the crown of Spain which prevented an internal revolt from breaking out within the ranks which might have resulted in Peru gaining independence prior to 1821. As the beneficiaries of the Spanish imperial system, deeply fearful of the lower classes which the army served to subjugate, these creoles possessed a colonial mentality, preferring to work within the framework of the empire to achieve gains rather than to run the risk of social upheaval which might overturn their privileged position altogether.<sup>93</sup>

In New Spain, divisions between creoles and Spaniards manifested themselves in the increased number of conflicts of jurisdiction which stemmed from the grant of expanded military privileges

that accompanied the reform of the army. Moreover, these privileges, or fueros, were successfully employed by the army as an institution against the civil, mercantile, and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, attesting to the success of the military reform there. In Peru the army was less able to utilize its privileged jurisdiction, a fact which bespoke the weakness of the reform itself. In certain areas such as Lima, the military jurisdiction was strong, but in the provinces traditional jurisdictions were frequently able to withstand this institutional challenge to their authority.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>AGI:AL 640, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . .," pp. 1-15. The public debt of the viceregal treasury had reached the sum of ten and one-half million pesos by 1786. Céspedes del Castillo, Reorganización, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>Viellard-Baron, cited in Moore, p. 138.

<sup>3</sup>For a laudatory view of Croix, see L. E. Fisher, "Teodoro de Croix," Hispanic American Historical Review, IX, No. 4 (November, 1929), 488-504. My own opinion is somewhat less favorable. Croix mistook the exhaustion of the Viceroyalty of Peru for tranquility and told his brother that a fifteen-year-old boy could have ruled the country. José Antonio de Lavalle, Estudios Históricos (Lima, 1935), p. 349.

<sup>4</sup>AGI:AC 29, Benito de la Mata Linares to Gálvez, Cuzco, June 30, 1783, pp. 1-3.

<sup>5</sup>The failure of the Nordenflucht mission sent to Perú in 1788 to raise production levels seems due to the fact that the Born process which it was sent to apply could not be adapted to the low grade ores of the Peruvian mines, and also to the failure of Peruvian officials to cooperate. Carlos Deustua Pimentel, "La expedición de Nordenflucht en el Perú," Mercurio Peruano, No. 366-367 (Lima, October-November, 1957), pp. 510-519; Diffie, pp. 381-382.

<sup>6</sup>Notably the La Condamine and Malaspina expeditions, the latter a botanical mission which catalogued much of the flora of western South America. See Arthur Robert Steele, Flowers for the King: the expedition of Ruiz and Pavon and the Flora of Peru (Durham, N.C., 1964).

<sup>7</sup>AGI:AL 1118, "Extracto de los informes dados por varios gefes del Peru y Buenos Aires sobre la ordenanza expedida por S.M. en 28 de enero de 1782 para el establecimiento, e instruccion de Intendencias en dhos virreynatos y sus provincias."

<sup>8</sup>Carlos Deustua Pimentel, Las Intendencias en el Perú, 1790-1796 (Seville, 1965).

<sup>9</sup>Mendiburu, IV, 247-248; Moore, pp. 142, 146-147, 153.

<sup>10</sup>"El Virrey Caballero de Croix al bailio Frey Antonio Valdes, sobre inconveniencias de aplicación de las Ordenanzas de Intendentes, Año 1790, Lima, May 16, 1790," Revista de la Biblioteca

Nacional, VIII, No. 25 (Buenos Aires, 1943), 128-129; Moore, pp. 189-190. Escobedo had kept for himself the Intendancy of Lima which irritated the viceroy.

<sup>11</sup>AGI:AL 640, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . .," pp. 1-15.

<sup>12</sup>AGI:AL 666, Croix to Gálvez, Lima, May 22, 1784, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup>AGI:AL 666, Croix to Gálvez, Lima, May 1, 1784, p. 1; AGI:AL 667 "Estado de las Fuerzas que componen el actual Pie de Exercito de este virreynato del Peru . . .," Lima, August 14, 1784.

<sup>14</sup>AGI:AL 667, Diego Saenz de Alaya to Croix, Lima, July 29, 1784, p. 1.

<sup>15</sup>AGI:AL 667, Croix to Gálvez, October 5, 1784, p. 2; Memorias de los virreyes que han gobernado el Perú, V, Memoria de Teodoro de Croix, 220-221.

<sup>16</sup>AGI:AL 667, Escobedo to Jauregui, Lima, June 2, 1784, pp. 1-2.

<sup>17</sup>AGI:AL 667, Report of Inspector General Manuel de Pineda to Croix, Lima, August 12, 1784, pp. 1-11.

<sup>18</sup>AGI:AL 666, Croix to Gálvez, Lima, July 16, 1784, p. 1; AGI:AL 667, Croix to Gálvez, Lima, October 5, 1784, pp. 2-5; Memoria de Croix, pp. 223-224.

<sup>19</sup>AGI:AL 667, Croix to Gálvez, Lima, December 5, 1784, pp. 1-2; Memoria de Croix, p. 235.

<sup>20</sup>AGI:AL 667, Croix to Gálvez, Lima, October 5, 1784, p. 1; AGI:AL 1483 Pineda to Gálvez, Lima, May 1, 1785, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup>AGI:AL 667, "Estado que manifiesta los Oficiales, Sargentos, Cavos, y Soldados que se hallaran destinados al resguardo de los cinco Fuertes de la Frontera de esta Capital de Tarma como en los tres del Partido de Jauja . . .," Tarma, November 18, 1784.

<sup>22</sup>AGI:AL 667, Croix to Gálvez, October 5, 1784, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup>AGI:AL 667, "Copia de los Dictámenes que produxeron los Señores Vocales de la Junta de Guerra acerca de la permanencia o extinción del 2<sup>o</sup> Batallón de Regimiento Real de Lima, y decreto de se mandado llevar a efecto la Supresion . . .," Lima, August 24, 1784, p. 21; AGI:AL 1494, Escobedo to Gálvez, Lima, April 5, 1785, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup>Memoria de Croix, pp. 232-234.

<sup>25</sup>AGI:AL 681, Croix to Antonio Valdés, Lima, July 16, 1788, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>BNL: Document C4383 "Expediente obrado a representacion de varios oficiales del ejército de la ciudad de Arequipa, sobre que se declare a quien corresponde el mando militar en ausencia u otro motivo del Sr. Intendente de aquella ciudad." Arequipa, May 10, 1790, pp. 1-6.

<sup>27</sup>Lynch, p. 242.

<sup>28</sup>Auld, pp. 131-137.

<sup>29</sup>Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1963), pp. 229-231. For other descriptions of this growing creole nationalism in Peru, see Moore, pp. 173-196; Pike, pp. 38-40; Reuben Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru: Virreinato (Siglo XVIII), 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires, 1957), pp. 36-42.

<sup>30</sup>Recent research has shown that, rather than trying to weaken the cabildos in Peru, Visitor Escobedo tried to strengthen them in order to increase their efficiency so that the intendants could work through them. John Fisher, "The Intendant System and the Cabildos of Peru, 1784-1810," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIX, No. 3 (August, 1969), 430-453.

<sup>31</sup>AGI:AL 1496, "Informe Reservada del Sargento Mayor de Milicias de Guaylas Dn. Francisco Castañeda . . . al Virrey de Buenos Aires el Marqués de Loreto," Buenos Aires, September 3, 1786, pp. 1-19; AGI:AL 1496, Escobedo to Loreto, Lima, November 16, 1785, p. 1; AGI:AL 1496, King Charles III to the Viceroy of Buenos Aires, El Pardo, January 17, 1787, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup>Simón Ayanque (Esteban de Terralla y Landa), Lima por Dentro y Fuera, 5th ed. (Paris, 1924), p. 174.

<sup>33</sup>Simón Ayanque, El Sol en el Mediodía (Lima, 1790), p. 13.

<sup>34</sup>Pike, p. 35.

<sup>35</sup>Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Peru, VI, Memoria de Frey Don Francisco de Taboada y Lemos, . . . 303.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 306.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 307.

<sup>38</sup>W. B. Stevenson, Historical and Descriptive Narrative of a Twenty Years' Residence in South America, 3 vols. (London, 1829), I, 288.

<sup>39</sup>AGI:AL 667, "Representacion hecha a nombre de la oficialidad del Regimiento el Real de Lima, manifestando los Servicios que han contraydo, y perjüicias que experimentarän si llega a verificarse la supresión de su Segundo Batallon." Lima, August 31, 1784, pp. 1-3.

<sup>40</sup>AGI:AL 1495, Pineda to Gálvez, Lima, December 1, 1784, pp. 1-2.

<sup>41</sup>AGI:AL 1494, Escobedo to Gálvez, April 5, 1785, pp. 1-3.

<sup>42</sup>AGI:AL 671, Pineda to Croix, Lima, November 18, 1785, pp. 1-2.

<sup>43</sup>Memoria de Croix, p. 228. The cost of the Soria and Extremadura regiments had been 1,167,351 pesos according to Escobedo, greatly in excess of the estimate. This helps to explain the decision to increase the fiijo component instead. "Informe que hace el Visitador . . .," in Relaciones de los Vireyes del Peru . . ., III, 442.

<sup>44</sup>AGI:AL 673, Croix to the Marqués de Sonora, Lima, March 16, 1787, pp. 1-3.

<sup>45</sup>Memoria de Croix, pp. 43-45.

<sup>46</sup>AGI:AL 675, Croix to Sonora, Lima, November 28, 1787, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup>AGI:AL 671, "Estado que manifiesta . . . La Batallon de Infanteria Real de Lima . . .," Callao, January 1, 1786; AGI:AL 679 "Estado que manifiesta en que se halla el Regimiento de Infanteria Real de Lima . . ." Lima, April 1, 1788.

<sup>48</sup>AGI:AL, Croix to Sonora, Lima, August 16, 1787, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup>Memoria de Croix, pp. 250-252.

<sup>50</sup>AGI:AL 681, Croix to Valdés, Lima, June 16, 1788, pp. 1-4.

<sup>51</sup>BNL: Document C1550 "Representación del Dn. Augustin Vicente de Torres y Valle, Comandante accidental del Regimiento Real de Lima al Rey," Cuzco, October 15, 1789, pp. 1-4.

<sup>52</sup>AGI:AL 641, Croix to Valdés, Lima, September 20, 1790, p. 1.

<sup>53</sup>Richard Konetzke, "Ideas políticas del Virrey Francisco Gil de Taboada," Mar del Sur, VII (Lima, March-April, 1952), 53. This term is used to describe the period in which Peru produced several periodicals, newspapers, literary societies and other examples of intellectual accomplishment.



<sup>54</sup> Thomas Martin Gale, "Antonio Caballero y Góngora, Archbishop and Viceroy of New Granada, 1779-1789," M.A. thesis, University of California (Berkeley, 1950), p. 74; AGI:AL 667, "Estado de las Fuerzas que componen el actual Pie de Exercito de este Virreynato del Peru . . .," Lima, August 14, 1784.

<sup>55</sup> AGI:AL 641, Croix to Sonora, Lima, September 20, 1790, p. 1; Memoria de Gil, p. 314.

<sup>56</sup> AGI:AL 703, Gil to Conde Campo de Alange. Lima, February 26, 1792, p. 1; McAlister, Fuero Militar, p. 66.

The militia buildup in Peru in response to the war against France was not inconsiderable. In 1787, there had been, according to Croix, a total of 51,467 militia, of which 31,945 were infantrymen, 9,436 were cavalry, and 10,086 were dragoons. The increase by 1792 shows the desire to increase the mounted cavalry and dragoon units along the coast. Of this number, Croix estimated that only 17,000 could be considered to be disciplined. AGI:AL 673 Croix to Sonora. Lima, March 31, 1787, pp. 1-2. This ratio of disciplined to urban militia ran about the same in other vice-royalties also. Alexander von Humboldt, for example, estimated that only 8,000-10,000 men out of the 32,000 which composed the Army of New Spain were disciplined militia. Alexander von Humboldt, Ensayo político sobre el Reino de la Nueva España, 6th Spanish ed. (Mexico, 1941), IV, 189, 193.

<sup>57</sup> "Resumen que hace el Virrey Gil y Lemos de las disposiciones dadas durante su gobierno," Santa Fe de Bogotá, July 31, 1789, in Konetzke, "Ideas políticas del Virrey Francisco Gil," p. 53.

<sup>58</sup> There are several examples. One cited by Croix will serve as an illustration. Memoria de Croix, pp. 206-209.

<sup>59</sup> Humboldt, pp. 194-195.

<sup>60</sup> Memoria de Gil, pp. 308-309.

<sup>61</sup> AGI:AL 703, Gil to Campo de Alange, Lima, February 5, 1792, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> AGI:AL 704, Report of Avilés to Gil, Lima, May 16, 1792 in Gil to Campo de Alange, Lima, February 5, 1792, pp. 1-2.

<sup>63</sup> AGI:AL 704, "Relacion de los Partidos interiores del Virreynato de Lima en donde son inútiles los cuerpos de Milicias Provinciales Urbanas que hay en ellos y conviene reformarlos con expresion de su fuerza"; "Relacion . . . donde pueden permanecer los cuerpos de Milicias provinciales Disciplinadas y Urbanas que hay en ellos con noticia de su fuerza . . .," Lima, August 7, 1792.

<sup>64</sup>AGI:AL 706, Gil to Campo de Alange, Lima, September 21, 1793, pp. 1-3.

<sup>65</sup>Memoria de Gil, pp. 320-330.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 313-317.

<sup>67</sup>"Informe sobre el Virreinato, 1799" reproduced in Ricardo Donoso, El Marqués de Osorno, Don Ambrosio Higgins, 1720-1821 (Santiago, 1941), p. 467.

<sup>68</sup>AGI:E 73, Marqués de Osorno to Manuel Godoy, Príncipe de la Paz, Lima, November 8, 1792, pp. 1-2; "Informe sobre el Virreinato," in Donoso, p. 466.

<sup>69</sup>"Informe sobre el Virreinato," in Donoso, p. 466. In 1797 O'Higgins had raised a fijo company of dragoons "Reina Luisa" with a strength of 150 men. It was disapproved in 1799 on the basis of the royal order of August 15, 1793, forbidding any more companies of soldiers to be created in excess of those existing in 1784; Memoria del Virrey del Peru Marqués de Avilés, publicada Carlos Alberto Romero (Lima, 1901), p. 59.

<sup>70</sup>"Informe sobre el Virreinato," in Donoso, pp. 464-467. It is questionable whether the fijo troops would have accepted such a reduction in pay and prestige. Another idea of O'Higgins was to create corps of Indians for duty in the highland areas and to restrict coastal militia service primarily to the Negroes since each was more suited to the climate of these regions.

<sup>71</sup>AGI:AL 641, Marqués de Osorno to Diego de Gardoqui, Lima, March 8, 1797, pp. 6-7.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-5; AGI:AL 647, "Relacion de las disposiciones principales que ha tomado para poner en estado de defensa aquel Reino. Carta del Marqués de Osorno al Exmo. Sr. Ministro de Hacienda," Lima, January 26, 1798, pp. 1-2. For a detailed description of the military reform in the southern command, see BNL: Document D11619, "Relacion de gobierno que forma D. Bartolome Maria de Salamanca . . .," Arequipa, January 31, 1812, pp. 85-96. This document covers the period 1796-1811 and is a most valuable look at the army which later successfully put down the La Paz rebellion in 1809.

<sup>73</sup>Donoso, p. 375.

<sup>74</sup>Memoria de Avilés, pp. 55-59.

<sup>75</sup>Fernando Díaz Veneto, Las Campañas Militares del Virrey Abascal (Seville, 1948), pp. 38-39.

<sup>76</sup> José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, Memoria de Gobierno, p. lvi.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pp. 361-366.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., pp. 369-371. This had been proposed to him earlier by Goyeneche. AGI:E 74 José Manuel de Goyeneche to the Marqués de las Hormagas, Cuzco, September 8, 1810, p. 7.

<sup>79</sup> Viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela to the Minister of War, Lima, November 5, 1818, in Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, La Revolución de la Independencia del Perú, 1809-1819 (Lima, 1924), pp. 177-179.

<sup>80</sup> Díaz Veneto, pp. 17-18, states that Abascal was

. . . one of the most sagacious Viceroys that the Spanish monarch sent to the American dominions . . . having been the only source of support for the royal authority in all South America when it seemed on the point of collapsing.

<sup>81</sup> Sebastián Lorente, Historia del Perú bajo los Borbones, 1700-1821 (Lima, 1871), p. 302, states that Abascal won this support by various means: he reorganized the constitution and by-laws of the lawyers' guild, founded a school of medicine, established a public library, and opened a public cemetery, thereby winning over the lawyers, doctors, intellectuals, and general public.

<sup>82</sup> The Cuban Militia Regulation specified that militia officers should be of the same caste as the companies they commanded but this was not practiced in Peru. As Viceroy Croix noted, the lower castes were often too poor to outfit themselves and to command the respect of their troops, and through necessity these positions were given to "residents of honor and distinction," most of whom were white. AGI:AL 1496 Croix to King Charles III, Lima, September 5, 1786, pp. 1-2.

<sup>83</sup> Memoria de Abascal, pp. lxxxv-lxxxvi; Reuben Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú, p. 122.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., pp. 124-127.

<sup>85</sup> Memoria de Abascal, pp. 366-368.

<sup>86</sup> Historian Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, for example, states that even in the shadow of the royal palace of the viceroy in Lima, the general public watched quietly as the standard of the Regiment "de la Concordia Española" passed, but that they applauded wildly and set off rockets as the Royal Regiment of Lima passed, often accompanying it to the doors of its barracks. To them, he feels,

the regiment most nearly represented the emerging nation of Peru (p. 60).

<sup>87</sup>Memoria de Abascal, pp. 489-490.

<sup>88</sup>Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru, p. 303.

<sup>89</sup>Basadre, La Multitud, La Ciudad, y el Campo en la Historia del Peru, p. 143.

<sup>90</sup>Vidaurre, pp. 18-23. For Abascal's estimate of his capability to defend Lima from attack, see the Memoria de Abascal, pp. 336-352.

<sup>91</sup>Unanue, pp. 16-17. In 1790, for example, the total expenses of the viceroyalty were 2,970,599 pesos. Out of this amount, the military expended 1,176,710 pesos, over half of the total. During the immediate preindependence period this percentage increased.

<sup>92</sup>Stevenson, III, 48-49.

<sup>93</sup>North, p. 6; Pike, pp. 42-44; Stein, pp. 110, 114.

## VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED MILITARY PRIVILEGE

By the end of the eighteenth century the Bourbon military reform in Peru had largely run its course. Begun during the Seven Years War in an effort to prepare the Viceroyalty of Peru against English aggression, the subsequent decade of Indian rebellion demonstrated that the enemy within was a more formidable threat to Spanish sovereignty than were the possible invasions which might arise out of the crown's involvement in a long series of European wars. It was these interior uprisings which forced the Spanish authorities in Peru to drop their plans of creating a strong provincial militia elsewhere than on the coast, because of the lack of whites and the questionable loyalty of the mixed bloods who predominated in the highland militia regiments. In lieu of this, training cadres were provided to the pardo-dominated militia units which were located along the coast, where a sufficient number of whites could be counted upon to maintain order. Yet the breach between creoles and Spaniards in Peru was widening by century's end, making mere whiteness a false indication of fidelity.

At the turn of the century, the Bourbon military reforms in New Spain and Peru bore both great similarities and distinct differences. While the Army of Peru was approximately twice as large

as that of New Spain, its veteran component was considerably smaller, reflecting the fact that the crown still considered Peru to be geographically isolated and less likely to be invaded than its Caribbean possessions, which were rapidly becoming seedbeds of revolution.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the relative weakness of the *fijo* component in Peru was an indication that the military as a career had not captured the creoles' fancy as it had in New Spain, perhaps due to the fact that the creoles in Peru, due to their loyalty to the crown, were not excluded from positions of responsibility within the civil administration as they were in certain other viceroyalties.<sup>2</sup>

The differences to be found in the military reform of the Armies of New Spain and Peru seems to lie, however, less in their actual configurations than in the results which arose out of the reforms themselves. Historian L. N. McAlister, for example, has concluded that the Army of New Spain successfully utilized its *fueros* and military privileges which accompanied the reform to undermine the authority and prestige of the king's representatives, becoming "a military class exempt from civil responsibility and liability." He feels that this "autonomous and irresponsible" army helped to destroy the Spanish government there, especially after the abdication of the Spanish crown to the forces of Napoleon in 1808. McAlister offers this as one explanation for the development of a praetorian tradition in republican Mexico.<sup>3</sup> This chapter will attempt to determine if the army in Peru had a similar impact upon civil institutions and to what extent it was successful in

becoming an interest group similar to that which developed in New Spain.

The grant of *fueros* or privileges was an expression of the Spanish concept of liberty which had its roots in the Roman city-state. These privileges were specific and limited, and were granted to cities, guilds, institutions, and corporations rather than to individuals. These grants reflected a social structure of well-defined classes and corporate bodies with separate and distinct functions. Individuals derived their rights from membership in one of these bodies rather than from any privileges accruing to royal vassals as a whole. Such a system was reproduced in the Spanish American colonies as well.<sup>4</sup>

*Fueros* and other privileges (*preeminencias*) were granted to the army in an effort to secure its loyalty and to enhance the prestige and attractiveness of military service. Among these *preeminencias* were the freedom of payment of certain municipal taxes, such as the *media anata*, or half of the first year's salary, from the duty of quartering soldiers in their homes, from the payment of carcelage or jail cell fees, and from the payment of tribute in certain instances. The judicial corollary of this was the prized *fuero de guerra*, which freed the soldier from the jurisdiction of the royal, or ordinary system of courts and allowed him to be judged instead by his military superiors. In certain instances the soldier was also permitted to exercise his *fuero* in the capacity of a plaintiff to prosecute civil defendants.<sup>5</sup>

The military composed one of an estimated total of thirty-four privileged jurisdictions in Spain, and was governed by a legal code which dated from the sixteenth century.<sup>6</sup> By the eighteenth century the corpus of laws governing the military jurisdiction was large and exceedingly complex and covered troops not only in Spain but in the outposts of empire as well. Veteran troops in Peru, for example, were governed by the Ordenanzas de S.M. para el régimen, disciplina, subordinación, y servicio de sus ejércitos of 1768, which specified that the officers and men of the regular army, as well as their wives, dependents, and servants, enjoyed the military jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. Although the ordinance did not so specify, this applied only in a passive sense, that is, in a case where one of the above were defendants.<sup>7</sup>

The militia was covered by the 1734 Ordenanza de milicias provinciales de España, which was later modified by the 1767 Real declaración sobre puntos esenciales de la Ordenanza de milicias provinciales de España. The latter ordinance stated that officers in the provincial, or disciplined militia regiments and their wives were to enjoy this fuero in both civil and criminal cases even if their unit was not currently serving on active duty. Enlisted men were to be granted the fuero in criminal cases, but obtained the right to exercise it in civil cases only when on active duty.<sup>8</sup>

The privileges of the urban militia were somewhat less extensive. As a general rule urban units were only granted the



use of the *fuero militar* when serving on active duty, but the fact that a firm designation of urban and provincial militia was not achieved until 1791 in Peru confused the issue there. In 1786 the crown denied the urban militia of America the use of the *fuero militar* altogether.

In the interest of public policy certain cases were regarded as desafuero and excluded from the military jurisdiction. These included, among others, the disposition of entailed estates, actions in mercantile law, offenses committed prior to entry into the military, the division of estates, and fraud against the royal treasury.<sup>9</sup> The boundaries between these jurisdictions were not always clear, however, and competencias, or conflicts of jurisdiction frequently flared up as a result.

Cases involving members of the regular and *fijo* components were usually tried before the auditor of war, a legal aide of the captain general, with appeals going to the Consejo Supremo de Guerra in Spain.<sup>10</sup> Cases involving the provincial militia were generally heard by the regimental commanders or the subinspectors general, with appellate jurisdiction being exercised by the auditor of war in Lima. In practice, however, the auditor of war frequently sat as a court of first instance and hear the cases of the militia located in the Lima area. This was a significant departure from the system followed in New Spain.<sup>11</sup>

The Spanish imperial administration attempted to solve the problem of these jurisdictional conflicts by setting up a procedural mechanism to be followed after a member of one jurisdiction

had been taken into custody by the authorities of another. For example, if a soldier was apprehended by an officer of the ordinary or other jurisdiction, he was to declare his possession of the *fuero militar*. If the authority considered that probable cause existed, but that the defendant's *fuero* was controlling, he was bound to deliver him to the rightful authorities within a reasonable amount of time.<sup>12</sup> If, however, the official considered the *fuero* of the defendant to be invalid or inapplicable to the case, he was obligated to notify the defendant's commanding officer in order that the latter might lodge an appeal for a change of jurisdiction. The defendant was to respect and cooperate with the civil authorities until these procedural issues were settled.<sup>13</sup>

Such assumptions disregarded the realities of the New World, where laws were made only to serve the classes in power. As historian Stanley J. Stein has observed "to the elite, law became a norm honored in the breach. To the unprivileged, law was arbitrary and alien, therefore without moral force."<sup>14</sup> The *fuero militar* was considered an affront by the civil authorities for several reasons. In the first place, exclusion of the militia from the ordinary jurisdiction meant that local officials were deprived of the fines and fees which they collected from defendants and which they used to support themselves. Moreover, by reducing the size of the group within his control, a civil magistrate was similarly reduced in prestige, which was one of the attractions of holding public office. As a result, a

sensitivity over points of honor developed between civil and military officials. The military were especially jealous on the subject of honor which they equated with the preservation of discipline and morale. For these reasons cases frequently hinged on factors other than a valid point of law, which meant that decisions could be and often were based on subjective grounds.

As early as 1740 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa had observed these realities, and stated that men were enlisting in the militia less out of devotion for the king than to escape the persecution of the local justices or to avoid debts owing before other tribunals.<sup>15</sup> Viceroy Amat said later that "the militiamen view this prerogative as one of the most efficacious means of freeing themselves from the molestations of the Tribunals . . ."<sup>16</sup> Yet the civil authorities were unwilling to give up the rights which they had possessed for so long, and the military, which had been subject to this often capricious group of royal officials in the past, was equally unwilling to forefit the privileges which they had gained. As a result, tempers frequently flared on both sides. The alcalde (municipal magistrate) of Piura, Miguel Serafín del Castillo wrote the Audiencia of Lima and complained that whereas he had always arrested members of the military in cases involving homicide as a matter of right, he had been forced to stop this practice in order to avoid conflicts with the military justices, whom, he stated, "are exceedingly passionate" in the defense of their rights." He noted that they had eroded his authority in

Piura to such a degree that his prestige was reduced and he was subject to great embarrassment. He also maintained that these military judges often failed to prosecute the defendants they held.<sup>17</sup>

Class factors also entered into the numerous conflicts of jurisdiction between the civil and military jurisdictions. In Cañete, for example, Antonio Pumarada, a creole who served as administrator of the sales tax in the town of Pisco, spied a boatload of Spanish soldiers rowing inland from the frigate Primavera which was anchored offshore. Pumarada gathered a detachment of cavalry militia in Cañete and marched them to the beach where he demanded that the sailors, who had come ashore to wash their clothes, return to their ship. Such an action could only have its roots in the hatred of creoles for the Peninsulars. A subsequent investigation, headed by Colonel Ignacio Asin, the military commandant of Cañete, ruled that the ouster was without cause and secured the deposition of Pumarada.<sup>18</sup>

Because the number of veteran and fijo troops in Peru was small prior to the Seven Years War, cases involving this component of the army are few and relatively insignificant. It was the subsequent increase in the size of the militia component with its expanded system of *fueros* after 1766 which caused the increase in litigation between the civil and military jurisdictions in Peru. In 1777, Gaspar de Urquizu Ibañez, the current auditor of war and a judge of the Audiencia of Lima replied to Areche

that he "had not had a free hour," due to the "great multitude of Cases and petitions, both Civil and Criminal, as well as pleadings and wills, since with the formation of the militias just before my entrance the fuero has been greatly expanded."<sup>19</sup> In relation to the total number of cases involving a civil-military conflict of jurisdiction, Lima and the smaller coastal cities such as Arequipa, Ica, and Lambayeque predominated, due to the fact that the disciplined militia were located in these regions. The reduced scope of privileges accruing to members of the urban militia in the interior explains the relative lack of litigation in these areas.<sup>20</sup>

The fierce insistence with which the military defended their fuero presupposes that they hoped for, and even expected that they would receive preferential treatment in their own courts of law. Such had been the case in New Spain, and one might have reasonably expected the same situation to have occurred in Peru also. The fact that it did not in part is a reflection of the abortive attempts to reform the army in the latter area. In Chiloe, for example, the Cuban militia ordinance was never applied until 1793. All cases involving the militia were left to the ordinary jurisdiction by authorization of the subinspectors general who infrequently visited there, although this was contrary to the regulations. In 1793 this practice was finally called into question when a militiaman, Xavier Camacho, who had been appointed a lieutenant of justice by the governor of the island Pedro de Cañaveral, arrested one of the militia guards in the plaza mayor on an

unspecified charge and put him in the civil jail. When the news of the arrest reached the commandant of the militia Colonel Cesar Balviani, he instructed Lieutenant Joaquín Sánchez to go to the jail and inquire about the charges lodged against the defendant. Camacho, however, refused to divulge them and Sánchez returned to the colonel empty handed. Accordingly, Balviani petitioned the governor for the release of the prisoner, citing the pertinent sections of the Cuban Militia Regulation. The reply from Cañaveral stated only that the defendant had broken the law, but beyond this gave no information.

The case was then referred to Inspector General Gabriel de Avilés on appeal. In his opinion Avilés admitted the governor's right to name a lieutenant of justice in areas where no provincial judge existed, but disregarded the claim of Cañaveral that civil officials had the right to arrest militiamen. He asserted that the arrest itself was permissible as long as the defendant's commanding officer was promptly informed. Avilés distinguished the case at hand from previous rulings on the issue. He cited one of September 16, 1785, in which Viceroy Croix had ruled that a subdelegate could hear a civil case brought against a militia, and a later royal order of September 14, 1791, in which it was ruled that if a subdelegate himself was unable to hear the case, it should revert to the senior military officer in the parish in which the incident occurred. Neither of these applied, Avilés maintained, since the case occurred in San Carlos where the

governor himself was resident, so it could not be delegated to a subordinate. Moreover, Avilés held, a recent case adjudicated in Lima had established that officers and sergeants major enjoyed the active fuero militar and that enlisted men in disciplined companies enjoyed the passive fuero. Since the defendant's unit was in a disciplined category, the governor did not have jurisdiction over the case and therefore could not assign it to Camacho, since "one cannot give away what one does not possess to begin with." Avilés gave Cañaveral the option of answering the request of Colonel Balviani to show cause why the defendant should be held, or to defend his actions before the king.<sup>21</sup>

It is difficult and dangerous to speculate about the value of the fuero in the interior provinces of Peru. In an early pronouncement on the subject, Viceroy Guirior held that the judges and lawyers simply refused to enforce those provisions of the military ordinances which were repugnant to them, and asked the crown to publish an order that they be obeyed in the future.<sup>22</sup> The frequency with which the crown issued these orders subsequently is good evidence that such abuses continued throughout the period.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, there are records of civil officials bemoaning the fact that the militia took advantage of the lack of trained lawyers in the provinces to use their fueros for their own benefit.<sup>24</sup> The fact that in certain areas whole families dominated the militia also enhanced the probability of conflicts of interest occurring.<sup>25</sup>

The few cases which concern the interior militia demonstrate that the civil jurisdiction was quite capable of holding its own against the incursions of the military courts. In one case the civil authorities were able to oust Lieutenant Nicholas Moreno, an officer of the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima who had been detached to the militia Regiment of Tarma, for jailing militiamen whom he had failed to pay for their periods of service, and to replace him with the alcalde and the collector of tributes.<sup>26</sup> A more positive explanation for the ability of the civil jurisdiction to retain control of the militia in these areas was the fact that military commandants often lived in the provincial capitals or in areas far removed from military defendants and were unavailable to come to their defense. Not always were civil magistrates successful in this maneuver though.

One instance in which the military successfully retained jurisdiction over one of its members occurred in the village of Acobamba outside of Cuzco, where the subdelegate arrested a shoemaker named Pablo Muñoz on an unspecified charge. Since Muñoz was a member of the militia of Cuzco, he claimed his fuero militar and asked that he be tried by his commandant. The subdelegate denied his plea on the grounds that no company roster could be found to support his claim of militia membership. The subdelegate did, however, write a letter to the deputy militia commandant in the district, Captain Francisco Miranda and informed him of the arrest. In the letter the subdelegate held that since



the senior military officer lived far outside of Acobamba on a hacienda, it would be more proper for him, as the representative of the king in Acobamba where the offense occurred, to take the case. Miranda refused to accept this line of reasoning, however, and appealed to the auditor of war who granted him jurisdiction over the case.<sup>27</sup>

A more definite trend can be observed in the coastal provinces, where the presence of a larger disciplined militia produced a greater number of cases involving conflicts of jurisdiction. Although the militia in these coastal provinces was disciplined in the sense that it received regular training, apparently true military subordination was never achieved. The subinspector general Francisco de la Mata Linares admitted this and stated that

In Peru, it seems to me [military discipline] has never existed, and therefore there is no subordinate, there is no soldier . . . they feel that any humiliation is an offense, and that they can insult their superiors in any way at all . . . [and] flaunt subordination, which is the soul of the Profession.<sup>28</sup>

One consequence of this lack of a military ethic was to excuse men of high birth from their offenses. In Lambayeque, for example, a creole militia lieutenant Narciso Rioja hit his superior, veteran Sergeant Major José Rosales, who had tried to arrest him for missing a review. Since Rioja was a member of the local creole nobility, he was able to enlist the support of the alcalde Juan Alexo Muñoz de Pinillos. Although Pinillos was a notorious enemy of the militia, he supported Rioja against the hated Spaniard Rosales.<sup>29</sup> In addition, Rioja obtained the support of the clergy of Lambayeque, and that of his father, himself a captain in the

militia. The case was tried before the auditor of war in Lima who handed down a decision in favor of Rioja and sentenced Rosales to two months in jail as well as the payment of all court costs, prompting Inspector General Gabriel Avilés to wryly conclude that "military laws are made to serve the nobility which compose it."<sup>30</sup>

The few cases which are preserved indicate that the militia was more successful in circumventing the mercantile jurisdiction in the coastal provinces rather than in Lima where the power of the consulado or merchant's guild was strong. In the provinces, the German naturalist von Humboldt observed that the militia officers used their fuero to further their ends as businessmen.<sup>31</sup> One such example of this occurred in Piura where a man who had contracted a debt in 1785 and had successfully avoided repayment ever since, joined the militia in 1809 when he was seventy years of age in order to take advantage of the fuero militar. Although the plaintiff argued that the defendant's age precluded him from performing the functions of a militiaman, the viceroy refused to rule on this obvious bit of fraud and remanded the case to the defendant's military commander for decision. Although the outcome of the case is not known, the fact that the commandant had earlier shielded the defendant from arrest, raises the presumption that a favorable decision was granted the defendant by his ally. If this is true, it would bear out the assertion of the plaintiff in the case, who held that the military were expert in securing

the advantage of prejudice and delay in order to assure that cases concerning their members would not be decided on the basis of reason.<sup>32</sup>

In Lima the militia were less successful in circumventing the mercantile jurisdiction, represented by the powerful Tribunal del Consulado de Lima, whose membership included the most influential Spaniards in the kingdom.<sup>33</sup> In one recorded case, the authorities of this tribunal arrested Antonio Martinez, a merchant of Lima, for the nonpayment of 51,000 pesos, the value of some goods which the consulado had allegedly delivered to him. Since Martinez had been a lieutenant in the artillery militia since 1766 he claimed the arrest was illegal since he possessed the fuero militar and had the right to be tried by the military jurisdiction. The issue was heard by Isidro de Adana, the attorney for the Audiencia of Lima, who solicited briefs from both parties. In reply, Tomas Martin Luengo, the prior and consular of the consulado asserted that the case involved a business contract which was classified as *desafuero* under the provisions of the Laws of Castille. He reasoned that since practically all the militia of Lima were engaged in one form of business or another, it would be inequitable to allow them to circumvent their contractual obligations through the use of the fuero militar, which he asserted was primarily a privilege reserved for wartime. Luengo cited several cases in which the courts had held that the clerical fuero was not absolute, and reasoned that if

this was the case, the more recent military fuero could not be considered absolute either. He held that the exercise of this fuero during peacetime only created a situation in which the militia ridiculed their creditors and the mercantile jurisdiction. Since Martinez had contracted in the capacity of a businessman, Luengo held that he should be tried as one also. This line of reasoning obviously impressed the court, which held that the case properly belonged to the Tribunal del Consulado and warned the militia that legal loopholes involving military debtors were henceforth closed.<sup>34</sup>

By 1786 the relative advantage which the consulado had enjoyed over the military seemed to be disappearing. The consulado had fallen on hard times as the free trade regulations had reduced its economic strength considerably, while the militia of Lima was enjoying considerable prestige as the defenders of the kingdom during the period of frequent war in Europe. The case involved a militia lieutenant of the prestigious Battalion of Spaniards who had been arrested by the authorities of the consulado on charges stemming from the nonpayment of a debt of twenty-five pesos. That the seeds of the dispute lay deeper than this is demonstrated not only by the small sum involved, but by the fact that the lieutenant was marched through the streets of Lima in full public view and placed in the public jail. When the arrest was made known to the commandant of the battalion, he appealed to the subinspector to request that Viceroy Croix hand down a

decision on the jurisdictional issue.

Immediately Croix requested that the contending parties file briefs setting out their arguments. In reply, the officers of the consulado made no attempt to justify their actions, but instead haughtily declared that they "would do the same to a Colonel or a Sergeant Major in equal circumstances [emphasis theirs]." Such a bold assertion, Croix felt, could not be allowed to go unanswered, since if it were, it could threaten the morale and entire fabric of the army, whose support was vitally needed by the authorities in the critical period following the Indian rebellions.

In his verdict, the viceroy recognized that the outburst made against the officers of the Battalion of Spaniards made by the consulado was in fact a protest against the practice of granting commissions to men of low birth, something the nobility could not abide. To his credit, Croix did not apologize for the practice. Instead, he noted that the effect of such slurs upon their birth had been catastrophic to the officers of the Battalion of Spaniards, and by imputation to these of the Royal Regiment of Lima. He stated that as a result of the jailing of their fellow officer, these soldiers had been mortified to such a degree that they remained behind closed doors to avoid further humiliation. Therefore, to avenge this insult and thereby preserve the honor and morale of the army, Croix ordered the defendant freed immediately and threatened to levy a fine of 6,000 pesos against the consulado if it dared to abridge the rights of the militia in the future.

Such a decision ignored the legal issues of the case and demonstrated the extent to which honor and public policy formed the basis of decisions involving the *fuerro* militar. In a report to the crown, Croix admitted that, although the militia was hated and scorned by many people, it was necessary to guard their *fueros* and privileges with the utmost vigor in order to prevent mass resignations. Written during the chaotic period following the Indian rebellions, when the militia and *fijo* troops of Lima seemed to be the only source of support which the crown possessed, Croix was obviously concerned about the consequences which such resignations would produce. As he stated to the crown, if the king found himself without these troops in a situation which required them, the results would be extremely fatal for royal authority in Peru.<sup>35</sup>

Subsequent cases demonstrated the concern which the government had for the rights of the militia of Lima. In 1793 a case arose in which Juan Benaque, a Spanish soldier in the Regiment of Dragoons of Lima, who had contracted a debt with Andrés Morales, a scribe of the *cabildo* of Lima, was accosted in his store by Morales for refusal to repay the money. In the confusion which surrounded the struggle Benaque struck and seriously injured Morales. Not long thereafter, Benaque was arrested by Matias de Torre y Tagle, an *alcalde* of Lima and a member of a distinguished creole family of that city. When the news of the arrest reached Colonel Joaquín Valcárcel, the commandant of the regiment, he

petitioned Torre y Tagle to turn Benaque over to the military jurisdiction but was refused. Valcárcel then asked the Inspector General, Gabriel de Avilés, to decide on the jurisdictional issue.

In his brief Torre y Tagle asserted that the jurisdiction of the king was reduced to insignificance by the fact that practically every citizen in Lima assumed positions in the militia in order to avoid it. Although he did not say so, his choice of words implied that Benaque would escape punishment if the military assumed control of the case. He added that the jurisdictional issue should be regarded as secondary to the assault and battery on Morales. Nevertheless, Avilés chose not to rule on the merits of the case but instead ordered the defendant bound over to a military court for trial.<sup>36</sup>

The military was similarly successful in defending its fuero in cases of testamentary dispositions, often to the detriment of the legal heirs. In Lambayeque, for example, the commandant of a militiaman who died intestate claimed jurisdiction over his estate, contrary to the plea of the deceased's wife, who asserted that her husband had not been a member of the militia at the time of his death. The widow asserted that no service record of her husband could be produced, and introduced the testimony of an army surgeon that he had been totally unfit for military service for fifteen years. The auditor of war, nonetheless, awarded jurisdiction of the estate to the commandant. In her brief the widow stated that this was not the first time this officer had sought to

prejudice the rights of legal heirs in Lambayeque.<sup>37</sup>

The military also tried to retain jurisdiction over cases involving the partition of estates in separation proceedings between husband and wife. Although the king had stated in 1796 that cases where both parties claimed the fuero militar should be desafuero on the grounds that they soiled the honor of families, and set one member against another, the military fought diligently to bring them within their own jurisdiction since ecclesiastical tribunals could be counted upon to favor the female. And, in certain instances, they were successful. In 1813 Viceroy Abascal handed down a decision involving a militiaman and his wife in which he declared that the ecclesiastical court must limit itself to the issue of the separation alone, leaving the partition of the estate to the military tribunal.<sup>38</sup> Such a decision was an indication that the military could hold its own against the prestigious ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Other cases sustain the assertion that the military tribunal was gaining power equal to that of the ecclesiastical court by the end of the century. In Trujillo, for example, Cornelius Antonio Paredes, a militiaman of the Royal Corps of Artillery, rented a house from Manuel Espinosa, the collector of tithes in the town of Uzquil. In 1810 Espinosa died, apparently in debt to the church for the nonpayment of these tithes. Therefore Fernando Caballero, the lay chaplain of Trujillo, levied a tax of 3 per cent of the value of the deceased's house against Paredes, claiming



that he, as tenant, assumed the debts of Espinosa. When Paredes refused to pay, he was taken before the executive board of tithes in Trujillo. He claimed immunity from prosecution on the basis of his fuero militar and asked that the board notify his commandant, Antonio de Quevedo, in order that he might secure a change of jurisdiction.

Quevedo replied that he held jurisdiction over the case as the commandant of the Royal Corps of Artillery of which the defendant was a member, but the ecclesiastical court denied this on the basis that Paredes as the deceased's tenant was a debtor of the church and therefore within its jurisdiction. The court also ignored Quevedo's assertion that it ought to more properly proceed against Maria Ignacio Navarro, who had inherited the house from Espinosa rather than against Paredes. In March of 1812 the case went before the viceroy to decide the jurisdictional issue. The brief, written by Joseph Irigoyen, the assessor of the tribunal of artillery, complained that the church refused to recognize the tribunal as a separate and independent jurisdiction, and that it exhibited "a certain air of superiority" in its dealings with the military, regardless of the fact that the corps of artillery had been established in 1776. In its brief, the board of tithes noted that this money was part of the Royal Treasury and that payment of it could not be avoided by the defendant claiming the military fuero, since cases involving the Royal Treasury were excluded from the military jurisdiction. The

board also stated that it has contracted with various persons to collect these revenues, and that if they could not collect them directly from members of the militia it would constitute a great hardship, since scarcely anyone was not a member of these units. This argument failed to sway the viceroy, however, and on December 15 he ruled that all cases involving artillerymen were restricted to their own tribunal. He also held that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction would do well to bring their conduct into harmony with this ruling to avoid future conflicts of jurisdiction with the military.<sup>39</sup>

One of the most delicate areas involving a conflict between jurisdictions was that of marriage. The problem was always present when veteran troops from Spain arrived in Peru for there were few safeguards to prevent a married man from marrying again under false pretenses.<sup>40</sup> Royal orders held that regular officers who defaulted on a promise of marriage were to be forcibly married by the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and discharged from the service, but in fact this rule does not seem to have been applied.<sup>41</sup> Regulations regarding military marriages were actually relaxed in Peru after 1784 in the hopes that the soldiers of the Soria and Extremadura Regiments would remain in the country following their discharges.<sup>42</sup>

The most frequent source of disputes involves breach of promise and misrepresentation. Since the military life was not particularly stable, frequent liaisons between soldiers and local women were almost

impossible to restrict. Parents whose daughters had allegedly been wronged by a militiaman were generally unsuccessful in their appeals for justice before military courts which refused to treat many of these cases seriously. The fact that these liaisons were often between soldiers and women of the lower classes, or even slaves, increased the likelihood of acquittal for a military defendant, since the court was loath to require a soldier to marry a woman of low station. In cases involving a slave woman, the owner oftentimes testified on behalf of the soldier, perhaps in the hope that the child born of such a union would become his slave.<sup>43</sup> In one case of seduction involving a militiaman, the subinspector of pardos Antonio Bello fined a soldier eight pesos child support per month wryly noting that this was the minimum penalty which could be levied against "a teacher of his caliber."<sup>44</sup> Frequently a welter of conflicting testimony concerning the chastity of the female threw the court into confusion and increased the bitterness surrounding the decision. In one such case, the military judge became exasperated at a mother's pious pronouncements of her daughter's chastity, and ordered her to "remain perpetually silent" on the matter in the future since her daughter's scandalous conduct was a matter of record.<sup>45</sup>

The most divisive social issue within the coastal soldiery concerned pardo militia privileges. In these areas, where the pardos formed a large part of the population, and were considered to be shiftless and troublesome by the higher classes, a conflict

of interests occurred. On the one hand, the ability of the pardos to work in the humid coastal climate and their skill as fighting men made them invaluable to the whites as members of the local militia units. On the other, as a volatile and passionate group whose rights had always been suppressed by their white superiors, possession of the fuero was utilized as a weapon by the pardos to secure a measure of equality. Therefore white officials, both civil and military, sought to restrict their exercise of their military privileges. Subinspectors general often punished them heavily for insignificant offenses and possessed great discretionary powers to control them.<sup>46</sup>

Civil officials were strongly united in opposition to pardo military privileges, probably due to their chagrin over the exemption of this group from the payment of tribute and the loss of prestige which resulted from their inability to collect this revenue.<sup>47</sup> In Lambayeque the hostility was deeper than elsewhere. This stemmed in part from the pardos' successful refusal to pay the "military contribution" in 1779. Such hostility can be demonstrated by the fact that as late as 1791 the subdelegate of that city was seeking to charge pardo militia the fee of carcelage which they had been excused from paying by the 1767 ordinance.<sup>48</sup> A further illustration of this is to be seen in the case arising the following year in which the commandant of the regiment of pardos of Lambaycque, Lieutenant Colonel Benito Chirinos, was arrested by the alcalde of that city, Alexo Muñoz de Pinillos, for the alleged nonpayment of a debt owing to Pinillos' brother.

Chirinos lodged an appeal for a change of jurisdiction with Inspector General Gabriel de Avilés, who, in a brief filed with Viceroy Gil stated that

The more years of residence that I pass in these countries, the less I understand the authority and faculties of different employments; I observe that Subdelegates and Alcaldes possessing little more authority than the power of confusion, put militia officers in improper and demeaning prisons, and if the rightful Militia Chiefs put a pardo militiaman in the prison cell in the Barracks for desertion or other serious crime, [these subdelegates] write slanderous and personally injurious appeals. Even the Sub-Inspector General is not excused from having to apologize for his conduct.

In a legal concept the Militia are equal, whether they are to be found in the capital [Lima] or outside of it, without distinction other than that of their rank and classification; but I observe that those who have the misfortune to be residents of Lambayeque, suffer the vexation of having their rights trampled by these judges, whereas the fact that they are the noble servants of the King and the first ones to help these same judges when they require it, ought to gain for them preferential treatment.<sup>49</sup>

Although Avilés was successful in securing a change of jurisdiction for Colonel Chirinos, who was not a pardo, subsequent cases involving this race tended to confirm the problems of which the Inspector spoke.

In 1792 a case arose in Lambayeque involving the alcalde Pinillos and an officer of the pardo militia Captain Francisco Banda which illustrates the methods by which the civil jurisdiction denied pardo militiamen the privilege of their own jurisdiction. It seems that on the evening of June 8, Pinillos, accompanied by veteran Sergeant Major Juan de Carmen Cazos and Lieutenant Francisco Preciado, was making his nightly rounds of the city. Although the

subsequent events are far from clear, it seems that the party decided to enter the house of Captain Banda by force, where the defendant was allegedly found in bed with a woman by the name of Juana Vasquez. Pinillos thereupon accused Banda of living in sin with a woman not his wife and took him to the public jail. Although Banda claimed his fuero militar as an officer in a disciplined militia company, according to his testimony Pinillos paid no attention, and became furious when Banda tried to dispute his authority.

The following day Lieutenant Felix Rufz, Banda's immediate subordinate, got news of the arrest and notified Colonel Domingo Figuerola, the commandant of the regiment, who was also a regidor (magistrate) of the city. After hearing the story of the arrest, Figuerola sent a letter to Pinillos in which he prudently avoided the jurisdictional issue, but asserted that Banda had testified to Rufz that he had been asleep alone and the woman had been in an adjoining room in the house. He went on to say that Sergeant Cazos had thrown Banda into jail without ceremony and had threatened to beat him unless he kept still. He noted that this circumstantial evidence was insufficient to hold Banda prisoner, and that even if he were guilty of the offense charged, as first offender he should receive only a reprimand.

Figuerola also asserted that Pinillos was not the proper official to assume jurisdiction over the defendant, and that civil jurisdiction properly lay with the subdelegate of the district in

which the crime occurred. Figuerola stated that he had spoken with the subdelegate before the latter left Lambayeque to make a tour of the province and that he had assured him that the alcaldes would be careful not to infringe upon the rights of the militia if he would also comply with the law and restrain the troops under his command, which Figuerola held he had done. He noted that Banda had acted correctly in declaring his possession of the fuero militar but that he had been insulted for so doing, and that subsequently Lieutenant Ruíz had been denied any information about the case. The colonel therefore personally demanded that Pinillos turn the prisoner over to him in accord with the regulation.

Pinillos answered by saying that he had been elected alcalde to deal with situations such as this, and that Colonel Figuerola should not try to instruct him about these duties. He replied that if Banda had acted with moderation that he would not have been arrested in the first place, but that his violent defense of his fuero and his attempts to resist arrest made it necessary to jail him. Pinillos went on to say that no fuero was in itself absolute, since the king presumed that these privileges would be bestowed on men of high birth and good conduct. This argument implied that the fuero should not be applied in the case of pardos who were deficient on both counts. Moreover, the alcalde asserted that the fuero militar was not permitted to be used to revile the ordinary jurisdiction. He claimed that Banda had

insulted him, and in so doing, had insulted the king of whom he was the representative in Lambayeque. Pinillos also brazenly asserted that in cases in which commissions were held by "scandalous pardos," he would decide the proper limits of the ordinary jurisdiction in order that the sacred authority of the crown not be transgressed. He noted he was authorized to do this in the absence of Viceroy Gil, who was his only superior, and warned Figuerola to respect these limits in the future.

Colonel Figuerola responded by sending copies of Pinillos' letter to the subdelegate and to the viceroy, and on June 19 wrote to the inspector general to enlist his assistance in the matter. In his letter Figuerola explained that Pinillos was "powerful in money and favors in Trujillo where he is resident, because he is married to a niece of the Count of the Royal Prize," and that Banda was at a disadvantage as a result of the great influence which this official possessed. Moreover, Figuerola maintained that Pinillos had boasted that he was going to humble all of the militia officers in Lambayeque which his predecessors as alcalde had been unable to do. He went on to cite the fact that Pinillos had hit Banda with the flat of his sword, and claimed that he intended to use Banda as an example to demonstrate to the other civil officials that it was possible to prosecute members of the militia in defiance of the inspector general if it was done with dispatch. Figuerola stated that Pinillos had averted the inquiry of the subdelegate with "a million lies" and, refusing



his petition to transfer Banda to the military jail, had instead appeared before a notary with his own subordinates in the capacity of witnesses and had drawn up charges against Banda which were false. The colonel noted that Pinillos had then sworn never to free Banda or any other militia officer. He also informed the inspector that Banda was a master hatmaker and that he had no income to hire a lawyer or to support his family.

This letter was carried to Lima by a group of pardo militia officers who felt similarly threatened and who hoped to testify on behalf of their friend. In the meantime, Pinillos had done what the colonel had claimed in his letter. When the subdelegate had written from the town of Guadalupe inquiring about the details of the case, Pinillos replied that he had already drawn up an indictment against Banda which had been sent to Lima for disposition. In this way he prevented the subdelegate from claiming jurisdiction over the case or from ordering Banda freed. In addition, Pinillos had filed suit against Colonel Figuerola and Captain Joseph Clavijo at the same time on the grounds that they had interfered with the royal jurisdiction. In his brief, Pinillos testified that Colonel Figuerola appeared at the public jail on June 15 and ordered Timothy Guinea, one of the jailers, to free the prisoner, which Guinea refused to do on the grounds that he lacked the proper authority. Pinillos then alleged that Figuerola demanded the keys in order that he might free Banda himself. When Guinea again refused, the colonel reportedly tried

to bribe him with an offer of six quintales of ham in exchange for the keys, but this was prevented by the arrival of another jailer who ordered Guinea to leave the room. The alcalde also held that Captain Clavijo accompanied Figuerola and shouted to Banda not to worry, that they would return with four Negroes to get him out. The following day, Pinillos said, a servant of Figuerola returned to the jail with a message for Banda to decline any offer of freedom from the civil authorities, and later Clavijo appeared to inform him that the colonel had apprehended Pinillos for his actions and was preparing to give him a whipping.

On July 2 Avilés had heard the testimony of the pardo officers of Lambayeque who had come to Lima to plead Banda's case for a change of jurisdiction. On July 13 Avilés wrote to Viceroy Gil and urged that he intervene to stop this flagrant abuse of the military jurisdiction. In his letter he related a different version of the story than that given by Pinillos. He stated that Captain Clavijo had appeared at the jail, not to help Banda escape but rather to free two militiamen who had been jailed by Pinillos for nonpayment of a debt, and noted that they were being forced to pay a carcelage fee of twenty one reales apiece in violation of the militia ordinances. Avilés asserted that Clavijo had refused to pay the fee, and that Pinillos had drawn up a complaint against him since he feared that he and Figuerola would try to free the prisoners by force.

The issue at stake, Avilés held, was not Banda's morality or lack of it, but the rights of militia possessing the fuero militar in Lambayeque. He conceded that the militia was unpopular there, judging by the number of competencias concerning them which had passed across his desk. Avilés judged that although the number of judges who hated the pardo militia was small, their ties of blood and marriage, and connections in Lima, gave them a strength disproportionate to their size in a small town like Lambayeque. He therefore asked that Banda be freed and awarded damages for the income lost during the time he was unable to practice his trade, and that Pinillos be severely punished for his attempts to interfere with the military jurisdiction which had been granted to the members of the militia by the king himself. Unless this were done, Avilés warned that the streets of Lambayeque were not safe for any member of the militia who might be summarily jailed by the ordinary authorities on the pretext of having insulted the royal jurisdiction.

This appeal went unanswered and the following month Banda again wrote to Colonel Figuerola asking him to inform Avilés of the situation. In it he reiterated Pinillos' tremendous power, which was not restricted only to the civil sector. He observed that Pinillos also had great influence with the officers of militia, whom, in exchange for his friendship and protection, he utilized to exert pressure on other authorities who refused to do his bidding.

Whether Figuerola dispatched this note to Avilés is not known. Avilés did, however, continue to press the viceroy to

decide the Banda case. In another letter he detailed to the viceroy the way in which Pinillos was able to utilize the law to suppress the rights of the militia. He noted that Pinillos would arrest a militiaman regardless of the jurisdictional limitations, and would form a case against him which he would immediately send to Lima before the subdelegate could step in and claim the case as his own. In this way he could utilize the lengthy appeals process to keep the defendant in the public jail until a decision on the jurisdictional issue was handed down. In this fashion, Avilés asserted, Pinillos had the satisfaction of humiliating the militia regardless of the outcome of the case. He stated that Banda had no funds to hire a lawyer, and that it was feared that his oldest daughter might be forced to part with her virtue to support the other members of the family. Unless the viceroy acted, Avilés asserted, Banda would remain in jail indefinitely. He pleaded with the viceroy not to repute the militia which he had placed on such a disciplined footing, and who served him so well in time of need. Instead, he maintained, men like Pinillos, who sought to bring the two jurisdictions into conflict rather than jailing true criminals who were a threat to society, should receive the wrath of the viceroy.

On August 20 these appeals bore fruit. Through his minister, the Marqués de Salinas, Gil ruled that Captain Banda was to be freed immediately and paid 200 pesos as compensation for the three months unjust imprisonment which he suffered. No penalty was levied

against Pinillos for his actions, but the viceroy ordered that Sergeant Major Carmen Cazos be sentenced to two months in jail for his part in the affair.<sup>50</sup> Such a decision, although ultimately vindicating the rights of the militia, demonstrated how civil authorities dominated the military in areas far removed from the capital. Not only was the ordinary jurisdiction older and better entrenched, but also it was vested in men of substance and prestige such as Pinillos, who were more than a match for pardo officers, who bereft of family and finances to defend their rights, could only appeal to the authorities in Lima.

An equally interesting feature of the Banda case was the inability of Colonel Figuerola to free the defendant. Since Figuerola was a regidor of the city, it might be presumed that he could have used his influence to retain jurisdiction over his soldier. Moreover, Figuerola stopped short of his threat to free the defendant when Pinillos had refused his ultimatum. Banda hints at the reason for such a situation in his appeal when he says that Pinillos enjoyed great popularity among the militia officers in Lambayeque, who apparently curried favor with him in an effort to secure better treatment. Such a comment indicates that Figuerola could not secure support even among the other members of the officer corps in his fight to free Banda. Considering that the defendant was a pardo, this support would be even more difficult to obtain. Not only does this point up the superiority of the ordinary jurisdiction in Lambayeque, but also the conflict

of allegiance among the militia, especially in areas of heavy Negro concentration where whites struggled to keep people of color in their place, and where loyalties followed racial rather than institutional lines. The pardo social issue seems to have divided the militia in Peru internally, preventing it from acting as a unified interest group as it did in more racially homogeneous areas such as New Spain.

The Banda case was not unique in Peru. In the town of Huanta, the subdelegate Bernardino Estevanes de Cevallos was in the practice of hiring militiamen from the disciplined Regiment of Huanta to work for him in violation of the military ordinances. Witnesses held that Cevallos bore a deep hostility towards the officers of this regiment and would use these employees to harrass them at every opportunity. Should an officer seek to discipline one of these men, they would decline their fuero in order to remain under Cevallos' paternal jurisdiction. As a result, the officer corps was demoralized and constantly terrorized by Cevallos. In one instance his men entered the home of Ayudante Mayor Domingo Garcia Quintas and arrested his whole family on an unspecified charge. Quintas was severely beaten when he tried to resist arrest, his daughter's head was shaven and she was forced to suffer other indignities. The Intendant of Guamanga, Demetrio O'Higgins, the nephew of the previous viceroy, at first refused to intervene in the case until Quintas appeared in Guamanga "half dead" from the beating which he had

received. Although Quintas was to sue Cevallos for attempted murder subsequently, the outcome of the decision is not known.

In a separate incident, Cevallos and the subinspector of militia Fernando Ruíz were discovered by Adjutant Major Manuel Cardona listing mestizos in the register as Indians in order that their membership in the militia would not excuse them from the payment of tribute. This forced the individual to either produce a birth certificate or to pay the duty in violation of the military ordinances. When Cardona discovered this practice, he demanded that Cevallos cease falsifying these records, but was jailed for daring to protest. By pressing false charges against Cardona, Cevallos was able to have him removed from his position by O'Higgins. Although Cardona had the pleasure of inducting Ruíz's brother into the militia prior to losing his job, he noted that this tactic backfired because the man refused to obey orders and, due to his relative's position, was never punished. The case mentions several other incidents of Cevallos physically mistreating members of the militia.<sup>51</sup>

Faced with such an unequal situation, the militia in Peru was often forced to collaborate with the civil authorities in an effort to preserve itself. In one recorded instance in Ica, the military commandant, Colonel Antonio Uría, in league with the titled nobility, set up a Consejo Preparatorio (preparatory council), which, by rotating the elections of its officers among the group, retained control of the town. The consejo bypassed the normal

avenues of jurisdiction and assumed control over both civil and military cases occurring in the city. In 1813 the officer corps of the cavalry militia of Ica filed a suit with the auditor of war against Uría and the consejo on the grounds that he charged "horrible extorsions" in order to avert unjust sentences. Nevertheless, the authority of the consejo was upheld on the grounds that it was necessary in order to allow a military commander to retain order and discipline among his troops.<sup>52</sup> Such a case demonstrated that often the military chose to rule in conjunction with the powerful civil authorities in an effort to retain their rights which they could not sustain in opposition to them.

If the fuero militar was not a disruptive influence in the provinces where the militia remained weak and internally divided, one might expect a different result in Lima where the militia was prestigious and powerful. Nonetheless, such does not seem to be the case. In his Memoria, Viceroy Abascal mentions that the grant of the fuero to the militia had made the administration of justice "extremely laborious," but also he lauded the high standards maintained by the auditor of war in his efforts to control fraud and crime among military defendants.<sup>53</sup> It is notable that the auditor and the viceroy heard the majority of cases involving the militia of Lima, contrary to the practice in other areas where local commanders acted as a court of first instance.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, an examination of the decisions handed down by these officials indicates that abuses of the military juris-



diction, while not being absent, are sufficiently infrequent to conclude that no undue favoritism was shown the military of that region, and that consequently it did not override civil justice in an authoritarian and irresponsible manner by the end of the colonial period in Peru.

This hypothesis is supported by a most interesting document entitled Reforma del Perú, written by a Spaniard by the name of Alonso Carrio de la Vandera, whose various observations about the viceroyalty have been described as "a good testimony of the attitude that predominated among the colonial elites in the second half of the eighteenth century."<sup>55</sup> This work, written in 1782 during the turbulent Indian rebellions, proposed a new plan of government for Peru, designed to grant minimal concessions to the lower groups to preserve the viceroyalty but not to alter the social or economic situation to the extent that the favored position of these elites would be endangered. Carrio began with a discussion of the military in Peru, acknowledging that men entered the service for a variety of reasons, not all of them noble. Simply because a small minority of them were corrupt, he went on, many persons argued that members of the army were not honorable or deserving of confidence, but such was not the case. Instead, Carrio termed the militia "men of honor . . . very astute politicians, urbane and loyal servants of those persons who have confidence in their persons."

Carrio asserted that by viewing the public punishments which take place in the regiments each day, one might also conclude that the militia was filled with criminals and those who evade the law, but actually he concluded

Not one tenth part of them are to be regarded as Idlers and Artisans. The reason is that in the militia it is a grave matter not to punish any infraction of the [military] ordinance outside of a grave scandal, and because all of the soldiers are students of the law they know the penalty for each crime. Neither do the [military] judges have any compassion [for these defendants] because they would be regarded as fainthearted by the troops, and more worthy of the distaff than of the sword . . . Outside of the militia many murderous bandits are at liberty . . . The military are not absolutely exempt from these crimes, because they are men, but through subordination, control, and severe punishment, the wolf is converted into a lamb and they are restrained. Desertion, regarded innocently by the people, many times costs the soldier his life. Who intercedes on behalf of these miserable persons? No one, because they all know the judges are correct. These are the men who I want for the execution of my Plan. Men of these circumstances, who hate avarice, will be prudent. Without these prerequisites it is impossible to govern a Republic honestly.<sup>56</sup>

Such testimony bears out the assertion that the militia of Lima were both disciplined and honest due to a strong system of military justice. Carrio hoped to raise 200 fijo troops in each of forty provinces and to utilize the militia of Lima to provide them with training cadres in an effort to spread these virtues throughout the viceroyalty, but the plan was never implemented, due, among other things to expense.<sup>57</sup>

In conclusion, the exercise of the fuero militar in Lima seems to have been far less disruptive than in New Spain for the reason that a strict code of military justice, often administered by the viceroy himself, prevailed. Elsewhere throughout the viceroyalty,

militia ambitions were checked through several devices. The government in Lima fully backed the power of the intendants and supported them whenever the local military commandants challenged their authority. In one such case, the auditor of war warned a local commander that

. . . such command could never exempt him from the jurisdiction of that Government which is both political and military, and it would scarcely be proper in the provinces, especially in the interior areas of the Kingdom, that command be divided among various persons, and that the Governors Intendant not be the only Leaders who are responsible for the complete peace and security of these areas.<sup>58</sup>

Since the militia in the interior was of an urban classification, whose privileges were substantially reduced after 1786, the problem did not present itself there.

On the coast, however, where there was a substantial disciplined militia, ambition was restrained by the issue of pardo military privileges which internally divided the fledgling institution and hampered its action as an interest group. Frequently, members of the civil authority were men of considerable power and prestige, backed by years of experience. In another context, Magali Sarfatti has noted that in the more remote regions of the viceroyalty "it is reasonable to suppose that the minor Spanish officials worked in collusion with the local oligarchies in a manner similar to that described by Bourricaud in today's Peru."<sup>59</sup> As an analogy to civil-military relations in colonial Peru, the quote is apt. Confronted by a powerful civil jurisdiction far removed from the authorities in Lima, allegiances, as in the

Banda case, might reasonably follow racial rather than institutional lines, and accommodation between whites of both jurisdictions replace conflict. A combination of these factors prevented the Peruvian military from becoming a disruptive element in society during the last part of the eighteenth century.

Notes

<sup>1</sup>McAlister, Fuero Militar, pp. 98-99, sets the Army of New Spain in 1800 at 29,962 men, of which 6,150 were regulars, 11,330 were disciplined militia, and 12,482 were urban or other militia. In Peru, on the other hand, there were approximately 1,985 regular troops, 23,114 disciplined militia, and 29,299 urban militia, with a total strength of 54,398 men. (See Tables 8 and 9, supra, Chapter V).

<sup>2</sup>For a list of creoles who served the crown of Spain in positions of responsibility, see Mendiburu, VI, 439-451. Their predominance in the Audiencia of Lima caused Visitor-General Areche to undertake a special visitation of that body which uncovered their spiritual and family relationships. Through these they held enormous power in Lima and throughout Peru. See AGI:AL 1082 Report of Areche to King Charles III. Lima, February 20, 1778, pp. 1-55. These, coupled with the continuous downgrading of the army in Peru, helps account for the relative lack of enthusiasm for a military career among the creoles there.

<sup>3</sup>McAlister, "Reorganization," p. 32; McAlister, Fuero Militar, pp. 88-89.

<sup>4</sup>McAlister, Fuero Militar, p. 5. For a discussion of the social structure of New Spain, which paralleled Peru in many respects, see L. N. McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change in New Spain," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII, No. 3 (August, 1963), 349-370.

<sup>5</sup>For an excellent discussion of the background of the fuero militar, see McAlister, Fuero Militar, pp. 6-10.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 7, 66.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid. In Peru, archival research indicates that often the viceroy and auditor of war formed the court of first instance in these competencias. Since many of the disciplined militia were located in the Lima area, many of the cases arose there also. The strict decisions which this court handed down against military defendants implies that, being above the local passions which often

prejudiced cases in which local commanders presided, military justice was more severe in Lima than elsewhere.

<sup>12</sup>Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y caballería de la Isla de Cuba, Chapter II, article 24; Chapter XI, article 17. The number of times the crown was forced to legislate on this point is an indication that the procedural instructions were not always followed. See McAlister, Fuero Militar, pp. 76-77.

<sup>13</sup>Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y caballería de la Isla de Cuba, Chapter IV, article 1; Chapter XI, article 20.

<sup>14</sup>Stein, p. 81.

<sup>15</sup>Noticias secretas, p. 141.

<sup>16</sup>AGI:AL 653, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 3, 1774, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup>ANL:SG, legajo 24, cuaderno 694 Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1794.

<sup>18</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 5, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1808.

<sup>19</sup>AGI:AL 1082, Letter from Gaspar de Urquizu Ibáñez to Areche. Lima, November 13, 1777, p. 6. A search of the legajos of the Tribunal Militar in the Archivo Nacional, Lima, produced only seven significant cases involving a conflict of jurisdiction between the military and ordinary jurisdictions during the years 1752-1780. During the period 1780-1789 thirteen such cases exist, while the number increases to forty-four during the period 1790-1800. During the two decades 1800-1821, 126 litigations of this sort were adjudicated. I arbitrarily regarded as "significant" any case in which the fuero militar was an issue, and disregarded the numerous cases involving minor debts or other issues in which the jurisdictional question was not being debated.

<sup>20</sup>A sample of 190 cases examined in the Archivo Nacional, Lima, which concerned a conflict between the civil and military jurisdiction, shows forty-eight being tried in the larger interior cities, with two being of uncertain location, another forty-eight being tried in the coastal provinces such as Ica, Arequipa, or Lambayeque, and the remaining 125 being adjudicated in Lima.

<sup>21</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 2, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1793.

<sup>22</sup>AGI:AL 654, Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, October 20, 1776, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup>Reales Cédulas, Reales Ordenes, Decretos, Autos y Bandos que se Guarden en el Archivo Histórico-Ministerio de Hacienda (Lima, 1947), passim.

<sup>24</sup>AGI:E 74, "Informe de las causas de la Rebelión de Tupac Amaru de Dn. Francisco Martinez y Acosta al Virey," San Felipe, August 30, 1781, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup>AGI:AL 1493, Colonel Demetrio Egan to Gálvez, Lima, February 20, 1781, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 4, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Tarma, 1801.

<sup>27</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Acobamba, 1809.

<sup>28</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lambayeque, 1798.

<sup>29</sup>Aside from the racial issue, the townspeople disliked the training cadres sent to their provinces because they had to share the expense of maintaining these soldiers. This obligation was frequently challenged. See ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Ica, 1795. Pinillos was involved in several other cases set out in this chapter.

<sup>30</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1791.

<sup>31</sup>Humboldt, IV, 195.

<sup>32</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 5, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Piura, 1807.

<sup>33</sup>Magali Sarfatti, Spanish Bureaucratic-Patrimonialism in America (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 62, 95.

<sup>34</sup>ANL:SG, legajo 14, cuad. 318, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1770.

<sup>35</sup>AGI:AL 673, Croix to the Marqués de Sonora, Lima, March 30, 1787, pp. 1-8; Memoria de Croix, pp. 86-88.

<sup>36</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1793.

<sup>37</sup>A royal cedula of January 27, 1777, stated that "Any individual holding the fuero militar with a will or without one shall have his estate divided by the Governor of the District." The royal order of February 9, 1793, limited this right of governors to decide these cases to militiamen dying intestate only. Where a soldier left a will, they were executed by his commandant. ANL:TM, legajo 5, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lambayeque, 1808.

<sup>38</sup>BNL: Bandos Virreynales (1684-1805) "Bando del Virrey don Ambrosio O'Higgins, Marqués de Osorno, espedido en Lima el 10 de Noviembre de 1796, por el que se ordena indistintamente a los militares, que deben quedar comprendidos en la Real Pragmática de matrimonios de 23 de Marzo de 1776"; ANL:TM, legajo 7, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1813.

<sup>39</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Trujillo, 1810.

<sup>40</sup>For example, Viceroy Croix noted in his Memoria that military commandants and chaplains refused to verify the marital status of their soldiers, who frequently posed as civilians and gave false surnames when courting the local girls, and often contracted marriage under these pretenses. Memoria de Croix, p. 45.

<sup>41</sup>AGI:AL 653, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 14, 1775, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup>Memoria de Croix, p. 43.

<sup>43</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Chancay, 1811.

<sup>44</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1798.

<sup>45</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1809.

<sup>46</sup>One of the differences between this issue in Peru and New Spain stems from the fact that Peru had an estimated 82,000 Negroes living primarily on the coast in a few cities, while New Spain had only 20,000. Haring, p. 203. For an example of this discretionary power, see ANL:TM, legajo 2, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lima, 1792.

<sup>47</sup>McAlister, Fuero Militar, pp. 44-45. For a detailed analysis of the pardo militia in New Spain, see pp. 43-51.

<sup>48</sup>ANL:SG, legajo 31, cuaderno 983 Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lambayeque, 1791.



<sup>49</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 2, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lambayeque, 1792.

<sup>50</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Lambayeque, 1792.

<sup>51</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Huanta, 1810. For some interesting observations about the militia in Guamanga, see the Informe del Intendente de Guamanga. D. Demetrio O'Higgins al Ministro de Indias Dn. Miguel Cayetano Soler, in Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, pp. 297-373, in which he describes the disorganization and loss of morale which led to civil domination of the companies.

<sup>52</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 7, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Ica, 1813.

<sup>53</sup>Memoria de Abascal, pp. 114, 372.

<sup>54</sup>McAlister, Fuero Militar, pp. 9-10. McAlister states that after the Seven Years War the military magistracy began to constitute a significant part of the legal structure in New Spain. In Peru, because the role of the militia was less well developed, the viceroy retained both primary and appellate jurisdiction over both regulars and militia as had been the case during the seventeenth century. Since the viceroy was less likely to be swayed by passion or prejudice, than local commanders, this served as a check on military ambition.

<sup>55</sup>Alonso Carrio de la Vandera, Reforma del Peru, transcripción y prólogo de Pablo Macera (Lima, 1966), p. 8. The author also wrote the book El Lazarillo de ciegos caminantes in 1773, which has been translated as Concolorcorvo, El Lazarillo: A Guide for Inexperienced Travellers between Buenos Aires and Lima, 1773, translated by Walter D. Kline (Bloomington, Indiana, 1965). Concolorcorvo was the pseudonym of Carrio, who came to Peru in 1746 from Spain, and served as a corregidor and visitador de correos. Married to a wealthy woman, who gave him financial independence, Carrio offers some insight into the elite mentality in Peru during the late eighteenth century. Pablo Macera is Professor of History at San Marcos and Peru's leading scholar of this period.

<sup>56</sup>Carrio de la Vandera, pp. 29-30.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>58</sup>ANL:TM, legajo 5, Expediente de una competencia de jurisdicción, Puno, 1808. Conflicts between intendants and military

commanders were repetitive, especially in Cuzco, according to Vice-roy Croix. AGI:AL 670, Croix to the Marqués de Sonora, Lima, August 5, 1786, p. 1; Memoria de Croix, pp. 215-217. In an order disallowing an auditor of war in that city, which was a ploy of the commandant Gabriel de Avilés, to usurp the jurisdiction of the intendant, the king held that military commanders were subordinate to both the audiencia and the intendant in all except purely military matters, in which case the commander was required to confer with them. AGI:AL 1496, Royal Order to the Viceroy of Peru, El Pardo, March 5, 1787, p. 1.

<sup>59</sup> Sarfatti, p. 78. The reference is to François Bourricaud, a noted sociologist who has written extensively on the Peruvian oligarchy.

## CONCLUSION

The central conclusion reached in this study is that the reform of the Army of Peru begun during the Seven Years War was abortive and that therefore a professional military did not evolve there by the end of the eighteenth century. The purpose of the reform had been to replace the veteran garrisons located along the coast with a disciplined provincial militia in an effort to not only produce financial savings but also to extend the authority of the crown more widely throughout the viceroyalty. Yet by the end of the century the army still remained largely restricted to the littoral as it had been in the past. Moreover, it still relied primarily on presidial troops. A disciplined militia had been created on the coast, but it was relatively small in relation to the size of the viceroyalty. The Army of Peru existed as such only in Lima and a few major coastal cities.

Several factors had produced these results. The first of them was the enormous size of the viceroyalty. An earlier Viceroy of Peru, the Marqués de Montesclaros, referred to the vicerogency as "a bronze giant with feet of clay," in the sense that, while Spanish administration was theoretically supreme throughout the kingdom, in fact this authority was restricted to the larger cities and towns, and that the vast part of Peru was virtually autonomous of its jurisdiction.<sup>1</sup> The great size of Peru had a

definite effect on the success of the military reform. In the first place, it caused both the Spanish and Cuban militia regulations to be unsuitable for the viceroyalty. Since the towns and cities in Peru were widely separated, their militia were similarly dispersed and were consequently unable to operate as tactical units or to aid other provinces in time of war. The great distance also made communications difficult. Frequently royal orders or regulations were not forwarded to the provinces or the local officials chose not to enforce them. For these reasons, the size and training of the provincial militia never had a uniform basis in Peru. The size of Peru also caused provincial autonomy which was a worry to Spanish authorities in Lima. In an effort to train and discipline the provincial militia these authorities dispatched veteran training officers to the provinces, but due to their abhorrence of these areas and the authorities' inability to pay their salaries, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Moreover, the scarcity of whites in the interior limited the number of loyal men to whom the crown dared to grant commissions in the militia. Consequently, commissions in these interior regiments were granted or sold to wealthy residents of Lima, who rarely, if ever, travelled to these regions to inspect or train the soldiers under their command.

The leadership gap which this produced and the potential for violence which the interior held became evident during the period 1777-1782 which coincided with the visitation of José Antonio de Areche to Peru. Although the visitation had been executed earlier

by José de Gálvez with great success in New Spain, it failed in Peru due largely to the power struggle which developed between Areche and Viceroy Manuel de Guirior. This weakened the viceroyal administration during a critical period which would have severely tested any reform program in Peru, since it further divided the Spaniards and creoles whose cooperation was an essential prerequisite to the success of the Bourbon innovations.

This disruptive situation was aggravated by Spain's constant involvement in a series of European wars. These came at a time when the free trade regulations had decreased the volume of Peruvian commerce and the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de La Plata had removed from Peru the silver mines of Charcas which constituted the richest sources of its wealth. Each declaration of war required Peru to send heavy military subsidies to other regions within the empire, and consequently placed severe financial limitations upon future military reform itself. In order to pay the salaries of veteran training cadres for the provincial militia, as required in the Cuban Militia Regulation, Areche had attempted to tax the mixed bloods who comprised the enlisted strength of the coastal militia. Their refusal to pay this tax, and their successful resistance of efforts designed to force this payment further weakened the military reform and demonstrated the inability of the authorities in Lima to rule in the provinces. The combination of the above factors raises the hypothesis that often the Bourbon reforms worked at cross-purposes with one another, rather than as a unified whole, a factor which might serve

to explain their lack of overall success in Peru.

With the advent of the Indian rebellions in 1780, the failure of the Spanish authorities in Peru to organize and discipline an interior militia became quite evident. Not only were these militia considered by the Spanish military commanders to be useless, but also because both the officers and men in these units were mixed bloods, and frequently sympathetic with the objectives of the Indian rebels, the government began to regard them as a positive threat to internal security. As a direct result, the majority of the militia regiments in the interior were disbanded after 1784 and the defense of this region was transferred to two veteran regiments sent from Spain. Such a decision was a tacit admission that the reform of the militia in the interior had failed in its objective of providing a measure of internal security to the area.

Thereafter, the reform of the militia was restricted to the coast where the loyalty of the Negroes was more certain, and where large numbers of regular troops were stationed. Yet by the end of the century Spanish military officials felt only the militia of Lima would be able to defend the kingdom successfully in the event of a seaborne invasion. The conclusion can only be reached that, with the possible exception of Lima, no professional military ethic had developed in Peru by the end of the colonial period. Visitor General Escobedo referred to the militia as "a useless fantasy," and as late as 1803 Viceroy Gabriel de Avilés

concluded that the persons who joined the militia did so only to be able to wear the uniform and exercise the *fuero militar*, but that they had no intention of meeting the obligations of an officer which accompanied these privileges.<sup>2</sup> Why this ethic failed to develop is difficult to determine, but certainly the isolation of Peru, which served as its best defense against foreign attack, made it extremely difficult to keep the army on a wartime footing. Secondly, the fact that creoles in Peru were not excluded from holding positions of civil responsibility meant that the army was only one of several avenues of advancement open to them, a factor which might have diminished military prestige somewhat.

After 1786 the militia was reduced in size and the Spanish authorities in Peru reverted to the use of veteran troops as the basis of defense as had been the practice during the seventeenth century. This effort also failed, however, since Peninsular Spaniards either resigned or deserted from the service in order to make their fortunes in nonmilitary pursuits. By 1787 the veteran Soria and Extremadura Regiments were disbanded. In their place, the *fijo* Royal Regiment of Lima, which the government had reduced in size as an economy measure following the Indian rebellions, was tripled in size and called upon to form the basis of the Peruvian army. Viceroy Teodoro de Croix, however, hoped to limit to half the number of creoles in this regiment in order to preserve it as a Spanish unit. But the Spaniards for one reason or another refused to join and by 1800 the regiment had become a creole body.

Contrary to the situation in Chile, where Spanish soldiers were constantly deployed against the Araucanian Indians and thereby won considerable prestige, the factionalism between creoles and Spaniards in the Army of Peru did not cease and the latter never became an integral element of society.<sup>3</sup> Instead, by the end of the century the defense of Peru was largely in the hands of creoles whom the Spanish regarded as inferior soldiers and whom the crown had suspected of disloyalty during the Indian wars. In this sense the reform of the veteran component of the Army of Peru was also less than successful.

A second conclusion reached in this dissertation is that because the Army of Peru failed to achieve the power and prestige which a successful reform might have brought about, it was less able to assert its fuero at the expense of the civil jurisdiction than in other areas where the reform was more widespread. In Peru, the interior militia were first placed in an urban classification and later abolished altogether. Since the king restricted the fuero of the urban militia sharply after 1786, the opportunity for this component to utilize it was circumscribed.

In the coastal provinces, the disciplined militia also failed to become a disruptive element in society for several reasons. To begin with, the Cuban Regulation was not uniformly applied in Peru, with the result that, as on Chiloe, militiamen were not infrequently tried by civil authorities for their crimes. Secondly, in the provinces where the regulation was applied, military justice tended to favor the nobility which comprised the



officer corps, but this favoritism did not always extend down to the mixed bloods who served as junior officers and noncommissioned officers. The question of pardo militia privileges bore a special significance to the whites of Peru since the percentage of these blacks to the total population was much higher than in some other areas such as New Spain. The result was that civil authorities often tried to suppress the rights of any black militia who dared to assert the rights of his fuero.

The creoles of Peru, who comprised a large part of the officer corps, were, according to several authorities, a conservative group for the most part.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, they were not a homogeneous body, but were divided among themselves on many issues. Only their common hatred of Spaniards and castes could unite them to any degree.<sup>5</sup> In Peru, as a result of the violent eighteenth century Indian revolts, the creoles' hatred of the Spaniards was exceeded by their fear of the castes. For this reason, Spanish and creole officers frequently refused to exert great efforts to defend pardo militia whose rights had been violated by the civil jurisdiction. The fact that the civil jurisdiction in Peru was older than the military and was enforced by men of power and prestige in the community no doubt reinforced this tendency. Therefore, if a conflict of jurisdiction between the civil and military authorities arose, loyalties often followed racial rather than institutional lines, and frequently the military cooperated with civil authorities in an effort to secure fair treatment both for them-

selves and their subordinates in the future. This lack of internal unity prevented the military in Peru from acting as a powerful corporate interest group.

In Lima the situation was somewhat different. There military ambition seems to have been checked by a strict code of military justice which was often administered by the viceroy himself. Also, because the militia were generally not considered to be the defenders of the kingdom, courts were therefore less willing to forgive their crimes and to grant them special privileges.

The significance of the conclusions reached above is two-fold. First, the fact that several of the Bourbon reforms in Peru, including the visitation, the mining measures, and the military reform all failed to produce the results which they had achieved in New Spain, indicated that the effect of these measures was not uniform throughout the empire. Historian Carlos Daniel Valcárcel has stated that an understanding of Bourbon Peru is a point of departure for an understanding of the problems of contemporary Peru.<sup>6</sup> If this is so, a detailed study of the Bourbon Reforms and their effect upon that area would seem to be a highly desirable undertaking. Unless this is done, the erroneous assumption that their effect was the same on all regions tends to be honored in the breach.

Secondly, the failure to achieve a true military reform in Peru may help to explain the absence of a praetorian tradition there at the end of the colonial period. The fact that the

reform did not extend uniformly throughout the viceroyalty, and that racial friction plagued it, meant that the military could not function effectively as a corporate interest group. Since it could not, it did not disrupt traditional institutions in Peru as it did in New Spain. Historian Carlos Pereyra feels that these traditional institutions were preserved longer in Peru than elsewhere in Spanish America, and that they counteracted and effectively suppressed tendencies towards rebellion.<sup>7</sup>

With the disappearance of the authority and prestige of the Spanish crown after 1808 the restraints imposed by the civil authority upon the military slowly began to erode. But as R. A. Humphreys asserts, it was the wars of independence that fastened militarism on many of the new republics.<sup>8</sup> During and after this chaotic period, the soldier in Peru, as elsewhere, began to consider himself to be the indispensable man. Moreover, the militia and clergy were the only two organized classes to emerge in Peru during the postwar period.<sup>9</sup> If the roots of a praetorian tradition in Peru are to be found, it is during this time that one must begin the search.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup>Memoria de Abascal, p. lxi.
- <sup>2</sup>Konetzke, Süd und Mittel-Amerika, I, 163.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 160.
- <sup>4</sup>Donald Marquand Dozer, Latin America: an Interpretive History (New York, 1962), p. 203; Pike, pp. 42-44; Stein, pp. 110-111.
- <sup>5</sup>Sarfatti, pp. 62, 92.
- <sup>6</sup>Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, "Peru borbónico y emancipación," Revista de Historia de América, L (December, 1960), 433.
- <sup>7</sup>Carlos Pereyra, Historia de America Española (Madrid, 1925), VII, 330.
- <sup>8</sup>Humphreys, p. 222.
- <sup>9</sup>Jorge Basadre, "Bosquejo sobre la clase militar en los primeros años de la República," Mercurio Peruano, No. 117 (Lima, March, 1928), pp. 181-183.

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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Leon George Campbell, Jr. was born May 8, 1938, in Los Angeles, California, the son of Dr. and Mrs. Leon Campbell of Pasadena. He graduated from the Woodberry Forest School in Woodberry Forest, Virginia, before entering Stanford University where he was a member of Zeta Psi fraternity and on the varsity track team, graduating in 1960 with a Bachelor of Arts in History. He subsequently served in the United States Army at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, before enrolling in the Graduate School of Stanford University where he earned a Master of Arts in Hispanic-American Studies in 1965. In September of that year he entered the University of Florida where he has remained enrolled until the present time. His studies were supported by several departmental assistantships and a research associateship in the Center for Latin American Studies. In 1968 he was awarded a Fulbright-Hays Research Fellowship to Peru and Spain for work in Peruvian colonial history. Mr. Campbell is married to the former Abigail Blake Adams of Piedmont, California. They are the parents of George Blake, Sallie Adams, and Margarita Campbell. He is currently Assistant Professor of History at the University of California, Riverside.

June, 1970

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